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PREFACE
It la the purpose of this thesis to present a sound
exposition of Locke's theological opinions. The rationalism
of Locke has been generally regarded by orthodox theologians
as having exerted a disintegrating Influence in theology.
His name has usually been associated with the Delstic
movement. But side by side with the rationalism in Locke's
theology there is evidence of sincere belief in its super¬
natural elements. With this in mind Mc O-lffert has character¬
ized Locke as a "rational supernaturallst." Soon after
Locke's death, however, the supernatural element in his
theology was shown to have an untenable foundation and
his position in this respect was undermined. As a result
this side of his theology has been neglected. It Is our
purpose to show the relationship of these two aspects of
Locke's thought, the content of each, and the substance of
his teaching on the Church and toleration.
And now I have a personal word. I wish here to
acknowledge my debt to my two teachers who have been my
advisors in this study. I wish to thank Professor John
o-f
Bailie, who believed that Locke had a theology worth^two
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years of study. I now concur In his opinion. His guidance
and criticism has heen helpful. The friendship and
encouragement of Professor G-.T. Thompson have made the way
easier. Also I wish to thank Dr. A. Mitchell Hunter for
reading Chapter Four and giving valuable suggestions; and
to R.G. Smith who has read the entire manuscript and
assisted in matters of form, I am very grateful. Finally
I cannot sufficiently thank my wife whose inspiration and








INTRODUCTORY: HISTORICAL AND .BIOGRAPHICAL
CHAPTER TWO 47




'THE CONTENT OF NATURAL RELIGION
CHAPTER FIVE 149.
THE CONTENT OF REVEALED RELIGION
CHAPTER SIX. 191.




BACKGROUND : HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL
In 1453 a Turkish army unwittingly influenced the course
of Western thought "by its capture of Constantinople. The
flight of the Greek scholars to Italy at this time marks
the beginning of an epoch known as the Renaissance, when
the rich humanity reflected in the literature of ancient
Greece became known to the western world. The treasures
which the scholars brought were readily welcomed. For a long
time, slowly but surely, the soil had been prepared for
what they brought. The preceding age was not one of confusion,
as has often been thought, but one of a tightly organized
ecclesiastical totalitarianism which controlled not only the
keys to heaven, but,.the tools of learning and secular power
in this world. As early as the time of the Crusades, the
re-discovery of Aristotle had stimulated the minds of men,
and had threatened to compromise the teachings of the Church,
when Albertus Magnus and his illustrious pupil, Thomas
Aquinas, were able to formulate a system whereby Christian
doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy were harmonized. For a
time the church was thus able to maintain its grip over all
areas of life, but such a condition could not last. The
growing commercialism and rivalry between the city states of
Italy produced a new set of values which were measured in
terms of human personality. At the beginning of the fourteen¬
th century, Dante drew material for his great masterpiece
from classical as well as Biblical sources, and a generation
later Petrarch and Boccaccio indicated in their writings a
frank interest in the literature of the past.
Those who had been stifled by the humid atmosphere of
medieval theological thought were eager to breathe the fresh
air which the re-discovery of classical learning brought to
them. By way of reaotion, the new civilization - for it was
not less than that - was a return to paganism and antiquity.
The appreciation of beauty, literature and the zest for
living in a temporal world with its own intrinsic sensuous
enjoyment, was in complete antipathy to the asceticism and
other-worldliness of the church controlled era.
^ Unfortunate
accompaniments of this movement was a frank hedonism in
contrast to the restraints hitherto imposed by the church.
But the Renaissance was more than a reawakened interest in
antiquity; it had in it something of a character of its own,
occasioned by the expansion of man's horizons. White-winged
ships sailed away to find a passage to the Indies and dis¬
covered a new continent. The invention of gunpowder, print¬
ing, the compass and telescope broadened life greatly at
many pbints. There arose scientists of the first magnitude.
It was the time of Galileo, Kepler and Copernicus. The
latter's discovery enabled man to see himself as a citizen
of the universe and thereby cut from under the church her
earth-centred theological and scientific views. As a result
of this widening of human horizons, men began to think about
themselves as human personalities, each one of whom could
achieve values for himself in this world. A secular concep¬
tion of life had forced a wedge into men's thinking, but
though the general influence of the church began to wane,
little direct conflict was at first apparent.
While the awakening came first to Italy, it quickly
spread to Germany, France and England. In Germany the mystic¬
ism of Eckhart and Tauler had deepened the quality of the
religious life. Realising the futility of rationalistic
discussion in religion and resenting the intrusion of the
Roman helirarchy, these men sought direct communion with the
spirit of God. 'The climax of this quickening of the religious
life came with the Reformation under Luther. It was in
principle a revolt against authority. There were several
contributing factors. On the negative side there was the
reaction against the abuses of the ecclesiastical organiza¬
tion and the revolt of the northern peoples against the dom¬
ination of Latin Christianity. On the positive side, the
Renaissance had brought with it an increased understanding
of the original Bible, which,: with its emphasis upon mystic¬
ism, produced a great evangelical revival among the more
profound and religious people north of the Alps.
As Locke's contribution to theological thought came at a
time when the spheres of reason and revelation were being
allocated, it is well that we should briefly consider the
position of the reformers in this respect.
Luther tended to narrow down the sphere of natural
theology, and he rejected Aristotle ald&gether. He accepted
the doctrine of "double truth", a medieval distinction made
concerning reason and revelation. He distrusted reason. For
? ' -■'
( him it was the "trumpet of the devil" because it was corrupt¬
ed with the rest of our nature at the time of the Fall.
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Assurance of the revelation of the gospel was gained hy
faith, the essence of which was an'unconditional personal
trust in Christ. Anything which preaches Christ was his
criterion of divine revelation.
Melanchthon, the classical scholar of the reformation,
was a lover of Greek philosophy and a far greater humanist
than Luther. He made a kind of amalgamation of the best in
Luther with the best in humanism. He maintained that natural
theology was essential and had its place as an important
preliminary in the understanding of religious truth, though
revelation gave by far the more complete knowledge of God.
Zwingli'3 position is midway between that of Luther and
Melanchthon. He rejected the view that the essential nature
of God could be known^natural theology, but he believed that
the light of nature gives an elementary religious knowledge.
He was the first writer to make a distinction between general
and specific revelation, and he maintained that the Bible
was a revelation of God. His friendly attitude towards phil¬
osophy anticipated the modern spirit and it was his view of
the relationship between natural and revealed religion which
was adopted by Calvin.
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Both the Renaissance and. the Reformation were medieval
in character, "but in them were the seeds of modern thought
which were destined to develop towards the end of the first
half of the sixteenth century. Implicit in the revolt against
authority, which characterized "both wings of this same funda¬
mental movement, there was a deep-seated conviction that man
had the right to free inquiry. This was, however, a compara¬
tively new conception and footsteps moved falteringly in
untrod fields of endeavor. Perhaps it was inevitable that
side by side there should exist science and sorcery, credulity
and scepticism, the claims of reason and of revelation. Here
was a confusion which barren Scholasticism, magic and theos-
ophy could not meet, and unless a new way of looking at the
world could be found no progress could be made.
One of the first to attempt to formulate a new method
to mark out the fields of knowledge was an English lawyer
and statesman, Francis Bacon. It is significant that from
this point forward we see philosophy passing out of the
hands of the ecclesiastics - all the medieval philosophers
were connected with the Church - and into the keeping of
those primarily concerned with secular pursuits. Between
1560 and 1600 there was born a series of able thinkers, who
were to do their creative work "between 1600 and 1650. With
Bacon, we find Hohhes, Lord Herbert of Cherbury and Descartes
in this period. 411 of these men were at one in their concern
that reason should be allowed to go its way untrammeled by
authority and prejudice. But the approach which was adopted
took two different lines. The English, on the one hand,
following Bacon, came to the problem seeking to draw conclu¬
sions from empirical data. The character of the thinking done
on the continent took ( following Descartes) a mathematical
and metaphysical turn. This distinction will be seen to have
its utmost importance when we seek to trace the tendency
manifest in the theology of John Locke.
Bacon began by admitting the breakdown of philosophy.
He found that great strides were being made in physical
science but that there was no adequate method for dealing
with its results and relating them to the great ends of
human life. This was caused by what Bacon called the "dis¬
tempers of learning"^ wherein words took the place of substant¬
ial thought, truth was deduced from d priori notions, and
credence was given uncritically to all kinds of fantastic
propositions. It was better, he said, to begin without any
presuppositions whatsoever, to examine the particular facts,
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and after considering the pros and cons, and deciding which
are true, to derive one's conclusions in the form of general
propositions. There was a danger, he pointed out, that too
great specialization might "bring ahout error, for true know¬
ledge he held to be univeral. These were the rules laid
down hy Bacon concerning empirical induction as the general
method of science and constitute his great legacy to the
modern world.
Since Locke was greatly influenced by Bacon it is well
that we should outline the chief points of Bacon's theolog¬
ical opinions. It is not easy to say just how sincere he was
in his references to religion, for there is indication that
his views were coloured to suit those in power. As we have
seen, his formulation of the scientific method was practical
and secular, without reference to metaphysics or theology.
But questions concerning God and the ultimate destiny of man
cannot be treated within the limits of the method of science.
Such are not within the range of reason, but are matters of
faith and theology. Reason and revelation have distinct
spheres. Thus:
The knowledge of man is as the waters, some
descending from above, and some springing from
- 9 -
■beneath; the one informed by the light of
nature, the other inspired by divine revel¬
ation.
All that reason can do for revelation is to refute atheism,
but anything positive is outside its sphere. But just as
reason has nothing to say within the province of revelation,
so too, Bacon maintains, theology must stay within its field
and not meddle with matters which do not concern it. The
Word of God has no right to be used as the basis of natural
theology. Here Bacon's purpose seems to appear most clearly.
He was not so much concerned to build a firm foundation for
theology as anxious to free reason from the hand of religious
authority and allow it complete freedom in its own sphere.
Thomas Hobbes also attempted to formulate a method whereby
natural science could become the basis of philosophy. Unlike
Bacon, he utilized the method of induction, taking as his
starting point the idea that all things which happen result
from motion. Like Bacon, however, he was anxious to free
scientific investigation from the restrictions imposed pri¬
marily by the Schoolmeni«He derived his method from geometry,
and sought to apply it, not only to phenomena of the material
1. Bacon, AOL, Vol. 6, 207.
- 10 -
world, but to mental and social facts as well, with the
result that he emerged with a mechanical and materialistic
world view. He rediced consciousness to motion and identi¬
fied it with the changes in the nervous system. All knowledge,
he said, rests upon sensation. This includes our moral and
religious ideas. Man's emotions are physical, and fear has
led man, originally a non-social "being, to form into groups.
Fear also lies at the "basis of religion, he maintained, and
has led men to "both truth and falsehood. Really, however,
there is no essential difference "between true and false
religion, and religion's criterion is "based upon the judg¬
ment of the community, resulting in the practical identifi¬
cation of church and state. It is not the truth of religion
that matters, "but its political suitability, and while Hobbes
was willing to recognize that might believed inwardly as
they pleased, outward conformity was essential to the state,
since no state could flourish with divergent religious
opinions. The trend of Hobbes' philosophy thus becomes
apparent. While, like Bacon, he wished to have reason untram¬
meled by eccesiastical authority, he did so for another
purpose. He wished to make the state the ultimate object of
loyalty.
Lord Herbert of Gherbury is another of the Englishmen
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whose thought exercised great .influence in the first half
of the seventeenth century. He does not, however, follow
Bacon or Hobbes in the empirical approach to knowledge. The
highest kind of truth, he said, was truth of the intellect.
Such truth was derived from certain common notions, and on
these religion and morality are based. It appeared to him
that there must be some axioms in knowledge from which we
can derive a foundation upon which to reason, for otherwise
discursive reasoning led to an infinite regress. As a result
he formulated those common notions from which the rest of
knowledge could be deduced. The criterion of these axioms
was that they were universally acknowledge^ and he found that
there were five in number which were common to all mankind.
They are as follows:
(a) Some Supreme Being exists.
(b) This Supreme Being ought to be worshipped.
(c) Virtue joined with piety is the chief part
of the. cult of the divine.
(d) Faults are to be expiated by repentance.
(e) Rewards and punishments are to be expected
hereafter.
Revelation is found in these common notions themselves, and
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may be found (1) in our hearts and (2) in nature. He reject¬
ed the idea that there was any external authority in religion.
He further disclaimed public revelation and maintained that
"formed" religions were but corruptions of the prime, original
religion which lies in mankind's immediate apprehension of
God. Pagan cults were the result of priestcraft and the
success of early Christianity was its direct appeal to the
heart. The difficulty with contemporary Christianity lay,
he believed, in the fact that the simple religion of Jesus
had been obscured by priestly accretions. The only true
religion, he held, was natural religion which was revealed
immediately in the heart of man. He thus overcame the conflict
between reason and revelation by amalgamating them, but it
is important to remember that when he uses the term reason,
he is always thinking of the intuitive as opposed to the
discursive reason. It was his emphasis upon natural religion
that later won for him the name of the "father of Deism."
While in England the general mode of thinking in phil¬
osophy was following the line laid down by.Bacon, Descartes
on the continent had formulated a different method of
approach. He too was anxious to assert the independent power
of reason but he pursued a less empirical and more
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mathematical method. It was with Descartes that modern phil¬
osophy is generally regared to have begun. He emphasized,
besides the importance of the mathematical method, the
modern principle of individuality, and the complete severance
of the spheres of thought and extension. He was educated in
a Jesuit school, and after completing his course, he found
himself with many doubts as to whether any real knowledge
existed in the world. He then became a master of mathematics
with the view to using its method in approaching the funda¬
mental problems of philosophy.
Descartes believed that if he could really attain "clear
and distinct" ideas which could be absolutely certain, and
from these could deduce other truths, he could by the mathe¬
matical method build up a comprehensive,system which would
explain to him the meaning of the universe. In order to do
this he began by doubting everything, but came to the conclu¬
sion that in the very act of doubting he asserted his own
existence. His first principle thus became "Cogito, ergo
sum." From it he derived the knowledge of the existence of
God by employing the idea of causation, an unchallenged
axiom of the thinking of his time. Of all the ideas which
one could find in one's mind, Descartes believed that there
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was but one which the mind could fail to produce by its own
power. This was the idea of G-od - infinite, eternal, immutable,
independent, omniscient, omnipotent, the Creator of all things.
It was unthinkable that the idea of such a perfect being
should arise within the finite mind of man. The idea of G-od,
Descartes believed, was implanted at birth in the mind of
every individual, as an indication of the divine workmanship
in each person. Furthermore, the idea of the external world
is placed in our minds by G-od, who would not deceive man by
compromising His integrity. Hence G-od must be perfect, with
the result that the reality of matter must be admitted when
the idea of it is clearly apprehended. Descartes was an
intensely religious man, and this feature of his character
has often been overlooked by those who would emphasize the
wide powers he gave to human reason. He never questioned the
validity of revelation, and was willing to trust its truth in
areas where reason had no basis for proof. But the Church was
quick to perceive that his work would undermine the orthodox
position and his works were condemned as heretical.
Having briefly surveyed the attitude to reason and revel¬
ation of the thinkers preceding Locke, we now turn to those
specifically English influences In the religious and political
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sphere which formed the background of Locke's writings on
the church and toleration. One must not forget that the
thinkers in the last half of the seventeenth century placed
scant value upon the intellectual heritage of the past. None
the less, they were debtors in a far greater measure than
they knew, and the factors which sharpened the issues with
which they had to deal find their roots in the English
Reformation.
The reformation under Henry VIII was born not so much
of religious conviction as of ecclesiastical politics, and
of an English national consciousness which resented any
encroachment by the Pope over what was believed to be
England's own affairs. It would, of course, be unfair to
overlook that small nucleus who had been convinced supporters
of the Protestant cause, many of whom were exiled abroad
under the Marian persecution. With the accession of Elizabeth
the exiles who were forced to leave England during the reign
of Mary returned, many of them great strengthened in their
Proestant views. Their zeal for a church based on the
scriptural pattern, in the interests of its purity, earned
for them the derisive name of "Puritans." Elizabeth, who
was primarily a politician in her approach to theological
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controversy, wanted peace and quiet, and she sought to take
the course of action which would settle the differences of
helief and weld the nation together into a unity. Yet all
through her reign the Puritan movement grew. The Bible became
the pattern in speech and living of this group of religious
zealots. For the most part the movement remained within the
established church, but there were those who in haste and
impatience became Dissenters. Meanwhile the more orthodox
in the church were consolidating their own position, educat¬
ing their priests, and becoming increasingly hbstile to the
Puritans. The climax came with the Oivil War, followed by
the Commonwealth when the Puritans under the leadership of
Cromwell had control of the government. During the time
when the Puritans were politically in the ascendant, a wide
degree of toleration was allowed. With the Restoration and
the decline of the Puritan cause, toleration became a great
issue, not only because men realized its political expediency,
but also because they had become tired of religious conflict,
and the realization had begun to work in their minds that
if there could be sufficient use of reason in religion, the
prejudices which caused the conflicts could be removed. It
was within this field of thought that John Locke was to
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exercise the might of his intellectual energy and to leave
the.imprint of his thinking upon subsequent generations.
We may now summarize the period between the Renaissance
and the world in which Locke was to take his place. In this
period a whole new conception of life had arisen, its neg¬
ative phase being manifest in the revolt against authority,
and its positive phase being an emphasis upon individuality.
In the intellectual sphere this took the form of a demand
that the search for truth be unrestricted by any authority,
the chief offender in this case being the church. There
were'two interconnected lines of inquiry. One concerned the
understanding of the world of nature, the other sought to
find the meaning of the conscious and spiritual interests
of man. Reason was the tool with which this search was
pursued in either case.
The first phase then of modern thought is
scientific Rationalism - an appeal to reason
which takes its method and criterion from the
new scientific inquiry, whose remarkable
results had been a revelation of what the
mind of man could accomplish.
As we have pointed out, this nevf inquiry was approached in
two different ways. The English after Bacon were more
1. Rogers, SHOP, 253, 254.
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empirical, while the continental thinkers after Descartes
were more mathematical and builders of metaphysical systems.
This was an era in which it was thought that the "unaided
reason", given free scope, could solve all the problems of
human existence; and indeed in spite of this immature
optimism, it cannot be overlooked that in this time such
investigations had proved exceedingly fruitful. Gradually,
however, the lack of historical perspective, failure to
relate reason to the warmer aspects of human living and the
inability of reason to settle many major problems in theology
brought the extent of reason's power into question. Men
sought to answer the question as to how far reason gave
valid knowledge in religion and morality. Here Locke
entered into the inquiry and left his mark on the history
of thought.
The register of the Parish Church at Wrington in
Somerset bears the following entry among the births. "1652,
August 29 - John, the son of John Locke." Not far from the
church stands the tw-storied thatched cottage in which he
was born. His mother, Anne or Agnes Keene, appears to have
come from her home in nearby Pensford to visit her in
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"brother in Wrington, where in due course she gave "birth to
her first son.
Very little is known about Locke's childhood. That it
was spent in the locality of Pensford seems highly probable;
perhaps he paid occasional visits to nearby relatives. His
father was a country attorney, and his mother the daughter
of a substantial tradesman. Five years after the birth of her
first son, another child was born to her and was given the
name Thomas. From this time on we hear nothing more about
Locke's mother, and it is assumed that she died shortly after
the second son was born. There is no indication that Locke
had any conscious recollection of her influence upon him.
The one reference we do have is couched in general terms and
comes from Lady Masham's letter to Le Glerc. "What I remember
him to have said of his mother expressed her to be a very
pious woman and affectionate mother.
To his father Locke believed himself to be in the great¬
est debt. "From Mr. Locke, I have often heard of his father,
that he was a man of parts Mr. Locke never mentioned
him but with the greatest respect and affection. His father
used a conduct towards him when young that he often spoke
1. Fox-Bourne, Life, 1, 13
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of afterwards with great approbation. It was the being severe
to him by keeping him in much awe and at a distance when he
was a boy, but relaxing, still by degrees of that severity
as he grew to be a man, till, he being become capable of it,
he lived perfectly with him as a friend.One may surmise
that both his parents were pious, industrious, self-reliant
lovers of liberty, typical of the middle class in seventeenth
century England.
For the first few years Locke was taught by his father.
This home instruction may have been supplemented by short
periods at a grammar school in nearby Bristol when the times
were not too troublesome. When Locke was but ten years old
the Civil War broke out and his father supported Cromwell,
serving as a captain under Colonel Popham. In such turbulent
times, his formal studies must have suffered, yet Locke's
mind could not have but matured in the stress attendant on
a nation in civil war. At a later period he looked back upon
this period and made the comment:
I no sooner perceived myself in the world,
but I found myself in a storm which lasted
almost hitherto.
1. Fox-Bourne, Life, 1, 13. Cf. "Some Thoughts Concerning
Education."
2. King, LLJL, 6.
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About 1646, through the influence of Colonel Popham,
Locke was admitted to Westminster School in London. Here he
was to remain for six years. The scholastic discipline, with
its emphasis upon verbal learning, had not been relaxed under
the Purioans, and the study of Latin, Greek and grammatical
rules formed the major part of the curriculum. Later, in his
treatise on education, Locke speaks with strong feeling against
this kind of learning, which even in these early years began
to distress him. The discipline in Latin and Greek, however,
was to prove valuable to him in later years when it opened
to him the great storehouses of learning written in those
languages. During the school years many events of great
significance took place, and Locke was in London on the day
when Charles I was executed. He had several close friends at
school but none of them reached fame in later life. Among his
classmates were John Dryden and Robert South, but there is
no indication that he was intimate with them.
At Whitsuntide, 1652, Locke was elected to a Junior
Studentship at Christ Church. He matriculated there in the
following November and for the next thirty years, with
few interruptions, Oxford was to be his home. At Oxford, as
at Westminster, the emphasis upon verbal sophistry still
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clouded the search for truth. It was at this time we first
begin to see in Locke that rebellion against scholasticism
and traditional modes of learning which was to mark his life
and thinking from this point onward.
I have often heard him say that he had so
small satisfaction from his Oxford studies, -
as finding very little light brought thereby
to his understanding - that he became discon¬
tented with his manner of life, and wished his
father had designed him for anything else than
what he was there destined to.-*-
He went rarely to the disputations, and spent much of his
time in the company of witty and learned men. His restless
and eager mind chafed.,what he considered to be mere casuistry.
One of his contemporaries, Anthony Wood, later wrote of
him.
This John Locke was a man of turbulent spirit,
clamorous, and never contented. The club wrote
and took notes from the mouth of their master,
who sat at the upper end of t3§e table; but the
said Locke scorned to do it; so that while
every man of the club besides were writing, he
would be prating and troublesome.2
There is one Oxford influence which, in view of later
happenings, is of the utmost significance. When Locke came
1. Fox-Bourne, Life. 1, 47*
2. Fox-Bourne, Life. 1. 94 note 1.
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to Christ Church, its Dean was John Owen. For many years when
his own religious views were "being attacked, Owen advocated
toleration. Later when there was political backing for his
own sect, he continued to plead for a toleration of all
different beliefs within the State. With Milton and Jeremy
Taylor, he advocated toleration, not as political expediency ,
but as a religious duty.
At some time in his undergraduate career, Locke's mind
was stirred by the "new philosophy" which allowed free
inquiry into the nature of experience. The work of Descartes,
who died the year Locke left Westminster, was beginning to
be felt even at Oxford, the stronghold of tradionalism, and
while opposition to his work was manifest, yet his books
were being read and his indirect influence was being felt in
the classrooms. While it is true that Cartesianism never
deeply affected the thinking at Oxford, the works of the
newer thinkers, Descartes, Hobbes and Bacon, were rousing
leading minds throughout England. Locke was stirred when he
discovered Descartes. "The first books....which gave him a
relish for philosophical things.....were those of Descartes."1
Towards the end of his undergraduate training Locke
1. Fox-Bourne, Life. 1, 62.
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"began to "be seriously concerned a"bout Ms life work. Two
years "before the Restoration he received his master's degree,
and the next year he was elected to a Senior Studentship,
which was tenable for life. Two years later, his father died
leaving him enough property to insure him a small but secure
living. Not long after being elected to the Senior Student¬
ship he was made lecturer in Greek and in Rhetoric, and
censor of moral philosophy, offices usually assigned to those
studying for holy orders. There is some indication that
Locke, at least for a time, seriously considered entering the
priesthood of the Anglican communion. His temperament and
training indicate that he had a strong interest in religious
matters. He had moved away from the Puritan position in which
he had been nurtured, but was not attracted by the Dissenters.
His sympathies seem to have been drawn towards the Latitudin-
arians in the established Church. In this period Whichcote,
the Cambridge Platonist, was his favorite preacher. But
whatever considerations may have urged him towards the church,
including, we may conjecture, that it was that for which his
father had prepared him, he determined upon a lay career.
When in 1666 he refused an offer of preferment from the Irish
Church, he said, after giving his reasons for so doing, "the
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same considerations made me a long time reject very advant¬
ageous offers of very considerable friends in England.
Perhaps, now that his mind had been stimulated by the method
of free inquiry, he feared the impediment of church authority
if he wished to continue his intellectual pursuits. But while
he decided against a church career, he continued throughout
his life to be keenly interested in theology and religious
affairs.
In the year 1663 the Royal Society was founded at Oxford,
and gave indication of the great advances which the experi¬
mental method was making as a method of obtaining knowledge
in physical science. Locke was not left untouched by the
influence of this kind of inquiry, and four years later we
find him engaged in experiments in chemistry, meteorology
and medicine. Two years later he was engaged in a sort of
amateur medical practice, and although he never took a degree
in this profession he continued to practice in a limited way
for the rest of his life and was always known among his
familiar friends as Dr. Locke.
During the winter of 1665, Locke was appointed secretary
to Sir Walter Vane, Ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg.
1. King, LLJL, 29.
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This experience was most profitable and enjoyable to him,
but was not, as one might be led to expect, a prelude to a
diplomatic career. He served his position creditably for a
year, at the end of which time he was asked to accept the
post of secretary to the embassy in Spain. This he refused,
and returned to Oxford, but his contact with men of affairs
was one more valuable ingredient which was added to the
mixture of his interests and experiences. He had not yet
decided what was to be his vocation, and in refusing the
Spanish appointment he said that he was "pulled both ways
by divers considerations."
This aptly expressed the state of mind in
these Christ Church years - pulled different
ways by divers tastes and ready sympathies, but
as yet without deep, decided, and persistent
intellectual purpose - Descartes, amateur med¬
ical experiments, theological problems, social
problems, intercourse with men in public affairs,
each in turn.-*-
It was at this point that a chance circumstance intervened
to determine^ the next few years of his life. Lord Ashley,
later to become the first Earl of Shaftesbury, came to Oxford
to drink the Astrof medicinal waters. He had engaged a certain
Dr. Thomas to procure the waters for him, but since the
1. Fraser, Essay, 1, xxii.
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doctor was called away he ashed Locke to provide them in his
stead. Through some misadventure Locke's arrangements miscarried,
so that he called on Lord Ashley to explain the matter. He
made his apologies and was asked to stay for supper, which he
did. So charmed was Lord Ashley with this young physician
that he asked him the next day for dinner, and afterwards to
visit him in London. This was the beginning of an enduring
friendship "based upon a mutual interest in civil and religious
liberty. The next year Locke became a member of Lord Ashley's
household in the combined position of physician, advisor,
and tutor. For the next fifteen years he shared house and
fortune with this very important statesman of the reign of
Charles II. This new relationship secured for Locke both
sufficient leisure and stimulus to continue his previous
lines of intellectual inquiry, and his entry into the com¬
pany of men of affairs may have done much to save him from
the faults to which the exclusive academic life is exposed.
As time went on he became increasingly intimate with Lord
Ashley.
Mr. Locke grew so much in esteen with my grand¬
father, that, as great as great as he experienced
him in physic, he looked upon this as but his
least part. He encouraged him to turn his thoughts
another way, nor would he suffer him to practice
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physic except in his own family, and as a kind¬
ness to some particular friend. He put upon him
the study of religious and civil affairs of the
nation, with whatsoever related to the business
of a minister of state; in which he was so suc¬
cessful, that my grandfather soon began to use
him as a friend, and consult with him on all
occasions of that kind.l
One of Locke's first activities in the service of Lord
Ashley v/as to act as secretary to a company of men engaged
✓
in framing a constitution for the colony of Carolina in
North America. Of particular interest are the notes, still
extant in his own handwriting, of the provisions made for
the ensurance of religious liberty in the colony.
No man shall be permitted to be a freeman
of Carolina, or have any estate or habita¬
tion within it, that doth not acknowledge a
God, and that God is to be publicly worshipped.
No restriction is made on the manner in which a man must
worship. Further:
Religion ought to alter nothing in any man's
civil estate or right. No person shall disturb,
molest or persecute another for his speculative
opinions in religion, or his way of worship.5




Fox-3ourne, Life. 1, 198.
Fox-Bourne, Life. 1. 240 Article xcv.
Fox-Bourne, Life. 1. 242 Article cix.
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these articles, we do know that they are opinions which he
had expressed on paper before this time. The articles were
framed in his presence and we may surmise that his influence
was great; for such opinions were far in advance of the
current conception of toleration.
During his years with Shaftesbury, Locke's interest in
medicine continued to flourish under the stimulus of contact
with leading physicians of the time, notably Sydenham and
Maplestoff. Locke had come from Oxford to London during the
year of the great plague, and the physicians in London found
the newcomer well qualified to help them in combatting the
disease. Locke also continued, in London, his experiments in
natural science, in the pursuit of which he became acquaint¬
ed with Boyle, the chemist, and entered on a friendship with
him which lasted until the tatter's death; when Locke was
made his literary executor. In 1668 Locke was elected to the
newly formed Royal Society, an event which brought him into
further intercourse with those minds which were being stirred
by success in experimental investigation.
During the winter of 1670 - 71 in the company of five or
six such friends, a question arose which thoroughly interested
Locke, the answer to which was to cost him great intellectual
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labour. The discussion centred about the principles of
morality and revealed religion, and the specific problem was
the capacity of the human understanding to deal with such
matters. At the request of those assembled to set down (on
paper) his thoughts concerning the problem and to report to
the group at their next meeting, ^Ce confessed that he thought
he could do it easily upon a single sheet of paper. But as
the dimensions of the inquiry became apparent to him, his
treatment became greatly extended, and it was nearly twenty
years before he completed his final answer in the form of
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
In 1675, when Shaftesbury fell from power, Locke was
able to journey to France, as he had long wanted to do. He
went for reasons of health, as the London air had aggravated
an old asthmatic complaint. In France he had much uninterrupt¬
ed leisure to continue his inquiry concerning the human
understanding and to pursue various experimental studies
in which he was interested. In Montpelier he found a new and
congenial friend in the person of Thomas Herbert, later the
Earl of Pembroke. Their conversations pn philosophical
subjects proved to be mutually stimulating. How many of the
leading French thinkers Locke knew personally during his
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sojourn in France it is difficult to determine. During the
time of his residence there Malehranche, Arnauld, Nicole,
Leibniz., and Spinoza were all at work, and at least he must
have followed the current of their thoughts and the contro¬
versy which their writings aroused. His letters disclose
that he was associated with Bernier, a pupil of G-assendi,
Guenellon, an Amsterdam physician, Thoynard, a naturalist
and "biblical critic, Justel, a jurist and man of letters,
RBmer, the Danish astronomer, and Thuvenot, the traveller.
The variety of their activities shows the wide field of
Locke's interests.
Locke returned to London in 1679, and shortly after,
when Shaftesbury returned to power, became busily engaged in
his service. This per^iod was short-lived, since, as a result
of his intrigue in supporting the Duke of Monmouth as success¬
or to the throne, Shaftesbury had to flee from England, and
dies within a short time in Amsterdam. The shadow of this
*
r ' vle.
evefct could not but fall- upon Locke, who, it appears, had
nothing to do with it. After Shaftesbury had fallen from
power the second time, Locke had left his service and return¬
ed to his own pursuits in Oxford and Somerset. None the less,
his relationship with Shaftesbury was well known and suspicion
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was directed against him to such an extent that he felt it
expedient to leave the country. He too, went to Holland,
which at this time was the asylum for those who could find
neither religious nor political freedom in other parts of
Europe. There he remained for five years. He first went to
Amsterdam, to stay with Dr. G-uenellon, a friend of his Paris
days. In G-uenellon's home he met Phillip von Limhorch, the
Remonstrant professor in theology. Their acquaintance
quickly ripened into a friendship, which is an important
clue to many of Locke's theological ideas. They continued to
correspond on theological topics until the end of Locke's
life.
/
Unfortunately, Locke could not long remain in Amsterdam.
The political suspicion which first was responsible for his
exile continued to molest him, with the result that he
kept moving in secret from place to place. For some time
he took the name of Dr. Van der Linden. During the winter of
1684, while he was still in Holland, he was removed from his
studentship at Oxford by direct order of the king, and depriv¬
ed of a part of his income. The injustice of this cut deep
into his heart and he was nevBr quite able to forget it.
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The next winter in Holland Locke met a young member of
the faculty in the Remonstrant College, Jean Le Clerc, who
had founded the "Bibliotheque Universelle", then the most
important literary organ in Europe. To this Locke contributed
several articles, the first of his writings to be printed.
The following year he removed to Rotterdam, and lived there
with a wealthy Quaker and book-collector, Benjamin Furley.
His association with religious men in Holland forms one of
the most significant chapters in the story of his life.
Towards the end of his exile, Locke became cautiously
associated with other men whose political activities had
caused them to be exiled from England. Among them was Burnet,
later to be Bishop of Salisbury, Mordaunt, later the Earl
of Peterborough, and above all he became well known to both
William and Mary. When the revolution proved successful and
James II was deposed in favour of William, Locke escorted the
Queen and Lady Mordaunt back to England.
After his return Locke settled at Dorset Court on
Channel Row in London, near to the centre of atcivities. He
was soon offered the important post of Ambassador to the
court of Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg. His weak pjaysical
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condition made it necessary for him to refuse. One sentence
in his letter to Lord Mordaunt gives an insight into the
quality of his devotion to faith and country. He speaks of
his regret in being unable to serve the king " at a moment
when there is not a moment to be lost without endangering
„1
the Protestant and English interest throughout Europe...."
Three months later he was offered a position which he was
able to accept, a Commissionership of Appeals, which provided
an honourable position and a modest income along with no
great claims upon his time.
With the coming of William and Mary the question of
toleration was raised in Parliament under the two forms of
Comprehension and Indulgence. Locke was greatly interested and
sought to bring the weight of his influence to bear on the
side of toleration. Rather than attempting any direct method,
he sought to leaven public opinion by writing in the press.
To this end he published anonymously the Epistola de Toler¬
ant la. wi^tten in Latin and addressed to his friend Limborch.
This letter, written in 1685, was published in March 1689,
and was the first really significant work which he gave to
1. King, LLJL, 175
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the world. Its contents represented the culmination of long
and earnest thought combined with the maturity of his own
personal experience, the germs of which can he traced hack
to his undergraduate days. This work was soon translated into
English hy William Popple, a Unitarian merchant, and its
dissemination aroused a storm of controversy. To clarify some
of the issues raised in the conflict Locke published a
second letter in the following year.
Very soon after this, in February of 1690, he published,
again anonymously, Two Treatises on Government. As the
letters on toleration were born of a desire to justify the
rights of the individual in religious matters, so these
treatises sought to point ought the rights of the individual
in relation to the state. In March of the same year the
Essay Concerning Human Understanding made its first appearance.
It presented in philosophical form the fundamental proposi¬
tions which were implied in both the 3-etters and the treatises.
It was Locke's answer to that problem proposed long before,
£2«., "to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our
understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal vi/ith.""'"
The two years in London following his return from Holland
Essay, from the Epistle to the Reader.
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were, as a result of his publications, of the utmost impor¬
tance. He had carefully supervised the Essay as it went to
press, and had watched with disappointment the various acts
of Parliament making up the Revolutionary Settlement, which
fell far short of the position he had upheld in his writings.
But now again, as before, the London air and his advancing
age - he was now nearly sixty - began to take their toll on
his constitution. He was invited to try the air at Oates,
the country seat of Sir Francis Masham. This place, about
twenty miles from London, amid the leafy lanes on the edge
of the Epping forest, seemed to fulfil his every need. In
February of I69I he gathered up his belongings and moved
to Oates, and as a paying guest settled down there for the
remainder of his life. It was undoubtedly the most congenial
home he had ever had. He was free to do as he wished, and
yet as the same time was enthroned in a family circle as its
most beloved member. Thus he was greatly comforted in his
declining years. Lady Masham was the daughter of Ralph
Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist, and her able mind and
friendly understanding greatly endeared her to Locke. At
Oates he continued to use his pen vigorously on a variety
of subjects. In 1695 he published !the Reasonableness of
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Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, in which he
made the attempt to rescue the simple essence of the gospel
from what he believed to he its accretions» Later, he con¬
ducted his famous controversy with the Bishop of Worcester,
and replied no?/ and then to the more stinging of the attacks
made on him by various writers. Towards the end of his life
he interested himself in the letters of St. Paul and made a
careful written study of them. The results of this study
were published posthumously.
At Oates he welcomed his friends, among them Issac
Newton, Lord Shaftesbury, Lord and Lady Peterborough, William
Molyneaux, the new friendship with whom cheered and encouraged
him, Peter King, his cousin, afterwards Lord Chancellor, and
Anthony Collins, a young Essex squire.
In 1696 Locke was appointed on of the Commissioners of
Trade and plantations. While he journeyed to London to attend
the meetings of this commission, Oates still remained his
home, and he was always glad to return to it after being away.
In 1700 his declining strength made it necessary for him to
resign the commissionership, and thereafter he withdrew
altogether from public life. As the shadows lengthened on his
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declining strength, he led a quiet life at Oates preparing
for the end, spending much of his time in Biblical studies
and religious meditation. During this time he wrote a
Discourse of Miracles, making his contribution to a current
controversy. Attacks were still being made against his
published writings, but he was content to ignore most of
them. Now and again some gross misunderstanding caused him
to take up his pen in defence. When the Essay was officially
condemned at Oxford, he wrote to his friend Collins, "I take
what has been done there rather as a recommendation to the
-J
book.' Before he died he was to see the fourth English
edition of the Essay published.
In the summer of 1704 his health began to decline
rapidly. During the summer he continued to ride out during
the day, but as the autumn approached he spent his days
enjoying the sunhine in the garden. During this time he was
tenderly nursed by Lady Masham and on October 28th he died,
as he declared, " in perfect charity with all men, and in
sincere communion with the whole Church of Christ, by what¬
ever names Christ's followers please to call themselves."2
In physical appearance. Locke was slight in build and
1. Fraser, LOC, 265.
2. Fox-Bourne, 2, 557» Life.
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his almost constant illness made his frame look spare indeed.
The portrait by Kneller shows the face, at once sensitive and
keen, yet bearing the trace of suffering.
Of his personal characteristics, we are indebted to the
letter of Lady Masham to Le Glerc, and to Pierre Coste, who
was Locke's amanuensis in the latter years of his life, for
our information. Both greatly admired him, but there is no
reason to suppose that their reports are inaccurate. They
give a picture of a great man, not overawed by his own impor¬
tance of learning, who loved to interest himself in what
other people were doing. He was courteous and loving to those
who came within the inner circle of his friendship. He was
fond of children, who were always happy in his company. Men
and women alike found him charming. His resourceful conversa¬
tion made him a congenial companion in any situation.
Averse to all mean complaisance, his wisdom,
. his experience, his gentle and obliging manner,
gained him the respect of his inferiors, the
esteem of his equals, and the friendship and
confidence of men in the highest station.1
To those who sought his counsel, he gave it freely. To the
poor he gave intelligently. He could not bear to see anything
1. Fox-Bourne, Life. 2, 534-»
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wasted and was careful in his own personal economy. He
dressed simply and in good taste.
In all his conduct he was upright and moral. It is very •
difficult to find direct evidence for the exact quality of
his piety, hut as one gathers up all the threads of his life,
there appears to have heen great depth in his relationship
with God, which sustained strengthened and comforted him
throughout his days.
Lady Masham, who probably knew him more intimately than
any other person, gives us this statement of his character.
He wasjalways, in the greatest and in the small¬
est affairs of human life, as well as in specu¬
lative opinions, disposed to follow reason, whoso¬
ever it were that suggested it; he being ever a
faithful servant - I had almost said a slave -
to Truth; never abandoning her for anything else,
and fallowing her for her own sake, purely.1
In order to understand Locke's thought, of which his
theology forms an important part, it would be well if we
could trace the influences which affected it. This, however,
is a very difficult thing to do, for Locke has been looked
upon as a founder of a new movement in philosophy and con-
1. Fox-Bourne, Life. 2. 540.
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sequently the historical antecedents of his own thinking have
been neglected by subsequent scholarship.
We have seen Locke's early disgust for the decadent
Scholastic philosophy at Oxford. None the less, while he was
there, he went through the courses offered in Aristotelian
logic, Metaphysics, Ethics and Physics. It is significant
that while he always speaks with derision of the Schools, his
references to Aristotle are always couched in terms of the
greatest respect.
As we have seen, Locke considered that his philosophical
awakening came as a result of his reading Descartes. But he
did not consider himself in any sense a pupil of Descartes,
for "he was much more frequently conscious of differences
thah of agreement, between the results of his own thought
and the system of his predecessor."'1" It is possible that
Locke may have underestimated his dependence upon Descartes,
for while it is true that the differences are great, Gibson
states that without Descartes' idea of self-consciousness in
the background of his mind it is quite impossible that the
author of the Essay could have produood the Essay uuuld have
produced the work as we have it today.
1. Gibson, LTK, 206.
Just how much Locke was influenced by the Camrfbidge
Platonists is also hard to measure. It has been pointed out
that at one time Whichcote was his favourite preacher, and
that at a later time he lived in the household with Cudworth'
daughter. Von Hertling, who has made a special study of this
relationship, makes a shapp distinction in Locke's thought
between the empirical and rationalistic tendencies and
maintains that strong influence was exerted by the Cambridge
men on the rationalistic side of his thinking. This cleavage
is hardly warranted, and it is probable that Hertling has
over-estimated such influence. None the less, "tfifith their
outlook in theology and ecclesiastical politics he was in
■J
complete sympathy." It is our opinion that it is in the
broad field of the practical interpretation of the Christian
ethic that the influence of these men most affected Locke.
One of the great surprises in Locke's writings is the
fact that he nowhere mentions Bacon, for in the general
approach to his work Locke invariably follows the Baconian
method as contrasted with the Cartesian. Much though he owed
to Descartes for his first awakening in philosophy, Locke
can never be classed as a system buidder, and his dislike
for metaphysical considerations is too well known to need
1. Gibson, LTK, 257»
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elaboration. He was too much the critical empiricist ever
to delve into pure metaphysics. In this connection there is
a fact in Locke's personal history which must not he over¬
looked. "....It is cardinal to the understanding of Locke's
life and thought to remember that he belonged to the med¬
ical profession and that he practiced it, intermittently,
all his life."1 Later, his interest in things experimental
and scientific brought him into personal contact with those
"master builders", Sydenham, Huygenius, Boyle and Newton.
That British quality of common sense, raised by him to the
point of genius, brought him to the task which he conceived
to be that of under-labourer to these men, "clearing the
ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies
in the way to knowledge.Whether he read Bacon is not
known, but it may be surmised that he did, for the Novum
Organum is among the books mentioned in a "catalogue of my
"7.
books at Oates." One may venture the opinion that the
empirical tradition was so much a part of Locke's intellect¬
ual environment, that after his early repudiation of the
scholastic method the one which took its placeg? seemed to
him to need no comment.
1. "Times Literary Supplement" 1932, 586.
Essay, in the Epistle to the Reader.
3. Fraser,LOC, 221.
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What books Locke read dealing with the history of thought
we do not know. He was a typical example of his time in his
failure to recognize the value of history as it revealed the
continuity of movements and thought.
So little store does he set upon a knowledge
of other men's opinions, on matters concering which
reason should be the judge, that it is only on the
rarest occasions that he refers to the views of
other writers in a manner sufficiently definite
to enable them to be identified. When he would
cite a supposed matter of fact, such as the virtues
which were cultivated by the people of Peru, the
capacity of a parrot for rational conversation, or
the non-existence of the idea of God among the
Garribee Islanders, he is ready with his references,
including chapter and page. But in matters of
speculation, where appeal is made to the reader's
own intelligence, he prefers to set forth what
he conceives to be the truth, contrasting it when
necessary with opposing principles, but without
encumbering it with references and quotations.!
That he read widely we may be quite sure, for he had an
almost insatiable curiosity, which though not always as
selective as it might have been, gave him a thirst for all
kinds of reading. His library at Oates gives some indication
of this.
Among them are the works of Descartes, Nicole,
Malebranche, Gassendi, 'Logique de Port-Royaie',
'Novum Organum', Newton's'prjjbipia,' 'from the
author', with many books on voyages and travels..'
1. Gibson, LTK, 182.
2. Fraser, LOG, 221.
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Fox-Bourne reports:
All old literature and every work of note that
appeared in his lifetime, written in English,
Latin or French, whether on philosophy, science,
or theology, politics, history or travel, was
not only skimmed over "but studied by him.-1-
This may be an extravagant statement, but there appears to
be no doubt that he read extensively.
One of the best clues to Locke's thinking would be to
know the content of his conversations, for he placed high
value on the stimulus and information derived in talking
with other men. As we have seen, the Essay was the answer
to a problem which arose in such a circumstance. Locke was
fond of bringing together groups of keen-witted men, whose
opinions he respected. At Oxford, in London and in Holland
he used this method to sharpen his mind and to obtain infor¬
mation. With its obvious advantages there is one drawback to
such a method for obtaining knowledge, for much of the infor¬
mation Locke must have gleaned was second hand and hence as
innacurate as such information usually is. A further method
Locke utilized for keeping in touch with leading minds was
that of letter writing. All his life he kept up a corres-
1. Fox-Bourne, Life. 2, 538.
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pondance with men of various activities.
His general approach to problems has been considered
characteristic of the English philosophical temper.
He is the typically English philosopher in his
love for concrete exemplifications of the abstract¬
ions in which more speculative minds delight; in
his reverence for facts - facts of nature, or
facts of conscious life; in indifference to spec¬
ulation on its own account; in aversion to mystic¬
al enthusiasm; in calm reasonableness, and ready
submission to truth, even when truth could not be
reduced to system by a human understanding; and
in the honest originality which stamped the features
of his intellect and character on all that he wrote.
There was little of the poet in him and his fancy never
soared to imaginative heights. Philosophical precision is
often wanting in his style. But with all his faults, "he
was woven of good English cloth: his texture was the
hodden gray which lasts."2
1. Eraser, LOC, 274.
2. "Times Literary Supplement", 1932, 586
CHAPTER WO
LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Inasmuch as Locke's theory of knowledge underlies the
whole of his thinking, it is essential for us to trace the
chief points of its argument if we are to understand ade¬
quately his theology on its rational side.^" We have already
noted that Locke's purpose in formulating such a theory
was to define the sphere of knowledge in relation to the
principles of revealed religion and morality. The Essay
Concerning Human Understanding he considered to he his
contribution to the solution of that problem. We have seen
that throughout his life Locke was a keen student of science
and did all that he could to follow the new trends in its
wide field. Yet when he comes to the formulation of his
theory of knowledge, he makes it explicit that the kind of
knowledge he considers most important for men to have, is
that which concerns man's duty and the discovery of the
existence of God, whose divine law he believes man's duty
1. Cf. Fischer, RJL, 5« "Die Grundlage der Religionsphil-
osophie John Locke's ist seine Erkenntnis_~theorie...."
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to be. "Morality and Divinity are those parts of knowledge
that men are most concerned to he clear in."''" When he had
come to the conclusion that the limits of knowledge are
very narrow, he none the less maintained that men "have
light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker,
2
and the sight of their own duties." After completing his
survey of the limits of man's knowledge, he was still able
to say that God "has furnished men with faculties sufficient
to direct them in the way' they should take, if they will
but seriously employ them that way when their ordinary
vocations allow them leisure."5 We may rightly conclude, then,
that Locke was not only interested in the scope of theolog¬
ical knowledge, but that he also considered he had found an
answer to the problem' concerning the "principles of morality
and revealed religion"which was the first active impulse
that set him to work on the Essay.
Locke identified certainty and knowledge. "With me to
know and to be certain is the same thing: what I know, that
I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know. What
reaches to knowledge I think may be called certainty; and
1. Essay, from the Epistle to the Reader.
2. Essay, 1. 1. 5»
3. Essay, 4. 20. 3*
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what comes short of certainty, I think cannot he called
"1
knowledge." Thus knowledge is affirmed to have in it no
element of doubt. But he goes even further to give it uncond¬
itional validity. "What we once know, we are certain is so;
and we may be secure that there are no latent proofs undis¬
covered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in
doubt."2 in this manner he protects knowledge, not only
against the possibility of doubt but against that of error
as well. There are two general characteristics which Locke
considered necessary to knowledge. Onethe one hand, knowledge
must be "instructive", that is, it must bring in something
new in its meaning in contrast to a "trifling proposition"
which has but verbal meaning. Further, knowledge, besides
being certain and instructive, must be "real"; for Locke
believed that the knowledge he sought to understand had
reference to a reality which is both independent of the
knowing mind and of the ideas by which it is apprehended.
The kind of knowledge to which Locke attributed certainty,
instructiveness and reality, he called "scientific", that is,
concerned with universal propositions. Scientific knowledge
he distinguished from "experimental" and "historical"
1. Works, 4. 145«
2. Essay, 4. 16. J>,
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knowledge which deal with the specific facts derived from
sensuous data. He held that empirical generalizations from
these facts could never he universally true, and consequent¬
ly that such propositions were inferior in quality to scien¬
tific knowledge. Knowledge, as he used the term, was found
in the intuitive perception of the connection between ideas,
which was seen to hold good in the very nature of the case.
He did not discuss the metaphysical theory upon which this
assumption is based. Since universal knowledge showed itself
most clearly in mathematics, Locke, as Descartes before him,
hoped to work out a system by which knowledge could be as
clearly deduced as in geometrical demonstration, especially,
as we have pointed out, in the interconnected fields of
morality and divinity.
The material of knowledge is ideas, and Locke felt that
if there was anything new he had to say it was about ideas. But
strangely enough he offered no explanation as to what he
meant by his use of the term "idea". It is apparent that he
equates ideas with conscious intelligence, so that if one is
daid to have ideas, he must be considered an intelligent
being, ks Gibson has pointed out,1 there was a considerable
1. Gibson, LTK, 21.
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divergence of opnion among seventeenth century thinkers as
to what idea meant. Locke, employing a 'j^lain, historical
method", the method of matter-of-fact common sense, waives
all transcendent questions, and as a result, fails to draw
distinctions as sharply as he might have done. For Locke,
as for others of his time, an idea might he conceived as a
psychological process or a logical content. When he defines
the term idea as "whatsoever is the object of the understand¬
ing when a man thinks,""*' we see idea standing for an object
of the understanding. Yet he also insistsdthat such an idea
can be present to the understanding only at the time of its
perception.
To ask, at what time a man has first any
ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive;
~ having ideas, and perception, being the
same thing. 2~"
This statement, and others like it, which indicate that Locke
viewed the meaning of idea as a psychical process, has le^d
many to the conclusion that his purpose was primarily a
psychological one. But no such conclusion can be admitted,
as his primary purpose was to find the certain content of
which the human mind is capable, and the knowing process
Essay, 1. 1. 8.
2* Essay, 4. 1. 9.
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receives consideration only so far as it is involved in this.
In this connection it may he pointed out that Locke inher¬
ited from Descartes the conception that whatever happens in
the mind is. the result of self-conscious thought. Thus an
idea can he present to the understanding only when one is
aware otits perception. In the light Locke found it necess¬
ary to modify his statements concerning the mind as a
"storehouse" and "repository" of ideas.
Our ideas heing nothing hut actual percep¬
tions in the mind, which ceases to he anything
when there is no perception of them, this
laying up our ideas in the repository of
the memory signifies no more than this -
that the mind has a power, in many cases, to
revive perceptions which it has. once had, with
this additional perception annexed to them,
that it has had them before. And in this sense
ideas are said to he in our memories when
indeed they are actually nowhere.1
Another characteristic of the ideas in Locke's account,
is that when they are clearly apprehended it is impossible
to confuse them with any other. "It is the first act of the
mind (without which it would never he capable of any know¬
ledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and disting¬
uish it from others."2 This character of an idea Locke calls
Essay, 2. 10. 2.
2* Essay, 4. 7. 4.
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its "determined" or "determinate" quality. Nor can an idea
"be capable of change. A mutable idea, he maintains, is not
possible, because if an idea is said to have changed, it
then becomes another idea alotgether. Since each idea is
determined in the process of perception, and its meaning is
exhausted in that single perception, the question arose as
to whether that idea could be said to be eternal. Here
Locke might have distinguished between idea as a logical
content and as a perception to^hTTSavantage, but he failed
u
to do $o, and contented himself by a reference with what
appeared to him to be plain matter of fact. "What wonder is
it that the same idea should always be the same idea? For if
the word triangle be supposed to have the same signification
always, that is all this amounts to."^ In this connection
it may be pointed out that when Locke speaks of ideas he
does not mean Platonic "Forms".
We see here then, the chief features of the "idea" which
Locke took to be the raw material of knowledge, and the
distinctions which he drew will show themselves as signifi¬
cant parts of the whole structure of his thought.
Before he could proceed with his own explanation of how
1. Works, 10. 257.
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ideas arise in the mind of man, Locke felt that it was nec¬
essary to refute the position of those who held that innate
ideas formed the "basis of knowledge. When the church and
Aristotle had "been swept away as final authorities over the
minds of men, an emptiness "became apparent, and a new auth¬
ority was sought. Accordingly, thinkers, in the seventeenth
century appealed to a doctrine of innate ideas which they
believed had been implanted by God, acting through nature,
in the minds of all men at birth. As we have seen, Lord
Herbert of Cherbury actually formulated a doctrine of innate
ideas. With others the doctrine was vague, but it was em¬
ployed by leading thinkers including the Cambridge Platon-
ists and Descartes. While those who held the doctrine did not
agree on all points, they were at one in acknowledging their
belief that ideas could be present to the understanding
prior to experience. It was against this principle that
Locke, who believed experience to be primary, waged his
battle.
It would be sufficient to convince unprejud¬
iced readers of the falseness of this suppos¬
ition [re innate principles] if I should only
show ( as I hope I shall in the following parts
of this discourse) how men, barely by the use
of their natural faculties, may attain to all
the knowledge they have without the help of
innate impressions, and may arrise at certain¬
ty without original notions or principles.1
i
, i
1. Essay, 1. 2. 1.
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Because it is so difficult to.determine exactly against
whom this principle was directed, some writers have assumed
that Locke set up the position merely to knock it down again,
4 1
to enhance his own theory therBy. Before we can judge the
weight of such a conclusion it is well that we have clearly
Before us what Locke Believed to Be the opposihg theory which
did so much violence to his conception as to how truth
p
actually arose. Innate principle, Locke conceived the
argument to run, gave a special origin to knowledge, for it
3
was implanted in the mind "in its very first Being," and
cannot Be appropriated By "the use of our natural faculties."^"
Such knowledge possesses a "distinct sort of truth,and
is the only valid foundation for knowledge, since our
"natural faculties would Bring us only an uncertain, float¬
ing estate. Since they are "sacred"?, these '"principles must
O
not Be questioned" . From them other certainties are deduced,
and in them are to Be found the Basis of religion and moral¬
ity. The criterion set up was the supposed fact that they
were universally agreed to, and they were universally agreed
to Because they were innate. So, Locke maintained, the
1. Fraser states in his edition of the Essay, 1. 37, note 2.
"Locke assails it in its crudest form, in which it is
countenanced By no eminent writer."
2. Gf. GiBson, LTK, 34 f.
3» $; 4. Essay, 1.1.1. §» Essay, 1.1.5* 6. Essay, 1.2. 13*
?• Essay, 1.2.21. 8. Essay, 1.3*25*
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the argument ran.
While this theory obviously ran counter to the way in
which Locke conceived ideas were formed, it also clashed
with another part of his thinking, for he was convinced that
knowledge could be of little value unless it made its appeal
to the actively appropriating intelligence of every indiv¬
idual.
The floating of other men's opinions in
our brains makes us not one jot the more
knowing, though they happen to be true..,.
Such borrowed wealth, though it were gold in
the hand from which he received it, will be
but leaves and dhstswhen it comes to use.1
Professor G-ibson believes this to be the deepest motive
for Locke's polemic against innate ideas, for Locke always
insists upon the primacy of experience, and of the individ¬
ual^ activity in appropriating knowledge.
Agsint whom was this polemic directed? Or is it simply
an argument of straw? This is one of the most perplexing
problems surrounding the Essay, and there have have been those,
as we have seen, who think Locke took a very weak argument,
the more easily to show it ridiculous. It is acknowledged
Essay, 1. 3« 24.
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that he had in mind Lord Herbert's De Veritate, for he
merlons him by name in the body of the Essay.1, But he also
says that the Essay was well started before his attention
was drawn to that work. There is good reason that we may
believe Looke had his old intellectual enemies, the School¬
men, primarily in mind when he refuted the the position that
knowledge was based upon innate ideas and that he considered
their position as the one which was fundamentally in oppos¬
ition to his own. He was quite sure that he would be upbraid¬
ed for "pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and
certainty."2 and that his confutation of innate principles
would " seem absurd to the masters of demonstration."5 These
are undoubted references to the Schoolmen. If at times he
was indeed referring to Descartes, it is probable that he
was disappointed that Descartes had only partly succeeded
in freeing himself from the trammels of scholasticism.
As long as men could hold sacred an untouchable theory
of innate principles, whereby prejudice could be kept in
and truth kept out, Locke claimed that the basis of certainty
was unsound and directed the vigour of his mind against it.
1. Cf. Essay, 1. 2. 15«
2* Essay, 1. 1. 28.
3« Essay, 1. 3* 2^t-«
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He was quite sure that the principles of certainty in moral¬
ity and divinity would he insecure just so long as men
could appeal to innate principles for their beliefs.
Once he thought he had shown that there could he no
foundation for a theory of innate principles, Locke pro¬
ceeded, in the second hook of the Essay to consider the
origin of "simple" ideas. It must be kept in mind that
Locke considered not that ideas intthemselves could he
thought of as knowledge, hut that they were the material, and
that certainty resulted from a judgment made about them.
He therefore set to work, using the plain, historical meth¬
od, to show how ideas arise in consciousness and declined
to formulate any theory concerning the connection of ideas
with their ultimate source; for he was convinced that any
such metaphysical speculation would carry him beyond his
matter-of-fact, commonsense method. None the less, as we
have pointed out, Locke always held that ideas somehow
held good of a reality beyond and apart from themselves.
In order to appreciate Locke's attempt to determine the
content of ideas, it is necessary to remember that in the
seventeenth century the historical point of view was in
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eclipse, and that the composition theory dominated all
thinking. Ideas of development and evolution were unheard
of. A complex whole was considered to be, logically and
actually, no more or less than the sum of its parts, and if
such a whole could be analysed into its parts, its nature
was thus thought to be understood. All creation was made
up of various complex combinations of simples, in a closed
non-developing order in which nothing new could emerge.
It was with the composition theory in mind that Locke
approached his problem of the formation of ideas. By ascer¬
taining what were the "original", "primary", and "simple"
ideas, he thought that he would have a basis for knowledge.
Since he held that complex ideas were no more than the com¬
bination of various simple ideas, which took on no distinct
character of their own apart from their constituent elements,
he thought that when he had shown by logical analysis what
were the simple ideas involved, he could establish a firm
foundation for knowledge. It has been suggested that "it was
for this reason that the question of the determination of the
logical content of our ideas came to be so closely connected
in Locke's mind with an investigation of their originn and
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manner of formation. One of the results of Locke's inves¬
tigation proved to he that the composition theory would not
always he ahle to support the materials he wished to engraft
upon it. Yet he never repudiated the theory, and was thereby
led to certain formal contradictions.
Locke defined a simple ideas as one which "being in
itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing hut one uni¬
form appearance or conception in the mind, and is not
distinguishable into different ideas.His criterion,
then, of a simple idea is its inability to be reduced by
analysis. He. had difficulty in applying this tes.t to his
♦
ideas of duration and extension, which none the less he
continued to class as simple ideas. When he was attacked by
critics at this point he answered^showing a practical rather
than theoretical interest, that one may spoil intelligent
discourses by making too nice divisions, and one must not
stress one's definitions too much.
There were two characteristics of a simple idea upon
which he placed the greatest emphasis/ In the first place
we can make no simple idea for ourselves. In this respect
1. Gibson, LTK, 51.
2. Essay, 2. 2. 1.
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the mind is passive and receive^ ideas from either sensation
or reflection. Ideas are in no wise to he construed as sub¬
jective creations but are appearances of real existences.
The ideas given in sensation have to do with the qualities
of material things, while the ideas gained from reflection
yield ideas concerning the operations of our own minds. The
term "passivity", or "passion", as Locke said, does not
mean that the mind is totally passive in tne reception of
of its ideas. Locke speaks of ideas as being "suggested" or
"furnished" to the mind, and in so doing his motive is to
guard against the notion that there can be any arbitrariness
arising from subjective desires at the ba,sis of the appre¬
hension of the fundamental material of knowledge.
In the second place, Locke insisted that simple ideas
are known first only in actual experience. This is a corol¬
lary to his polemic against ideas. He contended that there
could be no ideas prior to experience, and that the mind at
first is a tabula rasa. Thus we cannot make ideas as we
choose, nor can we fail to comprehend them when they are
presented to us in experience. Here we see the attempt Locke
has made to ensure the independence of our ideas from any
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arbitrary subjective tampering in their perception.
In the formation of complex ideas, Locke maintains that
the mind is active "wherein it exerts its power over its
simple ideas."1 Complex ideas are formed either by compound¬
ing or enlarging. In compounding the mind "puts together
several of those simple ones it has received from sensation
and reflection, and combines them into complex ones."^ The
process of enlarging is essentially the same, but is "a
putting of several units together, though of the same kind.
Thus by adding several units together we make the idea of a
dozen.While the burden of the argument here falls on the
synthesis of simple ideas, Locke maintains that we see
complex ideas already formed in nature, and taking the
method found there, o/ther combinations can be formed as the
individual wishes. Here again we see the breakdown of the
composition theory upon which Locke places so much stress,
for his theory cannot account for the unity of 3, complex
whole. If a complex idea is no more or no less than the
composition of its simple constituent parts, that is all
that can be said of it. But Locke introduces meaning into
1* ^ssay, 2. 12. 1.
2. Es say, 2. 11. 6«
3» Essay, 2. 11. 6.
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the complex idea thus "brought about which is not contained
in the analysis of its parts. The theory b^aks down again
in the treatment of "ideas of relation" and "general ideas",
an understanding of which is essential to the comprehension
of Locke's theory of knowledge.
Locke noticed that all ideas have in them "some kind of
relation."-'- We immediately see here the difficulty which
subverts the composition theory. Locke recognized that
ideas of relation could not result from either sensation or
reflection. He therefore made a kind of compromise, and
said that the relationship of ideas to the data of experience
in sensation and reflection is that they are "ultimately
founded upon" or "terminate in" ideas gained from experience,
without which ideas of relation would be meaningless. Relation¬
ships between ideas become known only though an overt act
of the mind. He illustrates this by using the idea of a
triangle, the idea of which is presented in experience as
a non-related whole. The relation of the various angles
remain "secret" until the mind by its own volition compares
them, and shows of what the relation consists.
The formation of universal, or, as Locke called them,
1. Essay, 2. 28. 18.
2* Essay, 2. 28. 18.
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"general ideas" is important, as these ideas are the basis
for scientific knowledge. Here the activity of the mind is
of the utmost significance, and is, according to Locke, a
specifically human thing, the possession of which "puts a
perfect distinction between man and brutes.General ideas
are formed by a process of abstraction from particular facts
presented in experience; but these ideas, when formed,
have no existence apart from the mind that forms them.
Thus the same colour being observed today
in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday
received in milk, it considers that appear¬
ance alone, makes it a representitive of all
of that kind; and having given it the name
whiteness, it by that sound signifies the
same quality wheresoever to be imagined or
met with; and thus universale, whether ideas
or terms are made.2
When an abstraction has been made and a general idea has
been formed, ideas of relation are used for purposes of
comparing, to decide if other particular qualities given
in experience, say that of white, fall under the class¬
ification of the general idea of white.
We see here Locke's recognition of the mind's activity
in comparison and abstraction, which despite its
1. Essay, 2. 11. 10.
2< Essay, 2. 11. 9»
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psychological vagueness concerning the association of ideas,
makes the distinction between the universal idea held in
the mind, and the qualities derived from experience. While
he marks them off as "being in fact mutually exclusive, he
shows how they may he related to one another, and indicates
the dependence of abstract ideas upon experience.
Having viewed the way in which Locke considers that
ideas arise, we now turn to his treatment of the manner in
which knowledge may be secured. Locke makes it quite clear
that ideas in themselves are not to be thought of as know¬
ledge but that it is derived from a judgment about them.^
We have seen that when he speaks of knowledge, Locke has
in mind that kind of cognition which is absolutely certain,
excluding the possibility both of doubt and error. If Locke
seems to assign a too narrow sphere to this kind of know¬
ledge, it is well to bear in mind the absolute quality of
his definition.
Judgments about ideas may be of two kinds. On the one
hand a judgment may result in knowledge, but on the other
hand, in the region where complete certainty is not possible,
1. Locke uses the term judgment ambiguously. At times he
uses it to mean the faculty of judgment as inferior to
the faculty of knowledge. Here it is used as a decision
about ideas. We use it in this latter sense.
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a judgment may be made which yields opinion or probability.
Locke is very careful,to point out that the difference
between knowledge and probability is not one of degree nor
of difference in kind. Nor is the distinction based upon
a subjective conviction that a proposition is, or is not,
true, for Locke acknowledges that where certainty is not
possible, probability has within it the power to convince
a man to act in practical circumstances. For:
The evidently strong probability may as
steadily determine the man to assent to the
truth, or make him take the proposition for
true, and act accordingly, as knowledge makes
him see or he is certain that it is true.-'-
The difference between knowledge and probability hinges on
the possibility of error. In probability our assent "excludes
not a possibility that it may be otherwise."2 When know¬
ledge has been achieved then its certainty is convincing
in all conditions and for all time.
What we once know, we are certain is so;
and we may be secure that there are no latent
proofs undiscovered which may overthrow our
knowledge or bring it to doubt.3
Locke defines knowledge as "the perception of the
1. Works, 4. 299.
2. Works, 4. 299.
3. Essay, 4. 16. 3«
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connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy
of any of our ideas.It is on this power of perception
that the understanding is said to he "based.
Where this perception is, there is knowledge;
and where it is not, there, though we may
fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come
short of knowledge.^
This perception Locke calls intuitive, and in it the agree¬
ment or di^greement between ideas is immediately apparent.
In this kind of knowledge there is no need for "proofs" or
"intervening ideas".
If we will reflect on our ways of think¬
ing we shall find that sometimes the mind
perceives the agreement or disagreement of
two ideas immediately by themselves, without
the intervention of any other; and this I
think we may call intuitive knowledge. For
in this the mind is at no pains of proving
or examining, but perceives the truth as
the eye doth light, only by being directed
towards it ....This part of knowledge
is irrestable-, and like bright sunshine
forces itself immediately to be perceived,
as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way;
and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt or
examination, but the mind is presently filled
with the clear light of it He that demands
a greater certainty than this, demands he
know not what, and shows only that he has a
mind to be a sceptic without being able to
be so.3
1. Essay, 4. 1. 2.
2. Essay, 4. 1. 2.
3* Essay, 4. 2. 1.
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Agreement or disagreement may not always "be immediately
apparent for its relationship to be visible, so that in
many instances "intervening ideas" must be employed. To
this process Locke gives the name "demonstration". This
process is much more difficult than intuitive perception.
A steady application and pursuit are requir¬
ed to this discovery: and there must be a prog¬
ression by steps and degrees, before the mind
can in this way arrise at certainty, and come
to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between
two ideas that need proofs and the use of reason
to show it.l
Each step in the process of demonstration is based upon
intuitive perception, and unless in each step of the demon¬
stration the intuitive relation is clearly perceived, then
the final result will fail to produce knowledge. Since the
steps in reasoning, in some instances, may be dependent upon
memory, and hence not immediately present to the mind in
perception, the possibility of error on the subjective side
is opened. It is doubtless this which Locke has in mind
when he speaks of demonstration as being inferior "in degree"
to intuition. Yet when each step, properly certified by
intuition, is added to another step equally certain, the
l* Essay, 4. 2. 4.
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result, even with these intervening proofs, Locke holds,
gives ajsolute objective certainty.
Locke further insisted that knowledge must he not only
certain hut also real. "Our knowledge...is real only so far
as there is conformity between our ideas and the reality
of things."^ kt this point it must he remembered that for
Locke the materials of knowledge were thought to be signs
which represent to the mind the world of reality, and while
the ideas about the world are not to be confused with the
real world itself, they somehow represent it to our minds.
Thus a proposition may be said to be true or "contain real
truth.......when our ideas are such as we know are capable
of having an existence in nature." For his proof that
this is so Locke said that the very simplicity of simple
ideas was the key to their reality, since it would be im¬
possible for us to make them ourselves. For the reality of
complex ideas, in which the mind may have been active in
their formation, Locke's criterion is based on their "so
being framed that there be a possibility of existing con-
A
formable to them" , even including those ideas for which no
actual correspondence can be found in nature. Unless such
-L• Essay, 4. 4. 3 •
2. Essay, 4. 5» 8.
3. Essay, 2. 30. 4.
- 70 -
ideas are incoherent and do not contradict what we know
about nature, it is in that sense that they may be said to
be real. In dealing with the knowledge of substances Locke
recognized the inadequacy of the foregoing explanation, and
was finally driven to the conclusion that ideas are inade¬
quate when one deals with concrete being in its essence.
It is Locke's assumption that knowledge is real which
involves him in difficulty. Though he accepted the current
metaphysical categories, his investigation often undermined
them, and he had to abandon them tacitly, though he never
expressly repudiated them.
Thus like many other thinkers, he was des¬
tined to prove an illustration of the truth
that metaphysics has a way of avenging itself
on those who slight or disregard it, and that
its deepest entanglements are often reserved
for those who think they have discovered a
path, by following which its difficulties may
be avoided.1
There is one further characteristic of knowledge upon
which Locke placed the greatest emphasis, for he drew a
distinction betwen "instructive" and "trifling" propositions.
This represents the philosophical basis of his feeling that
1. Gibson, LTK, 11.
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verbal consistency was insufficient for certainty. In his
treatment of the subject he seems to anticipate Kant's
classification of analytical and synthetic judgments. If the
subject and predicate are identical in a given proposition,
or if the predicate signifies only some part of the subject,
then Locke says that while we are bound to accept such a
proposition as true,.the knowledge so derived is "only a
verbal certainty, but not instructive."^ It is for this
reason that he maintains that they have no value, since they
contribute nothing to the extension of real knowledge or
the knowledge of things. They were true, yes, "but what
advance to such propositions give in the knowledge necessary
p
or useful to their conduct." Here we see Locke's reference
to the main design of the Essay in which he defined his ob¬
ject as a search to find knowledge concerning the principles
of morality and divinity, and, while he seems to have stray¬
ed far from his initial question, the trend of his mind
reflects itself in his ultimate problem.
Nov/ that we have seen the characteristics which Locke
assigns to certain, real and instructive knowledge, we turn
our attention to the criterion of that form of cognition
1* Essay, 4. 8. 3»
2* Sis say, 4-* 8. 3»
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which Locke calls probability, the assent to which yields
belief or opinion. While in belief and opinion the subject¬
ive factor enters in strongly in the apprehension of ideas,
it is not. this which is stressed by Locke to indicate its
distinction from knowledge.
And herein lies the difference between prob¬
ability and certainty, faith and knowledge,
that in all parts of knowledge there is intui¬
tion; each intermediate idea, each step has
its visible and certain connection: in belief
no so. That which makes me believe is something
extraneous to the thing I believe; something
not evidently joined on both sides to, and
so not manifestly showing the agreement oh
disagreement of, those ideas that are under
consideration.1
Thus Locke would say that we do not know that the sun will
rise tomorrow, but we believe thajs it will. Nor do we know
that Columbus first discovered America but we believe that
it was so. The first proposition is believedbecause of the
background of one's experience, the other on historical test¬
imony. Both may determine judgment and result in an assent
being given, as indeed it should, but the result of such a
decision is short of knowledge because the inner connections
of the sun and of Columbus do not in all cases indicate what
1. Essay, 4. 15« 3»
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is predicated about them above, and the decision thus made
rests upon extraneous support.
After having defined the general nature of knowledge
Locke turns to its classification.
To understand a little more distinctly wherein
this agreement or disagreement consists, I think
we may reduce it all to these four sorts: (1)
identity or diversity. (2) Relation. (3) Coexist¬
ence, or necessary connection. $4) real existence.4
These sorts are not considered to be mutually exclusive, nor
do they represent his final view of the types of knowledge,
but are introduced presumably to illuminate his argument.
Identity or diversity was a distinction concerning the
content of an idea rather than a description relating to
personality.
It is the very first act of the mind, when it
has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive
its ideas; and, so far as it perceives them to
know each what it is, and thereby also to per¬
ceive their difference, and that one is not an¬
other. This is so absolutely necessary that
without it there could be no knowledge, no
reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts
at all.2
Thiseis, as Locke himself was aware, a presupposition about
1. Essay, 4. 1. 3
2. Essay, 4. 1. 4
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knowledge, rather than a type of it. Its weakness lay in the
fact that it could give hut "trifling" knowledge, since its
subject and predicate must he identical, and because real
knowledge was beyond its scope.
The second sort of knowledge has to do with those necess¬
ary connections which Locke supposed to hold good between
abstract ideas.
Since all distinct ideas must eternally be
known not to be the same, and so be univers¬
ally and constantly denied one another, there
could be no room for any positive knowledge
at all, if we could not perceive any relation
between our ideas, and find out the agreement
or disagreement they have with another in
several ways the mind makes of comparing them.
Locke found his chief examples of this sort of knowledge
in arithmetic and geometry, and believed that had he time,
he could work out a system of ethics based on the same
method.
Knowledge of "coexistence and necessary connection"
concerns the relations of concrete being, and, as such, ise
distinguished by Locke from the knowledge which is derived
in the former sort of knowledge, i..£«, of necessary
1. Essay, 4. 1. 5*
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connection, which depends upon the abstracted content of
our ideas. As we have already noted, Locke based his theory
of the origin of complex ideas upon the composition theory,
and thought that substances formed the substratum upon
which qualities are dependent; he next sought to understand
what the qualities were which gave the substance its dis¬
tinct character. This, he found, could not be determined in
any d priori way because we do not know what is the essence
of any given substance. This sort of knowledge must there¬
fore rest upon the facts of experience. " Coexistence
can no further be known than it is perceived.Even
though experience may have shown us that all men we have
ever known or heard of, sleep, yet Locke would not allow
the statement, that all men sleep, to be considered certain
knowledge, because he would say that we cannot know the
essence of a man in an ultimate metaphysical sense. It
would be by the knowledge of the essence alone, and hence
with all the qualities resulting from it, that we could
know whether this statement is true. It is probably true
that All men sleep, but this is opinion or belief and not
knowledge.
1. Essay, 4. 5* 14.
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Concerning "real existence" Locke always makes the tacit
assumption that ideas always hold good of a reality beyond
and apart from them. Since knowledge consists in "nothing but
the perception of the connection and repugnancy of any of
our ideas," how can it be said that knowledge in order to be
certain must have validity in relation to real existence?
This involves a formal contradiction in Locke's theory. Its
source is probably the fact that all knowledge, being depend¬
ent upon reality, must be taken into consideration whether
we will it so or not, unless we wish to become involved in
complete subjective idealism. Locke had drawn a sharp dis¬
tinction between idea and real existence, and thought that
there could be no bridge between them.
Having the idea of anything in our mind no
more proves the existence of that thing, than
the picture of a man evidences his being in
the world, or the visions of a dream thereby
make a true history.^
It was on this basis that Locke rejected the Ontological
argument for the existence of God, of which a full discussion
will be found later. "Real existence can be proved only by
real existence; and, therefore, the real existence of God
can only be proved by the real existence of other things."2
1. Essay, 4. 2. 1.
2. King, LLJL, 316.
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Locke therefore sought to find an example of the direct
apprehension of real existence. This he found in the conscious
subject.
ka for our own existence, we perceive it so
plainly, and so certainly that it neither needs
nor is capable of proof. For nothing can be
more evident to us than our own existence. I
think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain; can
any of these be more evident to me than my own
existence? If I doubt of all other things, that
very doubt makes me perceive my own existence,
and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For,
if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as
certain perception of my own existence as of
the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have
as certain perception of the existence of the
thing doubting, as of that thought which I
call "doubt". Experience then convinces me that
we have an intuitive knowledge of our own exis¬
tence, and an internal infallible perception
that we are. In every act of sensation, reason¬
ing or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves
of our own being; and in this matter come not
short of the highest degree of certainty.
This Cartesian argument is open to the same criticism as
has been levelled against it in Descartes' own formulation.
In this argument all that Locke can be said to have proved
was that his own thoughts existed. These thoughts, or, in
his own term,"ideas", do not predicate real existence.^ But
1. E s say, A ® 9• 3 •
2. From a psychological point of view the argument is also
seen to be false, for a child often refers to itself in
the third person before it has learned to identify its
thoughts with itself.
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Locke was convinced that he had found a true instance of
real knowledge ( a unity of real existence and idea) in
self-conscious experience. On it he based his demonstration
of the existence of God, to which we will give attention
later.
While knowledge of the existence of the natural world
did not comply with all the requirements which Locke set
up, he considered that we can, nevertheless, have real
knowledge of it. He was not, of course, a subjective ideal¬
ist, for while he was concerned primarily with ideas, he
always held that they were signs of a reality distinct from
them. His test of the existence of anything material lay in
the convincing power of the experience itself.
I ask anyone whether he is not invincibly
conscious to himself of a different percept¬
ion, when he looks on the sun by day, and
thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes
wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on
that savour or odour.1
Here Locke clearly distinguishes between memory and imagina¬
tion on the one hand, and actual perception on the other.
He has three corollaries to this central proposition. First,
1. Essay, 4. 2. 14.
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if one looks at the sun at noon, the impression which the
experience makes carries with it a completely convincing
quality. Secondly, even when an act of will is responsible
for the creation of wrtten letters on a page, their exis¬
tence, once they are set down, is no less real than any
other real existence. Lastly, he uses the argument that
certain sensations always come through the same sense organs
and that the senses support one another in revealing the
real existence of material things. While he acknowledges
that these reasons fall short of his requirements for know¬
ledge, he none the less, in his common-sense way, assigns
to them that certain cognition which he calls knowledge.
"This certainty is as great as our happiness or misery,
"beyond which he have no concernment to know or be."''"
Locke thus concludes that we can have three absolute
certainties. We can know ourselves by intuition, the exis¬
tence of God by demonstration, and the existence of material
things, by an inference he does not previously provide for.
These and these alone come within the range of knowledge.
All else is belief or opinion.
1. Essay, 4. 2. 14.
CHAPTER THREE
REASON AND REVELATION
The hundred years following the middle of the seven¬
teenth century have been called the reign of natural theol¬
ogy in England. In this era many writers on theological
subjects rested their case on a vague and often unexplained
appeal to Nature and Reason. Nature they understood to he
the universe in its orderly functions, material and immater¬
ial, and insight into its ways was made by reason, sometimes
held to be the "light of nature." For many, the highest
test of any fact or proposition was whether it was natural
or not, and that meant "natural" as judged by the criterion
of reason. The rapidity with which scientific discoveries
were being made in the"world of nature" inspired men's
ingenuity, and in the wonder of what had been achieved, men
began to feel the power of reason, but failed to understand
its limits. It was inevitable that religion, as the chief
concern of man, should feel the influence of this tendency
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to ground everything on nature and reason, and in theology
there appeared to he a widening gulf between the claims of
revelation or positive religion on the one hand, and nat¬
ural theology, or reason, on the other. The culmination of
the reign of natural theology came with the Deists, who
believed that the Gospel was but a republication of the
original, pure religion of nature, and that the tradional
theology of the time was in accord neither with good reason
nor good morals.
As a result of this tendency of rationalism to make
inroads on orthodox theology, the respective claims of
reason and revelation and the proper province of each were
much discussed. In the heat of the ensuing controversy
many took extreme positions on either side. But compara¬
tively early in the str$gle there was a group of men, Til-
lotson, Locke and Samuel Clark, called by Mc Giffert the
"rational supernaturalists", who, while rationalistic in
spirit, nevertheless refused to disregard what they believ¬
ed to be the legitimate claims of revelation, and sought to
work out a careful relationship between the two.
Locke was never able to state exactly and consistently
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wheat he "believed the Mmits of reason and revelation to be.
His treatment of the subject, nevertheless, represented a
genuine effort to satisfy the demands of both reason and
revelation without sacrificing what appeared to him to
ix:
ce-n-tein the truth in each. As we have seen, Locke employed
the "plain, historical method" in the formulation of his
theory of knowledge. In it he sajd very little about natural
religion as such, but his references indicate that he was
sure that a very substantial part of religious truth could
be won by the use of the "unaided reason." "I doubt not
but to show, that a man, by the right use of his natural
abilities, may,.......attain to the knowledge of God and
other things that concern Him.11"'" "For the visible marks
\
of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all
the works of creation, that a rational creature who will but
reflect on them seriously cannot miss the discovery of the
Deity."2
But Locke was more than a rationalist. He was a sincere
and devout Christian, whose piety carried him "in the bottom
of his heart" beyond the position he was disposed to accept
1. Essay, 1. 3» 12.
2. Essay, 1. 3« 9»
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with the "top of his mind". He never questioned what appear¬
ed to him to he an undeniable fact of revelation. Like all
true Puritans, out of whose tradition he had come, he simply
accepted it without remark. He believed that in his polemic
against innate ideas he had destroyed a false basis for the
discovery of the knowledge of God, and in the fourth book
of the Essay, and in his specifically religious writings, he
sought to define what he considered to be a surer way to
attain religious truth. For him reason and revelation were
the two distinct channels by which such truth could be
discovered, and he set about to define their separate spheres.
Reason is natural revelation, whereby the
eternal Father of light and fountain of all
knowledge, communicates to mankind that
portion of truth which he has laid within
the reach of their natural faculties: revel¬
ation is natural reason enlarged by a new
set of discoveries communicated by G-od immed¬
iately; which reason vouches the truth of. by
the testimony and proofs it gives that they
are from G-od. So that he that takes away
reason to make way for revelation, puts out
the light of both, and does muchwhat the
same as if he would persuade a man to put
out his eyes, the better to receive the
remote light of an invisible star by a
telescope.1
Here as elsewhere in the Essay, Locke, while admitting the
possibility of revelation, none the less^ pleads chiefly
1. Essay, 4. 19« 4.
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for a more extended acknowledgment of the abilities of
reason to discover religious truth. This passage clearly
indicates the position of revelation as being a kind of
supplementary source of religious knowledge "enlarging11
upon that which can be derived from the use of the natural
faculties.
Thus, like Tillotson before him, Locke employed reason
as a criterion of the truth of revelation, using the
current phrases of his time concerning revelation as being
"according to", "above" and, "contrary to" reason.
By what has been before said of reason, we
may be able to make some guess as to the dis¬
tinction of things, into those that are accord¬
ing to, above and contrary to reason. 1. Accord¬
ing to reason are such propositions whose truth
we can discover by examining and tracing those
ideas we have from sensation and relfection;
and by natural deduction find to be true or
probable. 2. Above reason are such propositions
whose truth or probability we cannot by reason
derive from those principles. 3« Contrary to
reason are such proposition as are inconsist¬
ent with or irreconcilable to our clear and
distinct ideas.. Thus the existence of one God
is according to reason; the existence of more
than one God,contrary to reason: the ressurec-
tion of the dead, above reason.1
This further passage indicates that revelation not only
1. Essay, 4. 17• 23
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supplements reason by enlarging its^ knowledge, but also
that revelation must always bow to reason in ascertaining
the validity of revelation, ji.e., as a true revelation.
Locke elsewhere makes this even more explicit, viz., "..No
proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain
the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our
clear intuitive knowledge.Further, there is in Locke's
thought the latent assumption that though revelation^ when
true deserves to be believed, prejudice and fancy enter in
unless its credentials are in accord with reason. There are
but two instances when reason cannot positively judge the
truth of a given revelation, first, when the content is
wholly above reason:
Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against
God, and thereby lost their first happy state:
and that the dead shall rise and live again:
these and the like £are] beyond the discovery of
reason.....with which reason has nothing to do,^
and secondly, "revelation, where God has been pleased to
give it must carry it against the probable conjecture of
reason." In the first instance, Locke accepts the rebell¬
ion of the angels and the ressurection of the dead as leg-
1. Essay, 4. 18. 5«
2. Essay, 4. 18.
3. Essay, 4. 18. 8.
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itimate data of revelation. Since they are beyond the reach
of sensation and reflection, reason cannot refute them, and
they must be accepted as matters of faith. In the second
instance, a given revelation deserves to be believed even
when the weight of probability may be against it. Remember¬
ing Locke's theory of knowledge, and the very narrow scope
which he gives to the absolutely certain cognition which he
calls knowledge, and the extensive area in which probabil¬
ity obtains, we see that while the tendency of the fore-
e.
going discussion is to limit revelation severly, in the
context of his thought he gives revelation greater scope.
Yet revelation must always receive its credentials from
reason, in a negative sense, before the revelation can be
said to be true. For,"we cannot have an assurance of the
truth of its given revelation's] being a divine revel¬
ation greater than our own knowledge.""'" Thus our believing
a revelation to be true does not make it so, and Locke
disparages anything that savours merely of subjective per¬
suasion. Yet no doubt is thrown on the validity of revela¬
tion itself. "Whatever G-od hath revealed is certainly true:
1. Essay, 4. 18. 4.
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no doubt can be made of it."1 Nor is doubt cast on the integ¬
rity of God, for it is that fact which leads Locke to show
that there can be no ultimate disparity between that which is
discovered by reason and that which is revealed.
......No mission can be looked on as divine,
that delivers anything derogatory to the hon¬
our of the one, only, true, invisible God, or
inconsistent with natural religion and the rules
of morality: because God having discovered to
men the unity and majesty of his eternal god¬
head, and the truths of natural religion and
morality by the light of reason, he cannot be
supposed to back the contrary by revelation;
for that would be to destroy the evidence and
use of reason, without which men cannot be
able to distinguish divine revelation from
diabolical imposture.2
This statement is better understood when we realize that
Locke, incredible as it may seem, was quite sure that dia¬
bolical spirits jjfiftjfcilled perverse thoughts into the minds
of men. But what we have here is far more important than
simply a reference to diabolical imposture. It is another
illustration of Locke's -fundamental position that reason
is natural revelation and that the source is in God, whose
nature is such that He cannot reveal one thing by reason
and its opposite by direct supernatural means. It would
1. Essay 4. 18. 10.
2. Works, 9. 261, 262
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have been interesting to have had a development at this
point; but Locke's dislike of metaphysics, and his desire
not to be carried by any speculation beyond his "plain,
historical method ", prevented him from developing it.
As a corollary to the above proposition Locke gives us
further indication of what he believes the character of
God to be in His revelations.
......It cannot be expected that God should
send anyone into the world on purpose to inform
men of things indifferent, and of small moment,
or that are knowable by their natural faculties.
This would be to lessen the dignity of his maj¬
esty, in favour of our sloth, and in prejudice
to our reason.1
It has been suggested^ that the passage just quoted is in
contradiction to Locke's statement in the Essay, "that
the same truths may be discovered and conveyed down from
revelation, which are discoverable _to us bx reason "3
But this later statement is, as Worcester maintains, des¬
igned to throw light on the majesty of God. The emphasis
is on its probability and indicates again the central theme
of Locke's contention, that truth coming from God may be
1. Works, 9. 262.
2. Gf. Worcester, ROJL, 25, note.
3« Essay, 4. 18. 4.
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apprehended by the two channels of reason and revelation,
but that in accordance with our conception of God, and the
facts of human experience, it seems well to conclude that
it is beneath the divine dignity and majesty to utilize
the extraordinary process of revelation to make known those
truths which can be easily discovered by the "more natural"
means of reason.
In this connection we see the empirical tendency of
Locke's theory of knowledge again appearing in his discuss¬
ion of revelation. "......I say, that no man inspired by
God can by any revelation communicate to others any new
simple ideas which they had not before from sensation or
reflection.One might receive new ideas in an immediate
revelation, but they could not be communicated to others
except on the basis of the content of simple ideas already
known by those to whom is would be communicated. Otherwise,
Locke maintained, it would be uninstructive and only verbal.
When St. Paul was rapt up into the third heaven, he was not
able to put into word3 what had happened to him there, but
could say only that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor
1. Essay, 4. 18. 5
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hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive"; he
could say no more. Locke considered St. Paul's inability
to communicate the content of his revelation to others
a necessary conclusion to "be drawn from the grounding of
simple ideas in sensation and reflection, a conclusion,
that is to say, which guards against the utilization of
"trifling propositions" in place of "instructive"ones.
When it has been shown that a revelation is not con-
tray to reason, Locke makes a further positive requirement
of revelation before it is to be believed. Here he employs,
as did Tillotson, the Christian evidences, .i.e., the ful¬
fillment of prophecy and the witness of miracles. On the
former, little stress is placed, and the examples are found
outside the main line of Locke's argument. They do, however,
help to show how much Locke was bound by the current
theological ideas of his time, and indicate how he never
really escaped from this bondage. In his commentary on
II Corinthians 5 ' 14, he remarks, "Christ, now he is come,
so answers all the types, prefigurations, and prophecies of
him in the Old Testament, that presently upon turning our
eyes upon him, he appears to be the person designed.1,1
1. Works, 8. 200.
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Furlther, "there are two arguments hy which the Apostle
Paul confirmed the Gospel. One was the revelations made
concerning our Saviour hy types and figures and prophecies
of him under the law; the other, miracles and miraculous
gifts."1
The evidence of miracles Locke held in high esteem,
and towards the end of his life he wrote a short Discourse
of Miracles whc^Lh was published posthumously. In it he
says that "miracles are the basis on which divine mission
is always established, and consequently that foundation on
which believers in any divine revelation must ultimately
p
bottom their faith." And in the Essay we find, "....... •
Miracles well attested, do not only find credit them¬
selves, but give it also to other truths, which need such
confirmation."*^ Locke is always explicit in his conviction
that miracles are a sure attestation of divine revelation,
and in that opinion he reflects the belief of his time.
When revelation has passed all the negative tests im¬
posed upon it by reason, and has produced the positive
"evidence" to witness to its divine character, then Losrcke WW
1. Works, 8. 200.
2. Works, 9« 264.
3. Essay, 4. 16. 13»
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that such a revelation must he received as true. "Not to
"believe what he |Gk>dj has revealed whether in a lighter,or
more weightier matter, calls his veracity into question.
Again in the Essay we find, "This carries with it an assur¬
ance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called
by a peculiar name, revelation, and our assent to it faith
which.as absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly
excludes all wavering as knowledge itself; and we may as
well doubt our own being, as we can whether any revelation
from G-od be true."^ Here Locke places revelation in joint
dominion over knowledge with reason. Thus when revelation
has satisfied the negative tests a-ndr imposed by reason,
and offers positive testimony by the witness of the eviden¬
ces of Christianity, then, according to Locke, divine revel¬
ation deserves to be believed. Such communicated truth,super-
naturally revealed, is as sure as the absolute certitude
discovered by reason.
Having established the theoretical grounds upon which
revelation may be said to exist side by side with reason,
each in its distinctive sphere, it is now necessary to invest¬
igate the faculty by which such a revelation may be apprehend¬
ed. Locke treats this in the Essay in the fourth book, under
1. Works, 7» 234.
2. Essay, 4. 16. 14.
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the heading, "Of Faith and Reason, and their distinctive
provinces."
Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished
^rom f3-ith, I take to "be the discovery of the
certainty or probability of such propositions
or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduct¬
ion made from such ideas, which it has got by
the use of its natural faculties; viz. byisensa-
tion and reflection.
Faith, on the other side, is the assent due
to any proposition, .hot thus made out by the
deductions of reason, but upon the credit of
the proposer, as coming from G-od, in some ex¬
traordinary way of communication.2 This way
of discovering truths to men, we call revel¬
ation.5
We see here that Locke allows the criterion of assent
in faith to rest on testimony, i. e., "upon the credit of
the proposer." He brings forward no philosophical argument
to show why he believes this to be so, for by his contra¬
distinction of faith and reason he has cut off reason from
judgment in the case of actual apprehension of revelation in
faith. He makes this even stronger in another passage where
he says, "Faith stands by itself and upon grounds of its own,
nor can it be removed from them and place to those of know¬
ledge."4 But such strong language is hardly justified,for
1. Essay, 3. 14. 18. 2. Locke uses faith in two different
meanings. This is theological faith, differing from reason
Elsewhere he speaks of faith as probability.
3. Essay, 4. 18. 2. 4. Works, 2.. 293, note.
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while Locke allows reason to go out one door in formal
definition, he finds it necessary to bring it tack through
another, for just so long as traditional revelation is
passed from person to person, its transmission opens it to
the possibility of error; and in such a situation reason
must judge. Thus:
VYhatever God hath revealed is certainly true:
no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper
object of faith: but whether it be a divine
revelation or no, reason must judge; which can
never permit the mind to reject a greater evi¬
dence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow
it to entertain probability in opposition to
knowledge and certainty. There can be no evi¬
dence that any traditional revelation is of
divine original, in the words which we receive
it, andcin: .then-sense we understand it, so clear
and so certain as that of the principles of
reason: and therefore Nothing that is contrary
to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-
evident dictates of reason, has a right to be
urged or assented to as a matter of faith,
wherein reason has nothing to do.^~
Faith, then,while distinguished by Locke from reason as a
different way by which religious truth may be received,
finally rests upon reason for its validity. Thus the empha¬
sis, with which Locke asserts, in the passage quoted above,
of the absolute dominion of faith in its own province, seems
1. Essay, 4. 18. 10.
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to be incongruous with the general trend of his argument.
He himself makes this specific in the following statement.
"Where I treat of it faith ....in contradistinction to
reason; though in truth it is nothing else but an assent
founded on the highest reason."''" There can be no doubt
about the ambiguity of the position indicated here, and one
may try in vain to make out of it a coherent system. Faith
«
appears most strongly when it is viewed by Locke as a theor¬
etical possibility, and when he is insisting upon the power
of God to communicate with men in direct suppernatural
revelation. In this capacity, faith can discover to men
certain religious truths which are above reason. Yet since
Locke is expressly concerning himself only with traditional
revelation, he insists that reason must judge its validity,
since errors may occur in its transmission from the specta¬
tor to one who has not seen. There are two vulnerable points
appearing in Locke's discussion of faith. In the first place,
it is open to the charge of subjectivism, when he allows
the credit of revelation to rest on testimony, !•£«, on
the "credit of the proposer." Secondly, and closely allied
to the first weakness, a strong individualistic tendency is
1. Essay, 4. 16. 14.
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manifest, when he states that every man must judge for him¬
self the truth of and given revelation. Perhaps the root
of the difficulty is in Locke's failure to distinguish clear
ly between the content delivered and the criterion of valid¬
ity. In one passage in the Reasonableness of Christianity he
indicates an awareness of the distinction which we suggest.
And many are beholden to revelation, who do
not acknowledge it. It is no diminishing to
revelation, that reason gives its suffrage too,
to the truths ef revelation has discovered. But
it is our mistake to think, that because reason
confirms them to us, we had the first certain
knowledge of them from thence; and in that
clear evidence we now possess them.-1-
If it were not for the fact that Locke staunchly maintained
that divine revelation was always accompanied by extraord¬
inary outward signs to vouch its truth, we might accept
the above distinction as final. As it is we are left with
logical difficulties in regard to his theoretical position.
Having taken into account the theoretical grounds on
which Locke marks off reason and revelation, and the manner
in which their respective data are to be appropriated, we
turn to that practical relationship which he assigns to
"natural religion" on the one hand, and "revealed religion"
1. Works, 7. 145.
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.on the other. We take the term natural religion to be the
content of religion discovered through the use of the "light
of nature" or the "unaided reason", as distinguished from
revealed or positive religion which is made known through
direct supernatural revelation of God in Christ. Behind his
whole treatment, on^e finds Locke's undiscussed assumption
that the Gospel v/as but a republication of the original,
pure, religion of nature. This assumption was held widely
among the rationalists of the time.
As we have seen, Locke's thought is very hospitable to
natural religion, i.e., to the religion whose contents can
be discovered by reason alone. Reason can instruct man about
the existence of God and in the knowledge of his duty. Before
the coming of Christ, the Gentiles had such a religion,
according to the light of nature which instructed them in
the "immutable standard of right."■*■ While theoretically this
should have been sufficient for them, actually something was
lacking, for "Natural religion, in its full extent, was no¬
where, that I know, taken care of by the force of natural
reason."2 Among the ancients, Locke says in an early
1. Works, 7« 133«
2. Works. 7- 138.
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fragment, Sacerdos. the philosophers instructed men in
virtue, hut their speculations were too intricate for the
vulgar, and since the philosophers had nothing to do with
the priests, such rules of morality had no authority. Locke
always assumes that there must he supernatural authority
to buttress a rule of morality. No promise of a futre life
was made explicit, with its hope of rewards and fear of
punishments, and " a clear knowledge of their duty was
wanting to mankind."1 The result was that, previous to
God's revelation in Christ, man was actually led by reason
not so much towards as away from the knowledge of God and
the fulfillment of His moral law.
When, however, Christ came to earth he gave both know¬
ledge and authority to the principles which men had or could
have discovered by natural reason, so that, as Locke insist¬
ed, men could not fail to recognize them as coming from God.
He attaches great significance to the coming of Christ from
this practical point of view and ascribes to it the blend¬
ing of religion and morality.
Jesus Christ, bringing by revelation from
Heaven the true religion to mankind, reunited
1. Works, 7« 139»
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these two again, religion and morality, as the
inseparable parts of the worship of God, which
ought never to have been separated, wherein
for the obtaining the favour and forgiveness
of the Piety, the chief part of what man could
do consisted in a holy life. . .1
Further, Christ was able to establish an authority for the
virtuous life, "To one that is once persuaded that Jesus
Christ was sent from God all his commands become
principles."2 And all must recognize that Christ was sent
from God, for he bears the extraordinary outward signs,
miracles which "lie level with the commonest understanding.
He that can distinguish between sick and well, lame and
sound, dead and alive, is capable of his doctrine."3 Once
acknowledged, Christ's principles were further fortified
by the revelation of the certainty of a future life, with
rewards and punishments dealt out in a last judgment, so
that men who recognized that in this world "virtue and
prosperity do not often accompany one another"4 would be
constrained to live the good life here for the eventual
reward in the next world. Worship was purified by Christ
of its too great formality, and made into an inward and
1. King, LLJL, 237.
2. Works, 7. 146, 147.
3» Works, 7• 146.
4. Works, 7« 148.
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spiritual service of prayer and praise to God as our Father.
In the human endeavour after righteousness God had promised,
through Christ, the continued assistance of the Holy Spirit!
There can he no doubt that Locke placed great emphasis
on the coming of Christ, on the actual and practical side.
While he would hardly he willing to say that Christ's advent
introduced any new content into our religious knowledge,
he explicitly asserts that the event is of the great impor¬
tance in bringing to men an absolute assurance of the know¬
ledge of God, and the consequent authority of this knowledge
is a buttress for morality. It had the further advantage of
revealing to the unlearned a content of religious truth
of which they would otherwise have remained ignorant. One
might wish that Locke had investigated fully the question
as to why, before the time of Christ, men had failed to
take advantage of the benefit of natural religion; for his
answer would have thrown great light on our central problem.
There is an obvious divergence between the theoretical
and practical position which Locke sets up concerning reason
and revelation as channels for discovering religious truth.
!. Works, 7« 151.
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In theory Locke never rejects the possibility of revelation,
hut he narrows its sphere, and the logic of his position
excludes it. Bound by his uncritical assumption that revel¬
ation is a fact, he attempts to make it cohere with his
theory of knowledge. The resultant tendency is to emphasize
reason at the expense of revelation. On the practical side
of his discussion, found chiefly within his specifically
religious writings, he finds that the revelation in Christ
procured advantages which natural religion was unable to
achieve. Thus in the practical sphere the tendency to
minimize tacitly the importance of reason, by emphasizing
the authority of Christ's advent, is manifest.
In connection with Locke's discussion of revelation,
special place must be given to his doctrine of miracles.
We have pointed out the evidential value which he assigns to
them in certifying a given revelation, but it is well that
we take account of what this seventeenth century man of
science considered a miracle to be.
A miracle then I take to be a sensible oper¬
ation, which, being above the comprehension of
the spectator, and in his opinion contrary to
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the established course of nature is taken by
him to he divine.^
Having defined a miracle, Locke immediately anticipates
two possible objections which he thinks might be raised
against his definition and sets about to answer them. In
the first place, he thinks that such a definition will be
considered very uncertain, "for it depending on the opin¬
ion of the spectator, that will be a miracle to one which
p
will not be so to another." But Locke holds, while admit'
ing the truth of the objection, that it has no force;
For it being agreed, that a miracle
must be that which surpasses the force of nat¬
ure in the established, steady laws of causes
and effects, nothing can be taken to be a
miracle but what is judged to exceed those
laws. Now every one being able to judge those
laws only by his own acquaintance with nature,
and notions of its force (which are different
in different men) it is unavoidable that that
should be a miracle to one, which is not so
to another.3
Here we see exhibited once again Locke's predisposition to
treat evidence from a completely individualistic point of
view, laying the burden of proof for the confirmation of
the reality of a miracle upon the spectator's ability to
r* Works, 9*6256.
2. Works, 9. 256.
3« Works, 9. 256.
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recognize it as such, and to distinguish it from what he
knows of the orderly processes in nature.
The second objection which he anticipates is that he
failed to make his definition exclusive enough.
Another objection to this definition, will be,
that the notion of a miracle thus enlarged, may
come sometimes to take in operations that have
nothing extraordinary or supernatural in them,
and thereby invalidate the use of miracles for
the attesting of dvine revelation.
To which I answer, not at all.....1
In this proposed objection the only miracles called into
question are those which are wrought in confirmation of a
divine revelation, and Locke assumes that history indicates
but three persons "who have come in the name of the one
2
only true God....viz. Moses, Jesus and Mahomet." Other
claims he dismisses as "obscure" or "wild stories" which are
"manifestly fabulous."
Now of these three before mentioned, Mahomet
having [no miracles} to produce, pretends to no
miracles for vouching his mission; so that the
only revelations that come attested by miracles,
being those of Moses and Christ, and they con¬
firming each other; the business of miracles,
as it stands really in matter of fact, has no
!. Works, 9« 257-
2. Works, 9« 258.
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manner of difficulty in it: and I think the most
scrupulous or sceptical cannot from miracles
raise the least doubt against the divine revel¬
ation of the gospel.
In this manner Locke thinks he has his argument well in
hand, as far as concerns what has actually taken place in
history, hut since "scholars and disputants will he raising
questions where there are none"'" he adduces further proof
to substantiate his position.
The first proof set forth is based upon two presup¬
positions, first, of the unity and supreme power -of God,
and second, that such power is utilized by God to commun¬
icate truth to men. Thus:
God can never he thought to suffer a lye,
set up in opposition to a truth coming from
him, should be hacked by a greater power than
he will show for the confirmation and prop¬
agation of a doctrine which he has revealed,
to the end it might be believed.3
To give a concrete example of what he had in his mind Locke
cites the miracles Moses performed before Pharaoh in com¬
petition with the Egyptian sorcerers. Since both were able
produce,, "serpents, blood and frogs" their actions "could
1. 1tforks, 9- 258.
2o Works, 9. 258, 259.
3,. Works, 9» 260.
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not to the spectators "but appear equally miraculous." "But
when Moses serpent eat up theirs, when he produced lice
which they could not the decision was easy.""1"
The other proof Locke proposed was "based upon the
abundance of miracles offered as credentials of the Gospel.
Such caret has God taken that no pretended
revelation should stand in competition with
what is trule divine, that we need but to
open our eyes to see and be sure which came
from him.2
The number, variety, and greatness of the
miracles wrought for the confirmation of the
doctrine delivered by Jesus Christ, carry
with them such strong marks of an extraord¬
inary divine power, that the truth of his
mission will stand firm and unquestionable..-^
Here again we are given concrete exemplification.
For example, Jesus of Nazareth, professes
himself sent from God: he with a word calms
a tempest at sea. This one looks on as a mir¬
acle, and consequently cannot but receive his
doctrine. Another thinks that this might be
the effect of chance, or skill in the weather,
and no miracle and so stands out; but after¬
wards seeing him walk on the sea, owns that
for a miracle and. believes: which yet to
another has not the force, who suspects it
may be done by the assistance of a spirit.
But yet the same person, seeing afterwards
our Saviour cure and inveterate palsy by a
1. Works, 9 • 260.
2. Works, 9. 261.
3« Works, 9» 261.
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word, admits for a miraclesand becomes a convert.
Another overlooking it in this instance, after¬
wards finds a miracle in his giving sight to
one "born blind, or raising the dead, or his
rasing himself from the dead, and so receives
his doctrine as a revelation coming from God.^-
As we have already noticed, whenever Locke speaks of a
revelation as having actually taken place, his discussion
is always marked by the conviction that it is miraculously
attested, 'ffhen he thinks that he has shown that a miracle
has been performed, there is to be no wavering in the
acceptance of the doctrine which it is employed to confirm.
For miracles...are the basis on which divine
mission is always established and consequent¬
ly that foundation on which believers of any
divine revelation must ultimately bottom their
faith..... 2 •
Yet in this passage we do not have Locke's complete position,
for he appears to engage in a kind of circular reasoning,
which hardly confirms the statement just quoted above. 3y
making the assumption that miracles did take place in
history, the purpose of which was to establish the truth
of the Gospel, he seeks to bring that ideajS into harmony
with the intellectual and moral claims of religion discover¬
able by reason. And when the theoretical claims of revelation
lo Works, 9« 259«
2. Works, 9. 264.
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and reason come into conflict Locke is, as we have seen,
prone to give the primacy to reason. This is true concern¬
ing miracles.
I do not deny in the least that God can do,
or hath done miracles for the confirmation of
truth; "but I only say that we cannot think he
should do them to enforce doctrines or notions
of himself, or any worship of him not conform¬
able to reason, or that we can receive such
for truth for the miracle's sake: and even in
those books which have the greatest proof of
revelation from God, and the. attestation of
miracles to confirm their being so, the mira¬
cles are to be judged by the doctrine, and not
the doctrine by the miracles 1
There is a further passage in the Reasonableness of
Christianity which thrown further light on this problem.
For though it be easy to omnipotent power
to do all things by an immediate over-ruling
will, and so to make any instruments work,
even contrary to their nature^ in subserviency
to his ends; yet his wisdom is not usually at
the expense of miracles,(if I may so say)
but only in cases that require them, for the
evidencing of some revelation or mission to
be from him. He does constantly (unless where
the confirmation of some truth requires it
otherwise) bring about his purposes by means
of operating according to their natures. If
it were not so, the course and evidence of
things would be confounded, miracles would lose
their name and force; and there would be no
distinction between natural and supernatural.^
1. King, LLJL, 126.
2. Works, 7* 84, 85»
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Thus when miracles are not needed they hut confound the
truth. The point is carried further and made more explicit:/
in relation to the whole matter of faith when, after saying
that faith and reason stand in their own separate spheres,
Locke says:
Their grounds are so far from "being the same
or having anything in common, that when it is
brought to certainty, faith is destroyed; it is
knowledge then, and faith no longer.^-
Hence when any truth has been apprehended as certain by
reason, then Locke says that faith is not only irrele¬
vant and confounding, but that, indeed, it is impossible.
Here he follows the tradional scholastic distinction, laid
down by Aquinas between faith and reason.
It is interesting to note that Locke considered that
no miracles were accomplished after the time of the apostles.
fc ivle.
In controversy with Jonas Proast, he, summoned -the- aid -e-f
his friend Limborch,to prepare for him the evidence on the
subject which can be found in his Third Letter on Toleration.
But this, I think, is evident, that he who will
build his faith on reasonings upon miracles deliv¬
ered by church historians, will find cause to go
1. Works, 2. 293, note.
109 -
no further than the apostles' times, or else not
stop at Constantine: since the writers after that
period..... speak of miracles in their time with
no less assurance, than the fathers before the
fourth century and a great part of miracles stood
upon the credit of the fourth.1
Locke was convinced that, after the time of Christ and his
apostles, the gospel was so well attested that it needed
no further assistance from miracles. This is in line with
his general point of view of the essential reasonableness
of Christianity, which, when once apprehended by the
simplest of human kind, would be acceptable to them.
It is not difficult to criticize this doctrine of
miracles with its assumptions and circular reasoning. As
Worcester has pointed out, in grounding the validity of
miracles on the scientific knowledge of the beholder, Locke
introduces one of the most cautious and destructive attacks
ever attempted. It is probable that he never intended to
throw discredit on miracles, but that in a time when reason
was attempting to assert itself amid religious prejudice,
the true significance of this destructive criticism was not
apparent to him. Bound by his naive assumption that miracles
must always accompany revelation, he sought to account for
1. Works, 6. 453*
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them as best he could. On the positive side it appears that
Locke believed that miracles told man something about God.
"Their significance to him lies not so much in the contrar¬
iety to ordinary events, as in the light they threw upon the
divine nature, which could use them to enforce a system
of morality, thoroughly acceptable to human reason."!
In the fourth edition of the Essay, after some corres-
pondance with Molyneaux, Locke added a section to it which
he called "Enthusiasm", a form of assent which he conceived
to be capable of the grossest error. Its discussion is
helpful in distinguishing Locke's conceptions of reason
and revelation and their separate spheres.
Upon this occasion, I shall take the liberty
to consider a third ground of assent, which
with some men has the same authority, and is as
confidently relied on as either faith or reason;
I mean enthusiasm: which laying by reason would
set up revelation without it.2
We have seen that Locke considered it impossible for rev¬
elation to assert its position without the aid of reason,
and that he who would put away reason in the interests of
revelation "puts out the light of .both." The_ source of
interest in immediate revelation as a manner in which
1. Alexander, LOC, 88.
2. Essay, 4. 19« 3»
- Ill -
religious truth could "be appropriated, Locke thought was
not hard to find. It was horn of the intellectual laziness
which he believed was characteristic of the majority of
mankind.
Immediate revelation being a much easier way
for men to establish their opinions and regulate
their conduct, than the tedious and not always
successful labour of strict reasoning, it is no
wonder that some have been very apt to pretend
to revelation, and tp persuade themselves that
they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven
in their actions and opinions, and especially
in those of them which they cannot account for
by the ordinary method of knowledge and the
principles of reason.
Locke did not deny the possibility of immediate revelation.
G-od, I own, cannot be denied to be able to
enlighten the understanding by a ray darted
into the mind immediately from the fountain of
light.2
But he did think that men too^basily made that possibility
an untrue conviction, with the result that the "conceits
of a warmed and overweening brain"^ led them to identify
their own wish of what might be true with that which actually
is true.
For strong conceit, like a new principle, carries
1. Essay, 4. 19» 5»
2. Essay, 4. 19* 5*
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all easily with it, when got above common sense,
and freed from restraint of reason and check of
reflection, it is heightened into a divine auth¬
ority, in concurrance with out own temper and
inclination. 1
Once this process had begun, it continued in a vicious
circle, and Locke says that the adherents unconsciously
become bound in this way. "it is a revelation because they
firmly believe it: and they believe it because it is a
revelation.
A little later in his treatment Locke makes a most
interesting statement, characteristic of his penetrating
insight. After making the more obvious statement that firm¬
ness of persuasion is hardly proof that any proposition has
come from God, he makes it very clear that the high quality
of one's moral life does not free the honest searcher after
truth from the hard intellectual labour of its pursuit.
Good men are still 'liable to mistakes, and are
sometimes warmly engaged in errors, -which they
take for divine truths, shining in the minds
with the clearest light.*
Locke dreaded enthusiasm. In its meaning was bound
1. Essay, 4. 19« 10.
2. Essay, 4. 19« 12.
3« Essay, 4. 19» 12.
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together those things which he hated most - subservience
to tradition and authority, emotional warmth buttressing
religious prejudice, and above all its tendency to obscure
reasoning. It was this dread which prompted him to look
among the things of sense for the evidence of revelation,
and led him to put his trust in the outward miracle rather
than in an inward assurance. It is in this section of his
work that Locke gives us, in a celebrated statement, the
key to his theology as well as his philosophy. "Reason
must be our last judge and guide in everything.Locke
had lived through a period of history when an unenlightened
religious enthusiasm had caused great difficulty. He raised
a strong voice against it, and the influence of his attack
carried weight through an entire century.
Now, after a survey of Locke's exposition concerning
reason and revelation, the main trend of his argument presents
itself in outline. It begins with the assumption that reason
and revelation are two distinct means for the apprehension
of divine truth. Reason is able to discover the existence
of God, and to instruct man in his duty. Revelation, accred¬
ited by miracles, and checked by reason, enlarges our know-
1. Essay, 4. 19» 14.
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ledge and enforces the claim of duty, but is never able
to contradict the knowledge gained by our clear intuitive
perceptions. In theory, Locke gives the more important place
to reason, which shares with revelation the function of
discovering religious truth, but stands supreme as our
"last judge and guide" to its validity. In the practical
experience of mankind, it has been found (Locke does not
say why), that reason has not been able to accredit, nor to
enforce, its claims to all people, so that it was not until
the revelation of God in Christ as Messiah that men actually
e
had the knowledge of God, and sufficient inducement to live
according to His will.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONTENT OF NATURAL RELIGION
In the previous chapter we have seen that Locke drew
a r$gid distinction between the claims of reason and rev¬
elation in the discovery of religious truth. It is our
purpose in this chapter to determine how much and what
divine truth Locke believed can reacb^by the use 'of
his "unaided reason." Our investigation will be attended
with some difficulty, since Locke nowhere gives a clear
account of what he means when he speaks of natural reli¬
gion, nor does he present s,n ordered survey of its content.
It must be remembered in this connection, that, at the
time when Locke was doing his thinking and writing, natural
religion was a topic of considerable importance, and all
thinking men, religious and laymen alike, had something to
/
say about it. It appears from Locke's scattered references
to natural religion that its importance was $o evident to
him that he did not consider it necessary to argue its case.
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V»e have noticed already that though his method in formulat¬
ing his theory of knowledge was empirical and was thus in
the main stream of Baconian tradition, Locke nowhere acknow¬
ledges the name or work of the one who formulated it. Simil¬
arly, his theoretical theological views are permeated with
what appears to he full consent to the claim of natural
,-s
religion to discover by reason all that it needful of G-od,
and of one's duty towards Him. It is only in this light that
Locke's principle interest in religious problems, wherein he
attempts to rationalize the content of revealed religion,
can be adequately understood. He was above all a practical
man whose interests were in "clearing the ground a little"
and applying principles. This he achieved with an extraord¬
inary amount of common^sense. It is this same general and
practical interest which precluded Locke from giving any
systematic treatment of the content of natural religion. As
a result we must draw our references from scattered and
fragmentary material.
Let us look at Locke's specific references to natural
religion. In his discussion of the imperfection of words,
when he speaks of the difficulty in comprehending the mean-
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ing of the Scriptures through words, he has this to say
ahout natural religion.
And we ought to magnify his God's goodness,
that he hath spread before all"the world such
legible characters of his works and providence,
and given mankind so sufficient a light of
reason, that they to whom this written word
never came, could not (whenever they set them¬
selves to search ) either doubt of the being of
a G-od, or of obedience due to him. Since then
the precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and
very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom
come to be controverted: and other revealed
truths which are conveyed to us by books and
languages, are liable to the common and natur¬
al obscurities and difficulties incident to
words; me thinks it would become us to be more
careful ahd diligent in observing the former,
and less magisterial, positive, and imperious,
in imposing.our own sense and interpretation on
the latter.
While it is true that Locke's purpose here is to assert
the insufficiency of language in the transmission of divine
revelation, he also asserts the "superior catholicity of
natural religion."2
Again in a passage already quote from a Discourse of
Miracles, there is this specific reference to natural
religion.
.No mission can looked on to be divine
i\
1. Essay, 3« 9» 23»
2. Essay, 1. 121. note 1.
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that delivers any thing derogating from the hon¬
our of the one, only, true, Invisible God, or
inconsistent with natural religion and the rules
of morality: because God having discovered to
men the unity and majesty of his eternal godhead,
and the truths of natural religion and morality
by the light of reason, he cannot be supposed to
back the contrary by revelation.......3-
It is quite clear that neither of these references deali>
primarily, in a positive way, with the theoretical adequacy
of natural religion; it is this fact, indeed, which had
caused Hefelbower to conclude that the weight of Locke's
emphasis is only to be properly understood when it is seen
as an attempt to rationalize the content of revealed relig¬
ion. But can we say that this is a proper interpretation of
what little material Locke gives us? Even in the narrow
sphere in which Locke found that absolutely certain knowledge
obtained, the basic elements of natural religion are found.
"We are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are)
to discover enough in the creatures to lead us to the know¬
ledge of the Creator, and the knowledge of our duty;......"5
Again, we find Locke saying that God "hath furnished men
with those faculties which will serve for the sufficient
discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being:
!• Works, 9. 261, 262.
2. Hefelbowev, RJL, 124.
3« Essay, 2. 23« 12.
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and I doubt not but to show that m man, by the right use
of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles,
attain to the knowledge of a God, and other things that
concern him."1 Here Locke's reference is in the midst of a
polemic against innate ideas, and contains a positive state¬
ment only in protest against what he believed to be a false
way of discovering religious truth, by innate prin¬
ciples. In his Journal for Sunday, September 18, 1681, there
is a much more positive statement. "That there is a God, and
what God is; nothing can discover to us, nor judge in us, but
natural reason." This is an important statement, for it
attributes to reason the power of discovery in religious
matters as well as that of judgment.
In light of our discussion it is not too much to infer
that Locke, as a rationalist, had in the back of his mind a
definite assurance that an adequate, if unsystematic, content
of natural religion could be discovered by the use of human
reason. It is on the basis of this deep-seated persuasion,
that, it appears to us, Locke sought to make reasonable the
revealed doctrines. Perhaps it is not untrue to say that in
his heart and experience the truths of revealed religion
1 • m s say, 1. 4. 12 •
2. King, LLJL, 124.
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were primary, "but that when he came to think about the extent
of human knowledge and the powers of reason, he found that
reason, well used, was able to discover a great body of
religious truth. This he called natural religion.
When Locke attacked the theory of innate ideas, he destroy¬
ed what he believed to be a false basis of ideas, including
the idea of God. He thought it unnecessary to appeal to such
a theory when it appeared to him that a better basis for
the knowledge of the existence of God could be established.
Locke's attitude towards the ontological proof for the
existence of God is moderately sceptical in the Essay. In
his discussion of the abstract opposition between idea and
real existence, Locke maintained that there could be no
direct transition between them. Thus, "the having of an idea
of anything in our mind no more proves the existence of that
thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the
world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history."4
This truth was one generally agreed upon, with the one excep¬
tion in which it was held that, since the idea of God includ¬
ed his possessing every positive quality of perfection, to
deny his existence would prove to be a logical contradiction
of terms. The argument was originally formulated by Anselm,
1. Essay, 4. 2. 1.
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"but was revived by Descartes and given gres,t emphasis by
him. In the Essay, Locke has this to say about it#
How far the idea of a most perfect being, which
a man may frame in his mind, does or does not
prove the existence of a G-od, I will not here ex¬
amine. For in the different make of men's tempers
and application of their thoughts, some arguments
prevail more on one, and some on another for the
confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think,
this I may say, that it is an ill way for establish
ing this truth, and silencing atheists, to lay the
whole stress of so important a point as this on
that sole foundation.^
Later, in a paper entitled Deus, published in the collection
by Lord King, Locke expressly considers this theistic proof
and rejects it. His objection to it has its basis in prin¬
ciples already laid down in the Essay.
By ideas in the mind we discern the agreement and
disagreement of ideas that have a like ideal ex¬
istence in our minds, but that reaches no further,
proves no real existence, for the truth we knwfe is
only of our ideas, and is applicable to things
only as they are supposed to exist answering such
ideas. But any idea, simple or complex, barely by
being in our minds, is no evidence of the real
existence of anything out of oursminds answering
that idea.^
Should the statement be made that our idea of God includes
Essay, 4-. 10. 7
2. King, LLJL, 316
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necessary existence, Locke would say that it is hut to
"suppose" it and does not prove His existence, for "real
existence can he proved only hy real existence, and there¬
fore, the real existence of G-od can only he proved hy the
real existence of other things."! In a reply to the Bishop
of Worcester's attack on the Essay, Locke utilized the
argument which was set down under Deus, and it may he con¬
jectured that it was for this purpose that Locke took upon
himself the consideration of the problem.2
Locke's use of the teleological argument is not clear.
In several instances he appears to infer the existence of
G-od from order and purpose observed in creation. "For the
visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so
plainly in all the works of creation, that a rational
creature, who will hut seriously reflect upon them, cannot
miss the discovery of a Deity."^ This may he read teleolog-
ically, hut it also may he understood cosmologically. There
are,however, further references which lend themselves to
interpretation as an argument for the existence of G-od from
design. Speaking of the eye, Locke says that "the structure
1. King, LLJL, 316.
2. Works, 4. 53^56.
3. Essay, 1. 3* 9*
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of that one part is sufficient to convince me of an all-wise
Contriver. And he has so visible claim to us as his workman¬
ship that one of the ordinary appellations of God in Script¬
ure is God, our Maker.
There are further references to "the all-wise Contriver",
a name for God which Locke often employs. Sometimes he speaks
of God as an Architect, as in the following statement."And
when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker,
we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnifi¬
cent harmony of the universe, and the great design and
infinite goodness of the Architect "2 From references
such as these Fraser has concluded that there can be no
doubt of "his [Locke'sj recognition of the teleological
argument."-^ Hefelbower, on the other hand, thinks it doubt¬
ful if Locke employs it, saying that his formulation of it
is neither clear nor adequate. He contends that the argument
appears but incidently. This latter statement is obviously
true, but that Locke did not employ the argument is not as
apparent. The passages cited give some fragmentary indica¬
tion that Locke recognized certain evidences of design and
Works. 5* 252.
'Essay, 3. 6. 12.
3. Hastings, ERE, 2. 177*
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purpose in the world which pointed men to the knowledge of
the existence of God. It is difficult to believe that the
essential points of the argument as we have indicated them
had no meaning for him.
There can be no doubt whatever that Locke placed the
greatest emphasis on his "demonstration" for the existence
of God; his own special formulation of the cosmological
argument. Locke lays great weight upon it and his treatment
of it is full and explicit. He believed that he had an
incontrovertible proof of God's existence, as certain as the
correct answer to a mathematical problem. Man can, "by the
right use of his natural abilities",''' come to an absolutely
certain proof of the existence of God which is open neither
to doubt nor error. "It is as certain that there is a God,
as.that the opposite angles made by the intersection of
two straight lines are equal.Locke, of course, realized
that God cannot be presented to us in sense experience. And
as we have shown in the discussion of his theory of know¬
ledge, real existence can be known only of one's own ego.
In his rejection of the ontological argument, Locke made it
clear that real existence could be proved only by real
-*-• Sssay, 1. 3« 12.
2. Essay, 1. 3» 17•
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existence, and the only real existence which one can know
is one's own conscious self. It is from this fact that Locke
deduced his demonstration. For, as he declared, "we cannot
want a clear proof.... .[that God exists] as long as we carry
ourselves about us."^ He then elaborated the steps of his
proof as follows:
I think that it is beyond question, that a man
has a clear idea of his own being; he knows cer¬
tainly that he exists, and that he is something.
...This, then, I think I may take for a
truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures
him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz, that
he is something that actually exists.
an
In the ne^t place, man knows, byAintuitive
certainty that bare nothing can no more produce
any real being, than it can be equal to two
right angles
If, therfore, we know there is some real
being, and that nonentity cannot produce any
real being, it is an evident demonstration, that
from eternity there has been some thing; since
what was not from eternity had a beginning; and
what had a beginning must be produced by some¬
thing else.2
Next, it is evident, that what had its being
and beginning from another, must also have all
that which is in an_belongs to its being from
another too. All the powers it has must be ow¬
ing to and received from the same source.5
1. Essay, 4• 10. 1.
2. Essay, 4. 10. 2.
j. E s say, 4• 10. 4.
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We can thus see the main outline of Locke's position.
He would say it something like this. As a rational "being, I
know that I have not always existed. It is evident also that
Something has existed from all eternity. It is a fallacy to
think that real existence, an example of which I have in my¬
self, could produce itself out of nothing. Since I am aware
of my finiteness, that I had a "beginning, and know that
everything which had a beginning must have been produced by
something else, all that belongs to me as a human being must
have come from another Being, an Eternal Something. This
Eternal Something is God. One may not care to call such a
Being God, but according to Locke "that matters not."
This process of demonstration "requires thought and
attention; and the mind must apply itself to a regular de¬
duction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or
else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of
other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear
demonstration."1 When this process has been properly has
been properly carried out, the existence of God, Locke
believed,is "the most obvious truth that reason (reasoning^
1. Essay, A. 10. 1.
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discovers.
It is this argument which lies behind Locke's theoretical
concept of God, and as we have pointed out, his demonstra¬
tion is hut a modification of the well-known cosmological
argument. Locke had given much thought to his proof of God's
existence, and while he undoubtedly received help from the
thought of others in its formulation, it may have said to
have been his own by virtue of the hard intellectual labour
which he gave to it. Aaron J[as pointed out some of the source
material for Locke's proof. "The influence of Cicero and
Cudworth... .is very apparent." He shows that in the tenth
chapter of the fourth book of the Essay, Locke mentions
Cicero's De Legibus by name and seems also to draw from De
Natura Deborum. "His journal for 18th of February 1682
reveals the extent of his debt to Ralph Cudworth's The True
Intellectual System of the Universe."3 One also sees here
evidences of the Scholastic thought which show how much
Locke was enmeshed in concepts which had been originally
I
\ 0 '
formulated by them. Ia) hrv»~'
Aaron also points out that a criticism which has been urged
1. Essay, 4. 10. 1.
2. Aaron, LOC, 241.
3. Aaron, LOC, 241, note 3*
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against the cosmological argument cannot he used against it
as it is stated hy Locke; it cannot he argued that he is
assuming as impossible an infinite series of causes, a series
that must end in a First Cause. What is heing argued for here
is simply that any present existent is dependent upon some¬
thing that has existed from eternity.
Locke's argument is full of presuppositions. He assumes
that anything which has had a beginning must have had a
cause. Throughout his demonstration the principle of causal¬
ity is employed as a universal necessity. In his discussion
of "cause" Locke used it to refer to those meanings which
arise in consciousness when sequences are observed in the
world of sense. But is it within the power of observation to
see what is the cause and what has been caused, in any given
instance? Even if one could be sure of the causal relations
in the pheijmena of the material world, its use be a theistic
argument such as this is precarious. The argument must break
down because its universal necessity cannot be proved, since
its observation is manifestly beyond the range of sensible
or reflective experience.
Furthermore, Locke's use of the term Eternity lacks
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precision. For him it was hut a negative idea. It can he
understood only in terms of the intellectual necessity which
forces one to make duration infinite. Locke's argument is
principally based on his 'belief that creation ex nihilis
is impossible. Since real existence cannot he conceived to
have come from nothing, the mind is called on to acknowledge
that some real being has existed from eternity which is
sufficient to create other real being. And, as Kant has
pointed out, we are thus driven from the cosrnological arg¬
ument to the ontologicalf since the idea of real being
carries with it the idea of necessary existence. Should
Locke protest that it is not the idea of real existence
which is presupposed, but real existence itself, one may ask
a further question. "Is the step from present existence to
necessary existence from eternity anything more than ideal?
And if it is merely ideal, has not the cosmological argument
revealed itself to be in essence the ontological argument
which Locke himself rejected?"^ It appears that Locke assumed
all that he sought to prove, but since the idea of 0-od as F
First Cujase was little criticised in his day, the argument
which he formulated continued to exercise influence through
1. Aaron, LOG, 243»
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the next century.
Locke not only used his demonstration to prove the bare
existence of God, but employed it as well in deducing two
of the attributes of God's nature. God's omnipotence, Locke
thought, could be proved by the via causalitatis. After he
had declared that it is necessary to suppose that something
has existed from eternity, he finds that it must have been
all-poweffful.
Next, it is evident, that what had its being and
beginning from another, must also have all that
which is in and belongs to its being from another
too. All the powers it has must be owing to and
received from the same source. This eternal source,
then, of all being must also be the source and
original of all power; and so this eternal Being
must also be the most powerful.!
This involves the principle that the ultimate cause of all
things must have within itself the capacity to produce all
that exists. On this principle Locke deduces the second
attribute of God's nature.
Again, a man finds in himself perception and
knowledge. We have then got one step further; and
we are certain now that there is not only some
being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the
world. There was a time, then, when there was no
!• Essay, 4.1. 4.
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knowing "being, and when knowledge began to be;
or else there has been also a knowing being from
eternity. If it is said, there was a time when
no being had any knowledge, when that eternal
being was void of all understanding; I reply,
that then it Was impossible there should have
been any knowledge: it being impossible that
things wholly void of knowledge, and operating
blindly, and without any perception, should pro¬
duce a knowing being, as it is impossible that
a triangle should make itself three angles bigger
than two right ones.1
Locke could not see how matter could possibly produce mind.
Intelligence alone, he would maintain, is capable of prod-
ducing intelligence. Therefore the fact of intelligence,
revealed in self-conscious thought, must have its origin in
a Supreme Mind. Locke was not exactly sure what mind meant
when it was applied to the Supreme and Eternal Being. His
great perplexity arose from the notion that in the principle
of causality, as he understood it, nothing can be contained
in the effect which is not first in the cause. This argument
he saw would prove too much. Locke had proved from the
existence of his own intelligent being, a Supreme, All-know¬
ing Being. Could not the same principle be used in another
way? Could not one take, as the starting point, extended
being, the reality of which Locke admitted, and infer as its
1. Essay, 4. 10. 5•
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cause a God of material substance? To do this would have
made the Infinite Being both "material and cognative." But
y
Locke could not accept this conclusion because it came into
conflict with his conception of God as Supreme Mind, a Being
totally immaterial. Yet if he was to go equally on his via
casualitatls, it was obvious that on the basis of the prin¬
ciple he used to infer Supreme Intelligence from finite
intelligence, he must also, for the same reason, infer
extension in God's nature. This Spinoza had maintained.
Locke was aware of the implications of his difficulty. One
way to have disentangled the problem would have been to
attempt to reduce matter to mind. But this was impossible
in Locke's philosophy because he had maintained that sensa¬
tion and reflection were two distinct and independent sources
of knowledge. Locke struggled to remove this obstacle in
his thought of God. He believed that it would be disaster-
ous to include matter as an attribute of Deity. If he
invested every particle of matter with thought, there would
be as many thinking beings as there were particles of
matter, and there would be an infinite number of gods.
If then neither one peculiar atom alone can be
this eternal thinking being; nor all matter, as
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matter, i.e. every particle of matter, can Tee it;
it only remains, that it is some certain system
of natter, duly put together, that is this think¬
ing, eternal being.
Locke believed that this was the most common held by those
who held that God was material. But it did not solve the
problem.
To suppose the eternal thinking Being to be
nothing but a composition of particle of matter,
each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all
the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal Being
only to a juxta-position of parts; than \^hich
nothing can be more absurd.2
It was impossible to produce matter from mind. Locke was
inclined to think it better understandable that even one
atom of being which thinks, could, if all-powerful, by an
act of will create all matter. But how matter could be
created out of nothing, he could not see.
Locke never came to any satisfactory solution of this
problem, though it was a continual disturbance to his mind.
In' a letter written to Anthony Collins very shortly before
his death, he expressed the opinion that mind cannot be
ascribed to God in the sense we know it in man.
1. Essay, 4. 10. 16.
2. Essay, 4. 10. 16.
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Though I call the thinking faculty in me,
mind, I cannot, because of that name, equal it
in anything to that eternal and incomprehens¬
ible Being, which, for want of right and dis¬
tinct conceptions, is called Mind also, or the
Eternal Mind.1
But with this statement Locke demolishes his whole argument
for the Divine intelligence. If the cause is fundamentally
different from its effect, then there is no basis for Locke's
inference of G-od's intelligence from the finite intelligence.
It must be concluded that Locke's demonstration of the
Eternal Being is faulty because he overrides the fundamental
distinctions upon which his theory of knowledge is founded.
While Locke utilized his demonstration to prove G-od's
existence, omnipotence and omniscience, he employed another
method to discover the remaining attributes of G-od's nature.
He said that we cannot know G-od in His essence for we can
think of Him only as a complex of qualities which we refer
to Him from the complex ideas we have about finite spirits.
The treatment of this important subject is remarkably slight,
/vl
given incidently in three short paragraphs. It is the only
A
place in which Locke considers the origin of our ideas of
God, and we shall quote the three paragraphs in full.
1. Fraser, Essay, 1. lxxix.
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For if we examine the idea we have of the in¬
comprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that
we come "by it in the same way: as a complex idea,
the materials of which are first seen in sensation
and reflection and that the complex ideas we have
both of God, and separate spirits, are made of
the simple ideas we received from reflection:
v.g. having, from what we experiment in ourselves,
got the ideas of existence and duration; of
knowledge and power; or pleasure and happiness;
and of several other qualities and powers, which
is is better to have than to be without; when
we would frame an idea of the most suitable we
can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one
of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting
them together, we make our complex idea of God.
For that the mind has such a power of enlarging
some of its ideas, received from sensation and
reflection, has already been shown.1
If I find that I know some few things, and
some of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can
frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which.I
can doubtle again, as often as I can add to num¬
ber; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by
extending its comprehension to all things exist¬
ing or possible. The same also I can do of know¬
ing them more perfectly; i.e. all their qualities,
powers, causes, consequences, and relations,&c,
till all be perfectly known that is in them, or
can any way relate to them: and thus frame the
idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. The
same may also be done with power, till we come to
that we call infinite; and also of the duration of
existence, without beginning or end, and so
frame the idea of eternal being. The degrees or
extent wherein we ascribedexistence, power, wis¬
dom, and all other perfections (which we can have
any ideas of) to that sovereign Being, which we
call God, being all boundless and infinite, we
frame the best idea of him our minds are capable
of: all of which is done, I say, by enlarging
1. Essay, 2. 23« 33
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those simple ideas we have taken from the oper¬
ations of our own minds, "by reflection; or by our
senses, from exterior things, to that vastness to
which infinity can extend them.^
For it is infinity, which, joined to our ideas
of existence, power, knowledge, &c, makes that
complex idea, wherevy we represent to ourselves,
the best we can, the Supreme Being. For,thoughtin
his own essence (which certainly we do not know,
not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly,
or of our own selves) G-od be simple and uncom-
pounded; yet I think I may say we have no other
idea of him, but a complex one of existence, know¬
ledge, power, happiness, &c., infinite and eternal:
which are all distinct ideas, and some of them
being relative, are again compounded of others: all
which being, as has been shown, originally got
from sensation and reflection, go to make up the
idea or notion we have of G-od.2
Here again we are confronted by Locke's empirical
account of the origin of our ideas, and, as we see from
the foregoing paragraphs, he applies the method to the
discovery and formulation of the attributes of G-od. The
process is quite simple. A person has but to examine
himself, to find those "qualities and powers, which it
is better to have than to be without", enlarge them to
an infinite number of times, and he will have some idea
of the qualities of the Divine Nature. The criterion
upon which the finite qualities are to be judged with
1. Essay, 2. 23« 34.
2. Essay, 2. 23« 35« '
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a view to their enlarging is loosely employed. What one
person might consider to be a quality or power "better
to have than to be without" might be different from
those chosen by another. Locke appears to have realized
that this was too unstable a foundation upon which to
choose the attributes which we to be infinitely enlarg¬
ed. In his Journal he makes this statement» "Whatsoever
carries any excellence with it, and includes not imper¬
fection, must needs make a part of the idea we have of
G-od."l But the same objection remains, and is yet
another indication of the strong individualistic tend¬
ency in Locke's thinking.
In another passage In the Essay, Locke discusses
the relation of God's goodness to His power, and con¬
cludes: "If it were fit for such poor finite creatures
as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and good¬
ness could do, I think I might say that God Himself
cannot choose what is not good: the freedom of the
Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is
best.1,2
1. King, LLJL, 123.
2. Essay, 2. 21. 50.
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Locke was aware that the complex idea we have of G-od was
inadequate. It was deficient because it was negative. The
raising of finite qualities only served to show that however
knowing, happy and good we might be, G-od was more knowing,
more happy and better than anything we can know or imagine.
Hence our complex idea of G-od must always fall far short of
what G-od must be in reality, and our best conception of Him
must fail to indicate His real nature. As Gibson has pointed• *
out, Locke assumes the scholastic identification of reality
and perfection, though he nowhere makes his assumption
explicit. Further, in Locke's usage, the process can only
be understood quantitatively, for he defines raising a
thing to infinity as but extending in quantity an idea
gained from experience. A God whose attributes are deter¬
mined by this method is different only in degree from human
beings. This gives Locke's discussion a crude anthropro-
morphic flavour.
An apparent contradiction between our idea of God gained
in this fashion and the account given in Book Four of the
Essay called forth a letter from Molyneaux to Locke. He
says in a part of this letter.
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In Bk. iv. ch. xvli, par. 2, you say the existence
of all things without us (except only of Hod) is
had by our senses. And in Bk. II. ch. xxlTi. par.
33-36, you show how the idea we have of God is
made up of the ideas we have gotten by our senses.
Now this, though no repugnancy, yet to unwary
readers may seem one. To me it is plain that in
Bk.IV, ch. xvii, you speak barely of the exist-
ence of God; and in Bk. II, ch. xxiii, you speak
of the ideas that are ingredient in the complex
idea of God; i.e. you say that 'all the ideas in¬
gredient in the idea of God are had from sense'
and in Bk. IV, you only assert that the existence
of this God, or that reall there are united in one
Being all these ideas, is had, not from sense, but
demonstration.4
Locke replied to Molyneaux that he had made a correct anal¬
ysis of his argument. But had he? Vfas it not true that Locke
had inferred the qualities of omnipotence and omniscience
as well as the bare existence of God by his method of
demonstration?
The difficulty which we have seen in Locke's thinking
about God is fundamental to his whole theology. It seems
we may conclude with Aaron that...
Locke believes first, and thenpeeks rational
justification for his belief....'. .Why does Locke
believe? His education and the custom of his age
clearly account in/ some part for this fact. But
the belief plays too great a part in his philo¬
sophy to be attributed to these sources. Locke,
1. Fraser, Essay, I. 418, note 2.
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no doubt, did feel that a First Cause was essential
and he also felt that we ourselves need explaining.
...Yet one cannot hut feel that his real
ground for "believing was no rational argument of
any kind. It was the knowledge of God 'through
His Spirit', this deep intuition and presence.
The piety and deep religious feeling of Locke's
works forcibly suggests such a view.1
/
Locke nowhere expressly states how be believed God is
related to the world and mankind. In our treatment of this
subject we are once again forced to look for scattered
passages which will give us hints as to Locke's actual
position. Behind his thinking in this matter there is an
unresolved point at issue. It can be stated in the form of
a question. What is the relation of God to the law of nature?
Two general tendencies are to be noted. In the first place,
when Locke is speaking against innate ideas, he expressly
states that he does not wish it to be understood that he
means to deny a law of nature, the operation of which can
be known by reason, the light of nature.
There is a great deal of difference between an
innate law, and a law of nature;......1 think
they equally forsake the truth, who running into
contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law,
or deny that there is a law of nature, i.e. with¬
out the help of positive revelation.2
1. Aaron, LOC, 304, 305
2. Essay, 1. 2. 13*
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There seeins no reason to douht that Locke was well acquainted,
with that conception of a law of nature which was held by
the majority of his contemporaries, a law which has indep¬
endent authority over men, and suffers no intrusion upon
its authority from external sources. This view is typical of
seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalists.
Yet while Locke believed in a law of nature, he also
insisted that God's omnipotence shall in no way be com¬
promised. He believed it essential to the majesty of God
that nothing should hinder His will. We have seen that he
thought God's will was probably determined by His goodness.
This was Locke's way of saying that the Divine will is not
capricious, but is directed to serve the ends of goodness.
Does Locke mean by this that there is something independent
of God, a law of right, to which God's will must conform in
the eternal nature of things?
The point at issue here had its roots in a controversy
of the later medieval theologians. In general, the nominal¬
ists tended to the view that law had an actual positive
existence, created by God, and the realists tended to the
belief in a law which is inherent in God's nature. It seems
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quite probable that Locke would have preferred to modify
the absoluteness of the realist view in favour of the
Omnipotence of God. God, he would say, is the ultimate source
of law, since there can be no law without a lawgiver. The
Lav/giver is an Omnipotent God.
The year following the publication of the Essay, Locke
wrote a letter to his friend Tyrrell on this subject. In the
letter he speaks of the law of nature as a "branch of the
divine law." Reason counsels man that it is good to obey
natural law. This law is obligatory on man, because it,
like all law, comes from God. Thus Locke appears to resolve
his difficulty without compromising the omnipotence of God;
but he does tend to give up the realist conception of a
law inherent in God. For when Locke became greatly involved
in some problem he could not resolve, he always preferred
to say that it was the will of God alone which could explain
them. This was a tacit reference to God's supervening power.
Locke found another agency which threatened God's omni¬
potence in man's free will. He could not reconcile the co¬
existence of divine and human agency after he had attributed
to God both omnipotence and omniscience. In his celebrated
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chapter on "power" in Book Two of the Essay,. Locke made an
attempt to work out a solution to this problem. In the
course of the successive editions of the work which were
published in his lifetime, many changes were made with the
hope that he might further clarify his position. The subject
forms the basis of a series of letters which he exchanged with
Molyneaux.
"Power", Locke said, is that "which is able to make, or
"1
able to receive any change.Active power is that which
initiates the change, and passive power is that which is
able to receive it. Matter he considered to be wholly des¬
titute of active power, and God, the author of all things,
Q
"is truly above all passive power." Man, standing between
God and matter in the scheme of creation, has combined in
his being the capacity both for active and passive power.
The danger to God's omnipotence, Locke thought, came from
the coexistence of the divine and human agency in active
power. Locke never solved this problem with satisfaction to
himself. His rewriting of the Chapter on "Power" and the
numerous additions he made to it only served to confuse the
1. Essay, 2. 21. g.
2. Essay, 2. 21. 2.
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problem further. He would not resolve one side of the con¬
tradiction into the other when the evidence made it clear
that both were true. At length he wrote to Molyneaux as
follows:
I own freely to you the weakness of my reasoning,
that though it be unquestionable that there is
omnipotence and omniscience in God, and though I
cannot have a clearer perception of anything than
that I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man
consistent with omnipotence in God, and yet I am
as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most
fully assent to.-1-
This indicates Locke's essentially empirical spirit. He
was never willing to purchase consistency at the price of
overlooking the facts as he found them. If he found it
impossible to clear the difficulty he did not further ob¬
scure the issues involved. That Locke should have failed to
comprehend human freedom as submission to God's will indi¬
cates one of the points where his common-sense method failed
him.
Locke has given us no definite ideas about his views on
the ultimate nature of reality. He would have been the first
to protest that his purpose was not metaphysical. Yet now
1. Fraser, Essay, I, civ, cv.
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and again he gives us a glimpse into the background of
reality out of which his theory of knowledge comes. It is
probable that he accepted, as did most of the thinking men
of his time, the dualism of the two kinds of substances in
nature, active immaterial substance and passive material
substance."*" This conception of nature had been given great
currency by Descartes, and was generally accepted during
Locke's time. Locke in his own investigation found it im¬
possible, on an empirical basis, to affirm that the universe
could be understood either as mind alone or matter alone.
Moreover he found it impossible, as we have seen, to reduce
one to the other. God, as "pure spirit" and "only active"2,
could invest matter with thought. To suppose matter could
in some sense produce thought, he conceived absurd. "..Those
who deny or question an eternal omniseient spirit, run them¬
selves into a greater difficulty by making an eternal and
3
unintelligent matter."
Locke set up a kind of graded order of being in which he
placed God, as active immaterial substance, at the top, and
matter, as entirely passive in power, at the bottom. In
1. Gf. Essay, 2. 23« 15»
2* Essay, 2. 23. 38.
4. King, LLJL, 87.
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■between God and matter there were various degrees of being
which partook of both kinds of substances in varying degrees.
Man stands midway in this order. He is the lowest in intell¬
igence, but abe&e brutes.
"This hypothetical conclusion concerning man was attacked
sharply by Locke's critics. Locke admitted that we cannot
have any certain notion of what substance is, but in con¬
cluding that God had added mind to material substance, he
was led to allow the possibility that man in substance might
be material. The scholastics had formulated a theory that
man was both material and immaterial, his soul being the
immaterial element. At death, they maintained, the body de¬
composed, but that the soul,being immaterial,was indestrBut-
ible. On this they based their doctrine of immortality. Locke
would not admit that there was evidence to prove the soul
to be immaterial, and denied that immortality could be proved
in this fashion. Such a proof, he maintained, was "above
reason", and was so adequately attested by revelation that
it needed no support from reason. It was the suggestion that
the soul was material in substance which cause Stillingfleet
to take him to task, for in doing so, Locke had undermined
a basic foundation of one of the Christian doctrines.
- 147 -
One of the unusual features of Locke's system of being
is the place which he gives to angels. The Essay is full of
references to them, and Locke thought it was not necessary
to appeal to revelation in support of the knowledge of their
existence.
Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents
downwards in those parts of creation that are be¬
neath man, the rule of analogy may make it probable,
that it is so also in things above us and our ob¬
servation; and that there are several ranks of
intelligent beings, excelling us in several degrees
of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infin¬
ite perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and
differences, that they are evry one at no great
distance from the next to it. This sort of prob¬
ability, which is the best conduct of rational
experience and influence; and a wary reasoning from
analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths
and useful productions, which would otherwise lie
concealed.
We see here that Locke makes no assertion that we can know
the existence of angels, but in the knowledge that there
are brutes below is in the order of creation, whose spiritual
faculties are less developed than those in man, so too, he
believes by analogy that it is probable that there are
creatures above men whose 'faculties are far more developed
in the G-odward direction than those of men.




What, then, may we be certain about God by reason? V\fe
do not know very much about God, Locke would say. We can be
sure that He exists, and that we owe an obligation of obed¬
ience to Him.
So, having an idea of God and myself, of fear and
obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be
feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will
be certain concerning man in general, if I have
an abstract idea of such a species whereof I am
on in particular•1
If man would but obey God, Locke believed it probable that
/
he would not only achieve happiness in this present world,
but that he would lay a good foundation for happiness in
the world to come, "it being highly rational to think, even
were revelation silent in the case, that, as men employ those
talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly
receive their rewards at the close of day, when their sun
shall set, and night shall put an end to their labours."^
1. Essay, 4. 11. 13«
2. Essay, 4. 14. 4.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONTENT OF REVEALED RELIGION
Locke assures us that by the use of our natural facul¬
ties we can know of the existence of God and that obedience
is due to Him. These insights do not require the aid of
revelation. "That there is a God, and what God is, nothing
can discover to us but natural reason."''' But, as we have
seen, there are truths above reason in religion, the con¬
tent of which is gained through revelation. Further, since
the prime purpose of revelation is not to inform men about
the nature of God, we may be led to expect that its signif¬
icance is found in the information which it gives concerning
God's relationship with men in salvation. This is, in fact,
what we do find, and we shall see that Locke developed a
doctrine of redeption on the basis of what he believed to
r>
have been revealed. In this he followed the main outline of
orthodox Christian teaching, but introduced many of his own
thoughts in several important instances. We must therefore
1. Fox-Bourne, Life, 1. 462.
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follow with care what Locke believed that we are taught
through the revelation of G-od in Jesus Christ.
Throughout his life, Locke reflected his early Puritan
training. Of the three ways which have been held to lead
to the apprehension of God's revelation, personal illumina¬
tion, the Church, and Holy Scripture, Locke declares for the
last. He stands squarely in the Protestant tradition, in
his conviction that the Bible is the sole basis of the
Christian religion. We have seen how completely he rejected
immediate personal illumination, which he called "enthusiasm"
as being a tool of lazy minds, behind which prejudice could
be shielded. We shall see that Locke was distinctly "low
church" in his ideas about ecclesiastical organization. But
his reverence for the Bible was as deep as his knowledge of
it was great. For a layman who combined a wide variety of
interests in his keen mind, Locke possessed a remarkable
grasp of the contents of Holy Scripture. The Essay itself
contains abundant quotations from the Bible. While he con¬
cerned himself primarily with the New Testament, his works
show that he was not unacquainted with the contents of the
Old Testament. The curriculum of Locke's studies in Oxford
included both Hebrew and Greek, and we may be assured by his
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frequent references that he knew something of the former and
was at home in the Latter language. He knew the Scriptures
and used them. He believed that Holy Writ contained all
that a Christian needed to know concerning the way to sal¬
vation. "in the New Testament I think are contained
all the articles of Christian faith.
While Locke's approach to Scripture was always reverent,
he was so sure of its truth that he did not fear to subject
it to the tests imposed by reason, for, as we have seen, he
did not believe that anything revealed was contrary to
reason. The title of his principal theological work, The
Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scrip¬
tures, indicates the trend of his thought in this matter.
It must be confessed, however, that Locke was more free in
his exegesis than certain passages allowed, and that he
often toned down or modified the meaning of refractory
materials.
Students of Locke's theology have pointed out a very
remarkable characteristic of his approach to Scripture. They
find it hard to reconcile the fact that Locke tends to
expand the use of reason in the religious sphere with his
1. Works, 2. 67, note 1.
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acceptance of the theory of plenary inspiration. Rational
in temper though he was, and eager though he was to test by
reason the claims of the Christian religion, he comes to
Scripture with his mind made up on two points. First, he is
sure that G-od has revealed Himself, and, secondly, that this
revelation has been given in the Bible. Grant to him these
two presuppositions and Locke is willing to treat Holy Writ
as he would any other writing. Several illustrations are
pertinent here. In commenting on I Corinthians II : 6,
"Howbeit we speak wisdom to them that are perfect", Locke
makes the following notation.
[Perfect] here is the same with spiritual.. .one that
is so perfectly well apprised of the christian rel¬
igion, that he sees and acknowledges it to be all a
pure revelation from God, and not, in the least, the
product of human discovery, parts or learning; and
so deriving it wholly from what God hath taught by
his Spirit in the sacred scriptures, allows not the
least part of it to be ascribed to the skill or
abilities of men as authors of it. but received as
a doctrine coming from God alone.1
This is the most extreme position to which Locke gives
credence; other statements are much more moderate, of which
the following may be taken as a fair example,. -
God, when he makes the prophet, doe not unmake the
1. Works, 8. 91» note a.
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man. He leave all his faculties in their natural
state to enable him to judge his inspirations
whether they be of divine original or no. When
he illumines the mind with supernatural light
he does not extinguish that which is natural.
This latter statement modifies the position of the former
which excludes human cooperation entirely. Locke's theory
here Ensures the infallibility of the Divine message, by
making it a personal communication of G-od to the one He
has chosen to do His bidding. In another comment Locke says
that the Apostle Paul "had the immediate direction and
guidance of the unerring Spirit of God and so was infallible
There is a further passage in which Locke speaks of the
manner in which G-od communicates with men.
G-od, I believe, speaks differently from men
because he speaks with more truth, more certain¬
ty: but when he vouchsafes to speak to men I do
not think he speaks differently from them, in
crossing the rules of language in use amongst
them: this would be not to condescend to their
capacities, when he humbles himself to speak to
them, but would lose his design in speaking
what when spoken they could not understand.5
Locke's doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture becomes
apparent in these statements which we have quoted. Locke's
uncritical acceptance of a doctrine of plenary inspiration
1. Essay, 4. 19«/4.
2. Works, 6. 184.
3. Works, 5* 245, 246.
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Is naive and appears incongruous to the general temper of
his method. This should not blind us, however, to the sig¬
nificance of the work which Locke has done in the inter¬
pretation of the content of revelation in Holy Writ.
Locke was led to write the Reasonableness of Christ¬
ianity, he tells us, because of his interest in the con¬
troversy which was going on between Churchmen, Unitarians
and other Dissenters, concerning justification by faith.
Gradually, as the subject made inroads into his thinking,
he found himself drawn "into a stricter and more thorough
inquiry into the question about justification.He was, he
said, not satisfied with the current systems of divinity,
which were more confusing than enlightening.
The scripture was plain and direct, that it was
faith that justified: The nexjs question then, was,
What faith that was that justified; what it was
which, if a man believed, it should be imputed to
him for righteousness? To find this out, I thought
the right way was to search the scriptures; and
thereupon betook myself seriously to the reading
of the New Testament, only to that purpose.^
Locke thought he had found the correct answer to the ques¬
tions which he had set for himself. But with becoming
modesty he declared in the preface that if anyone found him
1. Works, 7« 187«
2. Works, 7« 187*
- 155 -
wrong after an unprejudiced examination of his work, he was
asked "as a true Christian, in the spirit of the Gospel,
(which is that of charity,) and in the words of sobriety, to
set him [Locke] right, in the doctrine of salvation. The
doctrine of justification by faith is thus the central con¬
cept of Locke's scheme of redemption. Hi* interpretation of
the doctrine is somehv&t novel, as we might expect from his
dissatisfaction with traditional statements of the doctrine.
We must follow its development carefully.
Locke's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity is not
altogether clear. In his writings there is no formal state¬
ment concerning it, and nowhere does he expressly affirm or
deny its validity. We have seen that he denied to reason the
power to understand the essence of God's nature. He also
conceived it impossible that any simple ideas derived from
revelation could be communicated unless such ideas were
derived from sensation and reflection. Thus Locke set up a
formal barrier to any natural pr revealed knowledge of the
substance of the Godhead. Stillingfleet quickly seized upon
this point and concluded that Locke purposely undermined
the basis for belief in the Trinity. Such an imputation of
1. Works, 7. 2.
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Locke's motive is open to question; it is, indeed, doubtful
whether he purposely sought to refute the doctrine. His
attitude towards it. appears rather to have been that of the
agnostic. It is true that the times in vrtiich Locke lived
ma,de it dangerous to attack one of the fundamental doctrines
held by the established Church. One cannot refrain from
making the conjecture that had the times been more free
Locke might have defined his position more explicitly. His
cautious temper, in any case, prevented him from provoking
trouble on this point in theology. When he was directly
questioned about the Trinity by the Bishop of Worcester, he
side-stepped the main issue. He sought neither to comprom¬
ise his own view nor to risk incurring the wrath of the
orthodox. He seems to have thought that the doctrine of the
Trinity could not be established either by reason or by
revelation. Stillingfleet asked Locke directly if he "owned
the doctrine of the Trinity, as it hath been received in
the Christian church?"1 Locke replied that "it is too hard
to know how a doctrine so disputed has been received in
the Christian church", and added that he thought "it might
be enough to own it as it is delivered by the Scriptures."2
An entry in his Common-place Book entitled "Unitaria" leads
1. Works, 4. 197•
2, Works, 4. 197•
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us to "believe that Locke thought that the doctrine was en¬
grafted on Christian theology at the Council of Nicea. "The
Fathers before the Council of Nice speak-rather like Arians
than orthodox" and "there is scarcely one text alleged to
the Trinitarians which is not otherwise expounded by their
own writers."1 Again, "The Divinity of the Holy Spirit was
not believed, or as I think, so much as mentioned by the
p
time of Lactantius, i.e., anno 300.."
While Locke's reply to Stillingfleet was that he accept¬
ed the doctrine of the Trinity as it is delivered in the
Scripi^tres, he nowhere tells us what his scriptural inter¬
pretation of the doctrine is. He speaks of the office of
the Holy Spirit as that of inspiring and strengthening men
after the departure of Christ from the earth. But he does
not discuss its relation to the Godhead. Our only clue to
Locke's teaching on the doctrine of the Trinity is to be
found in the consideration of the implications of Christ's
relationship to the Father. Christ was sent by God, Locke
maintains, to reveal the full and final way of salvation to
men. His coming was prophesied in the Old Testament and His
divine mission was established by his display of supernatural
1. King, LLJL, 297
2. King, LLJL, 298
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power in the performance of miracles.
Locke never clearly defined what he meant when he said
that Jesus is Messiah. In the Reasonableness of Christianity,
he devoted many pages to the assertion that Christ is the
Son of God, which is but another way of saying that Christ
is Messiah. He quotes Peter in John 6 : 69, "Thou art the
Messiah, the Son of the living G-od," to prove his contention,
and cites many other passages in support of his conclusion.^
Locke also refers to this point in his controversy with John
Edwards. Edwards insisted that when the eunuch declared, in
Acts 8 : 57, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of
G-od", he implied that Christ is_ G-od. Locke did not agree.
The words"Son of God^f-" "appear to me to be spoken and meant
here as well as in several other places of the 'New Testament'
in this sense, viz. 'That Jesus Christ is Messiah', and in
that sense, in this place, I assent to them."2 Locke ener¬
getically seeks to justify his equation of the terms, "Son
of God" and "Messiah". He adds that it was on the basis of
Christ's revelation of Himself as Messiah to Peter that
"our Saviour said he would build his church."-5 In the Third
1. Works, 7* 18.
2. Works, 7. 242.
3. Works, 7* 18.
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Letter for Toleration. Locke speaks of Christ as being "th
wisdom of the Father", in which capacity he alone can know
perfectly the truths revealed in Scripture.
Further insight into the relation between Christ and
G-od is to be found in Locke's commentaries. Concerning the
phrase, "according to the spirit of holiness", found in
Romans I : 4, Locke says.
'According to the spirit of holiness', is here
manifestly opposed to, 'according to the flesh',
in the foregoing verse, and so must mean that
more pureidndlspiritual part of him, which by
divine extraction, he had immediately from G-od.1
Here Locke shows his belief in the two natures of Christ,
as a man "in the flesh", who partakes of the divine in his
"spirit of holiness."
Locke's treatment of/corinthians 8 : 5 and 6 is help»
ful. The passage is:
For, though there be that are called gods, whether
in heaven or in earth, as there be gods many and
lords many. But to us there is but one G-od, the
Father of whom are all things, and we in him; and
one Lord Jesus Christ by whom are all things..^
1. Works, 8. 278, note d. 2..
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His paraphrase of the 6th verse is as follows:
Yet to us Christians, there is hut one Sod, the
Father and Author of all things, to whom alone we
address all our worship and service; and hut one
Lord, viz, Jesus Christ, hy whom all things come
from God to us, and hy whom we have access to the
Father
In a note on the whole passage, Locke says that while among
the heathen there were many "Lords-agent^ with us as Christ¬
iana,' there is hut one "Lord-agent, Jesus Christ".2 Christ
is pictured here as the chief agent of God,.the mediator
of divine grace.
Locke had difficulty with Ephesians 3 J 9» "The fellow¬
ship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world
hath heen in God who created all things hy Jesus Christ."
His paraphrase studiously avoids attributing the power of
creation to Christ.
And to make all men perceive, how this mystery
comes now to he communicated to the world, which
has been concealed from all past ages, lying hid
in the secret purpose of God, who frames and man¬
ages this whole creation hy Jesus Christ.3
Locke further fortifies his contention that Christ's part is
hut to manage the creation of God, hy drawing attention to
!. Works, 8. 134.
2. Works, 8. 133» note c.
3. Works, 8. 470.
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the fact that Scripture employs the word "creation" in.two
different senses. He agrees that usually it is used "in
sacred scripture to express creation, in the scriptural sense
of creation, i.e. making out of nothing," hut adds in the
next note that , "it will be onserved that St. Paul often
chooses to speak of the work of redemption by Christ as
creation.
One final passage will be of value to us. In the verses
9 and 10 of John 14, Locke is confronted by Christ's words
to Philip. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father......
Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in
me? The works that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself:
but the Father that dwellesth in me, he doeth the works."
Locke says about this passage. "For that by being 'in God'
and "God in him' he signifies such union with God, that God.
operates in and by him....." "Let the works that I have done
tid
convince you, that I am sent by the Father. ^ John Edwards
was quick to comprehend the significance of this interpeta-
tion and called Locke "antitrinitarian and ^r_acovian", assert¬
ing that such an explanation made Adam and Christ equal as
the sons of God. Locke replied that he didanot know how the
1. Works, 8. 470, note 2.
2. Works, 7« 91*
3. Works, 7. 92.
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antitrlnitarians understood the passage. "I took not the
senseof those texts from those writers, but from the Scrip¬
ture itself, giving light to its own meaning."!
These passages have given us some understanding of the
relation which Locke thought to exist between Christ and the
Father. He thought ot'Christ as a supernatural being, sent
by G-od to be His supreme agent in the world. Christ brought
to earth a perfect revelation of G-od, but he did not claim
that he himself was God, nor did others, who knew him in
his earthly life^ think him to be such. From one passage we
gain the impression that Locke thought Christ's divinity
consisted in his sinlessness, i«e«, in his " spirit of
Holiness", which was the character of his "divine extraction."
This implies how completely the concepts of morality and
divinity were woven together in the fabric of Locke's mind.
Throughout his discussion he places emphasis upon the unity
of God. But is this enough to classify him as a Unitarian?
It is true that Locke was influenced in his theology by
Thomas Firmin, a Unitarian merchant, and we have references
to the theological discussions in which Locke took part in
this man's home. His Epistola de Tolerantia was translated
!. Works. 7. 172.
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from Latin into English by William Popple, another Unitarian®
Further, one can believe that the Unitarians took great de¬
light in reading Locke's theological treatises. Edwards hast¬
ened to point out that the Reasonableness of Christianity
was "all over Socinianized." Yet while there are tendencies
in the direction of Unitarianism in Locke's theology, it is
very difficult to classify him with the Unitarians, because
as we have seen, he believed that reason alone was too narrow
a foundation on which to establish Christian truth, and he
accepted with a simple faith the divinity of Christ.
What then, can we conclude about Locke's thinking con-
cering the Doctrine of the Trinity? He believed that it was
absolutely impossible for reason to discover anything about
the essence of G-od. Reason, did however, give man an assur¬
ance of God's existence and unity. In a careful study of the
Scriptures, Locke found no conclusive evidence to support
the Trinitarian doctrine. He saw that those who were consid¬
ered orthodox disputed over it. He appears to have had some
suspicion that the doctrine had been "invented"1 rather than
revealed. 4s a result it appears that he saw nothing suffic¬
iently compelling to induce him to accept the doctrine in
1. King, LLJL, 298
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any formulation. His cautious temper prevented him from deny¬
ing its truth when he had no positive evidence to the contrary.
Had its truth been plain, Locke probably would have consider¬
ed it a relatively unimportant doctrine, for he omitted it
from the articles which he considered essential in Christian
belief. Locke's own position concerning the Trinity is
agnostic. He was content neither to affirm nor to deny its
validity. But his denial that any positive knowledge can be
known about the essence of God by reason, and his failure to
find support for the doctrine in the Scriptures, cut the
foundations from under the orthodox position. His assertion
of its relative unimportance perhaps did more to discredit
it than its outright rejection could have done. Even the
rationalists among the orthodox could not but feel this
challenge which the doctrine received at the hands of Locke,
and the weight of his influence must be reckoned against it.
To make "Jesus Christ nothing but the restorer and
preacher of pure natural religion," Locke thought, did "vio¬
lence to the whole tenour of the New Testament."1 For the
influence of Christ is not limited to his restoration of
purity in worship. Christ is the Redeemer. Around his advent
1. Works, 7. 5.
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centres a whole doctrine of Redemption.
The doctrine of redemption, and consequently
of the gospel is founded upon the supposition
of Adam's fall. To understand, therefore, what
we are restored to "by Jesus Christ, we must
consider what the Scriptures show we lost byAdam•1
G-od created Adam in the state of paradise, righteous
and "immortal, destined to life without end."^ "Paradise
was a place of bliss, as well as immortality; without drud-
gery and without sorrow." When Adam ate of the forbidden
tree, he fell from the "state of perfect obedience, which
is called justice in the New Testament,"^ and "he lost
„4
bliss and immortality by so doing. He was condemned to
die. He did not die immediately, but became mortal, "and
from thence to his actual death, was but like the time of
C
a prisoner between the sentence passed and the execution."
What Adam lost by his sin in paradise is thus clear.
"Nobody can deny, but that the doctrine of the gospel is,
that death came on all men by Adam's sin."^ Locke is aware
that many dispute what death means in this instance. "Some
1. Works, 7» 4.
2. "forks, 7 • 5 •
3. Works, 7*7*
4. Works, 7. 5•
5. Works, 7. 5, 6.
6. Works, 7. 6.
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will have it to he a state of guilt, wherein not only he,
hut all his posterity was so involved, that every one des¬
cended of him deserved endless torment, in hell-fire."1
Locke objects to this interpretation because it seems " a
strange way of understanding a law, which requires the plain¬
est and directest words, that by death should be meant
eternal life in misery."2 Such an interpretation conflicts
with man's idea of the righteousness of God. "Could anyone
be supposed by a law that says, 'For felony thou shalt die',
not that he should lose his life; but be kept alive in
perpetual exquisite torments? And would anyone think himself
fairly dealt with, that was so used?"^ Why should Adam's
posterity be charged with his sin? Some interpret the passage,
"in the day that thou eatest of the forbidden fruit, thou
shalt die," Locke says, in this way, "Thou and thy posterity
shall be ever after, incapable of doing anything, but what
shall be sinful and provoking to me and shall justly deserve
„4
my wrath and indignation. Locke asserts that such an in¬
terpretation would not do credit to the justice of a human
being, and would much less be worthy of a righteous God.
1. Works, 7» 6.
2. Works, 7 • 6 •
3. Works, 7• 6.
4• Works, 7• 6.
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"I must confess, by death here, I can understand nothing
but a ceasing to be, the losing of all actions of life and
sense.If death meant corruption of human nature, then
Locke thought it "strange that the New Testament should not
anywhere take notice of it • "^ It is true, he says, that all
men inherit mortal life from Adam, "but, as I remember, every
one's sin is charged upon himself only."-'
When Adam had been turned out of paradise, "he was ex¬
posed to the toil, anxiety, and frailties of this mortal
life which should end in dust out of which he was made."^ His
mortalit descended to all his posterity. But Locke says it
A
may be asked, why, if God is righteous, should all men suffer
mortality for Adam's sin? Is it consonant with the justice of
God to have men suffer for the original sin? Locke replies
that it depends upon what one means by punishment, "if God
afford them a temporary, mortal life, 'tis his gift; they
owe it to his bounty; they could not claim it as their own
right, nor does he injure them when he takes it away from
them."5 This is quite a different thing from putting men in







wise compromises the goodness of God. It exhibits His grace.
Mortal life is the gift of God. "That such a temporary life
....with all its frailties and ordinary miseries, is better
than no being, is evident, by the high value we put upon it
ourselves."1
The conditon of mortality in which Mam's sin involved
all men prevailed until the time of Moses. Then God gathered
together His chosen people, the children of Abraham, and
formed them into a nation. He gave to them a law, which, If
they obeyed it perfectly would restore to them the immortal¬
ity lost by Adam.
Though this law, which was righteous, just, and
good, were ordained to life, yet, not being able
to give strength to perform what it could not but
require, it failed, by reason of the weakness of
human nature, to help men to life. So that, though
the Israelites had statutes, which if man did, he
should live in them; yet they all transgressed and
life, by the deeds of the law...... This was the
"state of the Israelites.2
The Gentile world, without such a law, became hopelessly
corrupt.
Though God made himself known to them, by leg¬
ible characters of his own being and power, vis¬
ible in the works of creation; yet they glorified
1. Works, 7• 8.
2. Works, 8. 275
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him not, nor were thankful to him; they did not
worship the one, only, true, invisible God, the
creator of all things, but revolted from him, to
gods, set up by themselves, in their own vain
imaginations, and worshipped stocks and stones,
the corruptible images of corruptible things.
That, they having thus cast off their allegiance
to him, their proper Lord, and revolted to other
gods, God, therefore, cast them off, and gave them
up to vile affections, and to the conduct of their
own darkened hearts, which led them into all sorts
of vices.
This was the stae of the Gentiles before the coming of
Christ. Thus both Jews and Gentiles were in a hopeless cond¬
ition. The Jews inevitably fell short of the law, and the
Gentiles were mired in sin.
We have seen that while Locke thought of Christ as a
supernatural being, he did not think of him as being God.
This, however, did not prevent him from giving assent to
the miraculous conception and birth of Christ. These he
accepted as facts revealed in an infallible book. Christ's
incarnation he believed to be the central fact of God's
redemptive scheme. Adam's fall excluded him from paradise,
and brought mortality to all men. The Jews had this penalty
remitted by the Law of Moses. Obedience to this Law was the
condition of Immortal life.
1. Works, 8. 276.
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Here then we have the standing and fixed measures
of life and death. Immortality and bliss, belong to
the righteous; those who have lived in an exact con¬
formity to the law of God, are out of the reach of
death; but an exclusion from paradise and loss of
immortality is the porition of sinners; of all those,
'who have any way broke that law, and failed of a
complete obedience to it, by the guilt of any one
transgression.1
This obedience Locke denotes as the "law of works" and it
is curious to observe that h@ believes that by exact obed¬
ience man has the right to eternal life, As a natter of
fact, no one was able to obey the law perfectly, for one
transgression precluded one'3 hope of immortality• All men
were in a state of death because they could not fulfil the
"law of Yjorks".
Since the "law of works" was a practical Impossibility,
proving too hard for the achievement of mankind, a new law
was promulgated by God, through Christ. This was the "law of
faith" which both built upon and superseded the "law of works
Locke is very careful to point out that the "law of faith"
does not abrogate the "law of works."
The difference between the law of works, and the
law of faith, is only this: that the law of works
makes no allowance for failing on any occasion.
1. Works, 7» 10.
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Those that obey, are righteous; those that in any
part disobey, are unrighteous, and must not expect
life, the reward of the righteous. But, by the law
of faith, faith is allowed to supply the defect of
full obedience: and, so believers are admitted to
life and immortality, as if they were righteous.i
"The rule ...of right, is the same that ever it was"^
Locke assures us, and stands immutable. To those who believe
properly God supplies sufficient grace to overcome the
defects in obedience.
What must be believed if one is to partake of the bene¬
fit of the "law of faith"? This is the point to which Locke's
whole discussion has been leading. "What we are now required
to believe to obtain eternal life, is plainly set down in
the gospel.Locke finds it clear and simple, contained in
a single sentence, "Believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of
God," or, in words which express exactly the same meaning,
"Believe that Jesus Christ is the Messiah.""'This-.was the
great proposition that was controverted concerning Jesus of
Nazareth, 'Whether he was the Messiah or no?' And assent to
that was that which distinguished believers from unbeliev¬
ers."^ Most of the pages of the Reasonableness of Christian-
1. Works, 7« 14.
2. Works, 7« 14-•
3. Works, 7. 17.
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ty«r are devoted to adducing proof-tests for this contention.
He eventually arrived at the conclusion that "it is plain,
the the gospel was writ to induce men to a belief of this
proposition, 'That Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah', which
if they believed, they should have life."-*-
Locke's usage of the term "belief" in this proposition
includes more than intellectual assent. He makes it clear
that to accept the proposition "Jesus is the Messiah" means
the commitment of one's whole self to the purposes of God,
which is to give as perfect obedience to His claims as
possible within the limits of our human nature. Locke would
concur in the Scriptural formulation, that faith without
works is dead. One must become Christ's disciple and follow
him.
The believing Jesus to be the Messiah, includes
in it receiving him for our Lord and King, prom¬
ised and sent from God: and so lays upon all his
subjects an absolute and indispensable necessity
of assenting to all that they can attain of the
knowledge that he taught; and of a sincere obed¬
ience to all that he commanded.2
We see here the final outcome of the fall of Adam in
Justification by faith to all believing Christians. By the
1. Works, 7« 18.
2. Works, 7. 421.
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"law of faith", a person who accepts Christ and sincerely
endeavours to follow him is accepted by God# But we must
inquire further into the exact manner in which man may be
justified.
Locke rejected the notion that man is accepted by God
because Christ accumulated merit which may be used to redeem
mankind. Locke thought such a payment on Christ's part to be
unnecessary. When faith is reckoned for righteousness, the
lack of perfect obedience is overcome and man is ideally
represented as having fulfilled the "law of works" which en¬
sured him the right to immortality. In his paraphrase of
Romans 4 •: 5> Locke states it thus:
But to him, that by his works attains not.right¬
eousness, but only believeth on God, who justifieth
him, being ungodly, to him justification is a fav¬
our of grace: because his believing is accounted
to him for righteousness, or perfect obedience.1
What this imputing or reckoning of righteousness
is, may be seen, ....viz, the not reckoning of
sin to any. one, the not putting sin to his account.2
Here we see how Locke has combined the operation of an
immutable law and the grace of God in his doctrine of just¬
ification by faith. "The doctrine of justification by faith
1. Works, 8. 310.
2. Works, 8. 310, note 6.
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necessarily supposeth a rule of righteousness....""'" Perfect
obedience to Ood's law entitles man to eternal life. Sin
prevents man from fulfilling the law perfectly, hut faith
supplies that which is lacking. Through faith man thus ful¬
fils the law and is entitled to the same reward as if he had
perfectly fulfilled the "law of works." This is Locke's
attempt to bring together the reformed and Romanist views,
which results in a curious blend. It neglects the importance
of Christ's sacrifice, and stresses his significance solely
as the bearer of a new law, the "law of faith."
Of Christ's work on earth Locke has little to say. He
points out that John the Baptist indicated that Jesus was
the Messiah. Jesus accepted that designation and the con¬
temporary witnesses are convinced ot it, first, because Jesus
fulfills the prophecies made concerning him in the Old
Testament, and secondly, because he is able to display super¬
natural power in the performance of miracles. He chose his
disciples and began his ministry of teaching and healing.
But though Jesus knew himself to be the Messiah, he made no
announcement of the fact, keeping it a secret even from his
disciples in order to prevent suspicion and prolong his
1. Works, 8. 308, note g.
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ministry. Locke dwells on this hesitancy of Jesus to reveal
the true significance of his coming. He cites many passages,
with the view, it would seem, of showing that even in Jesus'
own time his true purpose was not seen "by those who were
close to him. So, Locke would imply, just as it was difficult
then to see this central teaching of the gospels, so, at
the present time, it may "be overlooked.
Locke's doctrine of the atonement is obscure and we may
believe that he attached scant importance to the sacrificial
death of Christ. In the Reasonableness of Christianity he
devoted little space to the discussion of the topic, with
the result that John Edwards called him to task in a sting¬
ing rebuke. It is true that in the Reasonableness of Christ¬
ianity Locke does speak of the self-giving death of Christ
as a proof of his immortality. He quotes John 10 : 18 to that
end. "No one taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself."
And, "For this laying down of his life for others, our Sav-
t
lour " was for "his obedience and suffering, reward
with a kingdom.""1' Christ's death was a result of his obed¬
ience to God's law, and for it he received a heavenly king¬
dom, though which he made it possible that "all men shall
!. Works, 7. 109.
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return to life again at the last day."1 In the last day all
men shall be judged by God according to theirrighteousness.
Quoting I Corinthians 6 : 9» Locke says, "The unrighteous
shall not inherit the kingdom of God." But the righteous
receive their reward. "God therefore, out of mercy for man¬
kind, and for the erecting of the kingdom of his Son,.....
proposed to the children of men, that as many of them as
would believe Jesus his Son ( whom he sent into the world)
to be the Messiah...should, for his Son's sake, because they
gave themselves up to him,...be forgiven...and so their
p
faith.... should be accounted to them for righteousness."
Locke was not willing to concede that all men are re¬
warded with immortality. The condition of salvation, however,
he thought was not vested in the arbitrary will of God.. It
is true that God has singled out certain persons to receive
his favour, but such a decision depends upon the virtue of
the persons thus separated. The following statement is
Locke's note on the passage, "Even so, then, at this present
time also, there is a remnant, according to the election of
grace. And if by grace, then is it no more of works." Com¬
menting on this Locke says:
1. Works, 7« 110.
2. Works, 7« HO, 111.
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This exclusion of works, seems to be mistaken by
those, who extend it to all manner of difference in
the person chosen, from those that were rejected: for
such a choice as that excludes not grace in the
chooser, but merit is chosen. For it is plain, that
by works here, St. Paul means merit, as it is evid¬
ent also from ch.iv.2-4. The law required complete,
perfect obedience: he that performed that, had a
right to the reward; but he that failed and came
short of that, had by the law no right to anything
but death. And so the jews, being all sinners, G-od
might, without injustice, have cast them all off;
none of them could plead a right to his favour. If,
therefore, he chose out and reserved any, it was of
mere grace, though in his choice he preferred those
who were best dis/posed and most inclined to his
service. A whole province revolts from their prince,
and takes arms against him; he resolves to pardon some
of them. This is the purpose of grace. He reduces them
under his power, and chooses out of them, as vessels
of mercy, those that he finds least infected with mal¬
ice, obstinacy, and rebellion. This choice neither
voids, nor abates his purpose of grace; that stands
firm; but only executes it so, as may best comport
with his wisdom and goodness. And, indeed, without
some regard to a difference, in the things taken,
from those that are left, I do not see how it can be
called choice. A handful of pebbles, for example, may
be taken out of a heap, they are taken and separated,
indeed from the rest, but if it be without any regard
to any difference in them, and from others rejected,
I doubt whether any body can call them chosen.4
It is not our purpose to dwell on Locke's theoretical solu¬
tion of the difficulties involved in the Doctrine of Election.
It is obviously inadequate, for one has to ask the further
question - if G-od be Creator and Sustainer, why do some become
1. Works. 8. 388, note 6.
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more righteous than others? But Locke perhaps has failed no
more than others to throw light on this mysterious problem,
which is, in all probability, beyond the range of human
reason to understand.
In a short entry in his Common-place Book, entitled
"Electio", Locke expresses a practical objection to the
doctrine.
I cannot see of what use the Doctrine of Election
and Perseverance is, unless it be to lead men into
presumption and a neglect of their duties, being once
persuaded that they are in a state of garce, which is '
a state they are told they cannot fall from. For,
since nobody can know that he is elected but by hav¬
ing a true faith, and nobody can know when he has
such a faith that he cannot fall from, common and
saving faith, as they are distinguished, being so
alike that he that has faith cannot distinguish
whether it be such as he can fall from or no (vide
Calvin, Inst. 1.3» c. 2, 6, 12), - who is elected,
or has faith from which he cannot fall, can only be
known by the event in the last day, and therefore is
in vain talked of how till the marks of such a faith
be certainly given.
Predestination to damnation is a doctrine which Locke
rejected. When confronted/by the passage, "What, if God, will¬
ing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured
with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath, fitted to
1. King, LLJL, 295
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destruction" (Romans 3 *• 22), Locke notes that by "vessels
of wrath, fitted to d.estruction, w jjPaulJ manifestly means
the nation of the jews, who were now grown ripe and fitted
for the destruction he was bringing upon them."^ "That he
here speaks of men, nationally and not personally, in ref¬
erence to their eternal state, is evident....."2 The reject¬
ion of the doctrine finds support in another passage in the
Common-place Book, for August 7, 1681. "Looking on G-od as
a being infinite in goodness as well as in power, one cannot
imagine he hath made anything with a design that it should
be miserable, but that He hath afforded it all the means
of being happy that its nature and estate is capable of."^
We must now resume our discussion of Locke's interpret¬
ation of the meaning of Christ's death. As we have seen, he
found it difficult to believe it necessary that merit be
attached to it. He clearly rejects the satisfaction theory
of Christ's death in his comment on Romans 3 i 25» "Whom
G-od hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in
his blood "
Redemption signifies deliverance, but not from
1. Works, 8. 376, note w.
2. Works, 8. 377, note w.
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- 180 -
everything; nor does redemption "by Jesus Christ
signify that there was any compensation made to
God "by paying what was of equal value, for that is
inconsistent with what St. Paul says here express¬
ly, that, they were delivered gratis, - hut, if any¬
one will, from the literal signification of the
words in English, persist in it against St. Paul's
declaration, that it necessitates an equivalent
price paid, I desire him to consider whom he re¬
deemed are in bondage to, viz. sin and Satan. Nor
could the price he paid to God in strictness of
justice, unless the same person ought in strict
justice to have the thing redeemed and the price
paid for its redemption. For it is to God we are
redeemed hy the death 6f Christ.1
It seemed quite improhahle to Locke that there was any sac-
hredotal meaning in the death of Christ. "I do not remember
that he any-where assumes to himself the title of a priest."*^
Yet with all his arguments against the satisfaction theory
of Christ's death, Locke says, towards the end of the
Second Vindication of the Reasonablesness of Christianity.
"It is very hard for a christian, who reads the scripture
with attention, and an unprejudiced mind, to deny the satis¬
faction of Christ: hut it being a term not used hy the Holy
Ghost in scripture, and very variously explained hy those
that do use it.......I left it [out}And he adds, "I do not
remember that our Saviour has anywhere named satisfaction."^
1. Works, 8. 304, note.
2. Works, 7- 113.
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It appears that Locke realized the absence of an adequate
doctrine of the atonement in his theology. He indicated that
he would like to have believed in the doctrine of satisfac¬
tion. The verbal assaults from Edwards which accused Locke
of failing to do justice to the crucifixion and atonement,
finally brought the reply from Locke that such discussion
was outside the design of the Reasonableness of Christianity,
which was to discover only those necessary artS^.les, the
believing of which was necessary to make one a Christian.
If Locke neglected the sacrificial death of Christ, he
I place great importance on the resurection, for, to his legal-
J ■
I
I istic frame of mind, this brought the fact of immortality
to the knowledge of mankind in its most literal sense.
Christ's death and resurection proved beyond all doubt that
he was the Messiah, which fact set in operation the "law of
faith". Locke indicates the .central!ty of the resurection
in the following passage, commenting on I Corinthians 15 ;
17, "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain." "if Jesus
be no risen from the dead, he is not the Messiah, your be-
lieving in it is vain, and you will receive no benefit by
that faith."1 Locke regards the resurection as essential to
1. Works, 7. 340.
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the proof of Christ's Messiahship. The two doctrines support
one another. "Our Saviour's resurection...is truly of great
importance in Christianity; so great, that his being, or
not being the Messiah stands or falls with it: so that these
two important doctrines are inseparable. "•*■
The resurection assures mankind of existence beyond the
grave. Before the coming of Christ the doctrine of immortal¬
ity was not known, or if it was known, its meaning was ob¬
scure and men failed to graspii its full meaning. "There was
no particular promise of eternal life until the coming of
Christ."2 Christ not only brought the certain knowledge of
v
life after death but through his resurection and Messiahship
put into force the "law of faith" by which men may attain
to it. To the question as to the exact manner in which men
become partakers in the benefits of Christ's resurrection,
Locke gives only one explicit answer.
Adam being turned out of paradise, and all his
posterity born out of it, the consequence of it was,
that all men should die, and remain under death for
ever and so be utterly lost.
From this estate of death, Jesus Christ restores
all mankind to life: I Cor. xv. 22, 'As in Adam all
die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.' How
this shall be, the same authoh tells us in the
1. Works, 7» 34-1» 3^2
2. King, LLJL, 297«
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foregoing ver. 21. 'By man death came, "by man
also came resurrection from the dead.' Whereby it
appears, that the life, which Jesus Christ restores
to all men, is that life which they receive again
at the resurection. Then they recover from death,
which otherwise all mainkind should have contin-
ued under, lost forever; as it appears by Si.
Paul's arguing, I Cor. xv. concerning the resur¬
ection. 1
In Locke's dispute with the Bishop of Worcester over the
resurrection, he makes it clear that by resurection he means
•V
a resurrection on the last day when men shall be judged.
*y' Q
"I say, the general resurection on the last day." His doc¬
trine is thus clear though unusual. All men, as sons of
, V
Adam, are mortal, but through Christ's resurrection immortal
ity is assured to all. At death a man ceases to exist until
the last day, when he is called forth'from the grave and
judged according to his obedience and faith. If through
faith in Jesus as Messiah he has mitigated his lack of per¬
fect obedience to God's law, he is restored to life and
made immortal.
Concerning those who have never heard of the Saviour,
Locke allows them a place which does more credit to his hum'
anity than to the logic of his position. "God will require
1. Works, ?. 9.
2. Works, 4. 304
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of every roan 'according to what a man hath, and not accord¬
ing to what he hath not'". He conceives it impossible than
any man could "be without some knowledge of G-od's redemptive
purpose.
The same spark of the divine nature and knowledge
in man, which making him a man; showed him also the
way of atoning the merciful, kind, compassionate
Author and Father of him and his being, when he trans¬
gressed that law. He that made use of this candle of
the Lord, so far as to find out what was his duty,
could not miss to find also the way of reconcilia¬
tion and forgiveness, when he had failed of his duty:
though if he used not his reason this way, if he put
out or neglected this light, he might, see neither.
The law is the eternal, immutable standard or right.
And a part of that law is, that a man should forgive,
not only his children, but his enemies, upon their
repentance, asking pardon and amendment. And therefore
he could not doubt that the author of this law, and
God of patience and consolation, who is rich in mercy,
would forgive his frail offspring, if they acknowledged
their faults, disapproved the iniquity of their trans¬
gressions, begged his pardon, and resolved in earnest,
for the future, to conform their actions to this
rule, which they owned to be just and right. This way
of reconciliation, this hope of atonement, the light
of nature revealed to them: and the revelation of
the gospel, having said nothing to the contrary,
leaves them to stand and fall on their own Father
and Master, whose goodness and mercy is over all his
works.1
We see here a kind of a scheme of redemption discoverable
by reason parellel to that which is revealed in the Scrip¬
tures. While in both cases the hope of immortality is based
1. Works, 7« 133«
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on the grace of God, the way of revelation makes the hope
more sure. What can he discovered hy reason in this sphere
is only probable; it can never be more than that, and gives
no definite assurance of attaining to immortality. This doc¬
trine concerning those who have not heard of Christ plainly
contradicts what Locke has written about the state of the
Gentiles before the coming of Christ. It is another indica¬
tion of Locke's profound regard for the justice and mercy
of God, who is so bound by his own goodness, and an immut¬
able standard of right, that He will not punish those who
have lived according to their best light.
As for those who definitely reject Christ, Locke hints
at their annihilation. The little he says concerning them
indicates that he did not believe they were assigned to an
everlasting punishment. "Hot any to whom the gospel hath
been preached shall be saved without believing Jesus to be
the Messiah." The most explicit reference to those who
reject Christ is found in the Common-place Book for August
7, 1681.
Though justice be also a perfection which we must
necessarily ascribe to the Supreme Being, yet we
cannot suppose the exercise of it should extend
1. Works, 7. 127, 128.
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further than his goodness has need of it for the
preservation of his creatures in the order and
beauty of the state that he has placed each of
them in; for since our actions cannot reach unto
him, or bring him any profit or damage, the pun¬
ishments he inflicts on any of his creatures, i.e.
the misery or destruction he brings upon them,
can be nothing else but to preserve the greater
and more considerable part, and so being for
their preservation, his justice is nothing but
a branch of hid_ goodness, which is fain by sev¬
erity to restrain the irregular and destructive
parts from doing harm; for to imagine God under
a necessity of punishing for any other reason
than this, is to make his justice a great imper¬
fection, and to suppose a power over him that
necessitates him to operate contrary to the rules
of his wisdom and goodness, which cannot be sup¬
posed to make anything so idly as that it should
be purposely destined or put in a worse state than
destruction (misery being as much worse state than
annihilation, as pain is than insensibility, or
the torments of the rack less eligible than quiet
sound sleeping): the justice then of God can be
supposed to extend no further than infinite good¬
ness shall find it necessary for the preservation
of his works.1
We may conclude that Locke believed that the wicked perish
at death, and that because of theirsin and lack of faith in
rejecting Christ,?, are not.restored on the last day to
everlasting bliss.
Locke believed that his doctrine of redemption was a
reasonable one. That is why he called his work on the subject
1. King, LLJL, 123, 124.
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the Reasonableness of Christlanlty as Delivered in the Scrip¬
tures» 'The doctrines which have been revealed in Holy Y/rit
are in the category of "above reason" which Locke defined in
the Essay» He taught the doctrine of Justification by Faith
in such a way as to show that it is in 110 way contrary to
reason. The law of Moses he equates with the law of reason,
the law of nature. Reason convinces men that G-od is Omni¬
potent and One. The grace of G-od in his mercy to mankind
is a quality which Locke thinks man would have discovered
in time by reason, as some have done, without the hearing
of the G-ospel. The New Testament is such a perfect system
of morality that one needs to look no further for a guide
to conduct. The positive "law of faith", promulgated by
Christ is congruous with the mercy and justice of G-od. Thus
the G-ospel is seen to be reasonable when one approaches it
without prejudice. The G-ospel has two great advantages over
natural religion. The first is the Gospel's simplicity. Those
who have no time for study can grasp the doctrine in its
teaching and understand it. Secondly, the knowledge of re¬
wards and punishments in a future day encourages viritae on
earth. Sometimes Locke leans to the idea that the Gospel
reveals doctrine impossible for reason to discover. At other
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times he appears to think that in time reason would have
"been able to discover the truths revealed in the Gospel.
Generally, his position is, as we have seen in Chapter Three,
that the Gospel reveals truths that reason could not have
discovered, such truths "being judged as true when they are
accredited by miracles and found not contrary to reason.
The very last years of Locke's life were spent in a
close examination of the letters of St. Paul. To them he
brought the same method he had used in the Essay and the
Reasonableness of Christianity. He sought to understand the
Epistles as they were, bringing to them only an unprejudiced
understanding. In his work, Locke anticipates the spirit of
modern historical criticism. He attempted to iderijify himself
with the writer, to understand why he wrote, the conditions
which surrounded the writing, and the circumstances which
called it forth. He says of this method:
In prosecution of this thought, I concluded it
necessary, for the understanding of any one of St.
Paul's epistles, to read it all through at one
sitting: and to observe, as well as I could, the
drift and design of his writing.1
Of this method Fraser remarks: "He was among the first in
1. Works, 8. xiii.
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Europe who led towards the large historical exegesis since
practiced "by the great German critics, which has so trans¬
formed Christian thought.Locke here, as in his defined
purpose in the Essay, cleared the ground a little and cut
away the trammels of prejudice. Locke must not he credited
with too much. His method is not critical, for he lived in
and age which had not yet seen the significance of the idea
of development. His method was rational, which differs
chiefly from the critical in being non-historical. In the
course of this chapter especially we have had occasion to
quote from his Commentaries. Here and there he displays
remarkable skill at paraphrasing. In the following passage
we gain some insight, not only into the section commented
upon, but into Locke's thought concerning the significance
of the Gospel. The paraphrase is of I Corinthians 2 : 14-16.
But a man, who hath no other help but his own
natural faculties, how much soever improved by
human arts and sciences, cannot receive the truths
of the gospel, which are made known by another
principle only, viz, the Spirit of God revealing
them; and therefore seem foolish and absurd to
such a man : nor can he, by the mere use of his
natural faculties, and the principles of human
reason, ever come to the knowledge of them;
because it is, by the studying of divine revel¬
ation alone, that we can attain the knowledge of
1. Fraser, LOC, 262.
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til3mo But he that lays his foundation in divine
revelation, can judge what is, and what is not,
the doctrine of the gospel, and of salvation; he
can judge who is, and who is not, a good minist¬
er and preacher of the ?/ord of G-od; hut others,
who are bare animal men, that go not beyond the
discoveries made by the natural faculties of
human understanding, without the help and study
of revelation, cannot judge of such a one,
whether he preacheth right and well, or not.
For who, by the bare use of his natural parts,
can come to know the mind of the Lord, in the
design of the gospel, so able to instruct him
(the spiritual man) in it? But I, who, renounc¬
ing all human knowledge in the case, take all,
that I preach, from divine revelation alone, I
am sure, that therein I have,the mind of Christ;
and therefore, there is no reason why any of you
should prefer other teachers to me; glory in
them who oppose and vilify men; and count it an
honour to go for their scholars and be of their
party.1
1. Works. 8. 96, '97
CHAPTER SIX
THE CHURCH AND TOLERATION
In this chapter it is our purpose to examine Locke's
doctrine of the Christian Church and his teaching concerning
toleration. We will consider them together because the two
were inextricably woven together in the fabric of his think¬
ing. It is not too much to say that Locke thought that the
prime duty of the church was to exerbise toleration.
Since you are pleased to inquire what are may
thoughts about the mutual toleration of christ¬
ians in their different professions of religion,
I must needs answer you freely, that I_ esteem
that toleration to be the chlef characteristi-
cal mark of the true church.1
Locke's interest in toleration was life-long and in the
course of time he contributed four different letters to its
cause. The first letter, the Epistola de Tolerantla. is the
most important, and "has been called the most original of
Locke's works.The full significance of this letter may
1. Works, 6. 5»
2. Fraser, LOG, 90.
- 192 -
be underestimated in those countries where freedom of belief
has been an accepted part of the religious tradition for
over two centuries. But it must never be forgotten that
Locke's contribution to toleration was one of the strong
factors in the establishment of this tradition. The arguments
of the Epistola have a quality in them which time has not
been able to spoil, and even though it was written as a
tract for the times, to set right what Locke believed to be
the most conspicuous sin of the church, its message still
speaks against interference in religious belief. In our own
day when there is a tendency of the civil power to crush
this freedom the arguments of the Epistola might well be
studied.
Locke's teaching on toleration is not only the most
original and abiding of his religious works, but it speaks
most typically of Locke, the religious man. It combines the
interests of the thinker and the man of affairs; the deep
piety and sense of justice; and the concern both for the
rights of the individual and for those of the community as
a whole. We shall see, as we go on, how much of the man is
reflected in this phase of his work.
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It was not that Locke said anything entirely new. The
Eplstola de Tolerantla was first published in Holland where
for many years the subject had been the occasion for spirit¬
ed debate. Le Glerc had complained in the May, 1687 issue
of the Bibliotheque Universelle that toleration was the
only religious topic then discussed in Holland. Locke was
doubtless greatly influenced in his attitude to this matter
bijf his exile in Holland. But for the roots of his thinking
on the subject we must go further back than the years he
spent away from England. As Alexander has pointed out, "Moth
ing is more interesting than to trace the preparation in
Locke's mind for his authentic deliverances, and the papers
preserved to us show rather how early than late the central
ideas in his various doctrines took shape.""'" About the hist¬
ory of his ideas on toleration we are particularly fortunate
Various early fragments show how soon in Locke's thinking
he became aware of the barriers of intolerance and religious
prejudice which blocked the way to truth and the well-being
of mankind. Perhaps it is almost inevitable that Locke
should have made some contribution to the cause of tolerance
So many environmental circumstances, personal and national,
1. Alexander, LOC, 13»
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contributed to his interest in it that there is little
wonder that the idea was to be the "mainspring" of his life
from youth onwards®
The toleration which Locke sought "implied a protest
against those who in theological and other inquiries, demand
absolute certainty in questions where balanced probability
alone is within the reach of a human intelligence.""1" Amid
increasing religious discord in seventeenth century England,
into which Locke had been born, far-seeing men within and
without the church laid the foundations for the building of
a lasting tolerance. Chillingworth, Hales of Eton, Jeremy
Taylor and other liberal Anglican Divines had advocated a
broad comprehension within the Established Church. They
believed that the narrow limits of actual knowledge in the
sphere of religion made it necessary that mutual toleration
be practised apart from a very few fundamental doctrines,
so that a wide latitude of belief might be possible within
the confines of one comprehensive Church. Liberal Puritans
had also pled the cause of toleration, but the basis of
their polemic differed from that of the Latitudinarians.
1. Fraser, LOC, 90,91«
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Men like Goodwin and Owen were zealous for orthodoxy. They
disliked comprehension because they felt that it compromised
true doctrine. Yet for those who had genuine differences of
opinion as to just what constituted the orthodox position,
they sought a mutual toleration. Each sect, they believed,
should have the right .to its own doctrine without interferece.
Both the Anglicans and the Puritans united in their protest
against civil interference with those who did not or could
not accept the form of Christian faith officially approved
by the state.
One of Locke's very early decisions concerned his church
relationship. He had been reared a Puritan, but eventually
took his place with the liberal Anglicans, the Latitudinarians,
who advocated a broad comprehension within one Church. He
accepted their belief that each individual should have juris¬
diction over his own beliefs beyond a very simple formulation
of the fundamental doctrines of faith. Throughout his life
Locke purposely refrained from attaching himself exclusively
to any one ecclesiastical communion. He did not wish to be
bound by the total doctrine of any one church. He numbered
among his friends men of many beliefs and opinions. Perhaps
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the greatest single theological influence in his life was
his friendship with Limborch, the Remonstrant professor of
theology, whose acquaintance he had made in Holland, and with
whom, for the remainder of his life, he corresponded on
matters of theological importance. Locke knew Puritans, Ang¬
licans, Quakers, Unitarians, Dissenters, Roman Catholics and
Jews. To one of his broad sympathy and ready understanding
persecution was abhorent. Further, Locke's keen mind saw
that greed for power was the underlying motive for religious
persecution in many cases, and he was anxious to expose the
"V
flase pretence of much that had paraded under the banner of
religious conviction. Too, often, he noticed, belief was made
orthodox because it was the whim of the reigning sovereign.
He found that the church was "for the most part more apt to
be influenced by the court, than the court by the church.
How the church was under the vicissitude of
orthodox and arian emperors is very well known.
Or if those things be too remote, our modern
English history affords us fresher examples, in
the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and
Elisabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy
changed their decrees, their articles of faith, .
their form of worship, everythihg, according to
the inclination of those kings and queens.1^
By Locke's time, the people of England were tired of
1. Works, 6, 27•
2. Works, 6. 27«
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religious persecution. They had seen that the Dutch had
"benefitted "both spiritually and nationally "by their policy
of toleration. It had "become apparent to the keener thinkers
of this period that religious toleration was not only a
necessity for the spiritual health of the individual, but
that its achievment would also bring national unity and
strength. Locke approached the problem both as a believing
Christian and a loyal Englishman. His discussion on toler¬
ation is consequently both religious and political.
/
As early as 1660, according to Fox-Bourne's re/ckoning,
we have a fragment from Locke's pen which indicates his
early interest in toleration. The piece is entitled "Reflec¬
tions on the Roman Commonwealth." Locke found that the
religious system begun by Romulus and completed by Numa was
the "wisest and most politic system of religion that ever
any lawgiver founded.""*" Numa showed his wisdom in that he did
not require "the belief in many articles of faith", and Locke
observes that "if schisms and heresies ?;ere traced to their
original causes, it would be found that they have sprung
chiefly from the multiplying articles of faith, and narrowing
the bottom of religion by clogging it with creeds and
1. Fox-Bourne, Life, 1. 149
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catechisms and endless niceties about the essences, prop¬
erties, and attributes of God»""*" Numa was able to narrow
down the essentials of faith to two articles, which all men
could agree. "First, that the Gods were the authors of all
good to mankind, and the second, that to merit this good
the Gods were to be wonshipped, in which worship the chief
end of all was to be innocent, good and just."2 In Nurna's
system, Locke found the generous principle of toleration.
This was the result of vesting the management of the nation¬
al religion with the senate and the people. It prevented
tyranny at the hands of the priests. Locke applauded the
restrictions imposed upon those who presided at the worship
of the gods. It prevented priestcraft from developing, for
Locke observed that "priestcraft and tyranny go hand in
hand."3 It is interesting to note that here we have some of
the principal roots of Locke's mature thought on toleration.
We see already his emphasis that the essential articles of
faith should be few, that worship in its best sense is
primarily moral, and that whatever defection there has been
in religion has come through priestcraft.




Perhaps the next of Locke's writings is a treatise in
answer to the question, "Whether the civil magistrate may
lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things
in Religious Worship?" Locke answered this in the affirm¬
ative, hut it must he remembered that his reply came at the
time of the Restoration under Charles II. In the anticipa¬
tion that the Restoration would put an end to the eccles¬
iastical anarchy which had prevailed for some time, Locke,
along with many others, indulged himself in hopes which
were never realized. Writing out of his experience of the
conditions previous to the Restoration he found that " a
general freedom is hut a general bondage"'1", and hoped that
the quarrels of the various church parties would he settled
in the authority which would he imposed with the return of
the king. If, however, there had been ecclesiastical anarchy
before the Restoration, its place was taken by a new form
of tyranny. It was against this tyranny that Locke hence¬
forth directed his efforts.
There is a long entry in Locke's Common-place Book
called "Sacredos" from which we have previously quoted. Fox-
1. King, LLJL, 8.
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Bourne thinks that this undated paper was written "before
1667* In this paper Locke returned to the point of view which
he had taken in the "reflections on the Roman Commonwealth."
He could not see, he tells us, how the magistrate "hath any
pov/er to order and direct matters indifferent in the circum¬
stance of worship."^ From this position Locke never again
deviated. Here again we find a strong polemic against the
priesthood, but this time Locke makes his charge specific
and directs it against the Christian priests. He finds no
sanction for a Christian priesthood. Their presence is but
an indication that "antichrist has sown those tares in the
A
Church." He describes how the priesthood began.
The clergy, by degrees as Christianity spread,
affecting dominion, laid claim to a priesthood,
derived by succession from Christ, and so indep¬
endent from civil power, receiving (as they
pretend) by the imposition of hands, and some
other ceremonies agreed on (but variously) by
the priesthoods of the several factions, an
indelible character, particular sanctity, and
a power immediately from Heaven to do several
things that are not lawful to be done by other
men. The chief whereof are - 1st, To teach
opinions concerning God, a future state, and
ways of worship. 2nd, To do and perform them¬
selves certain rites exclusive of others. 3rd,
To punish dissenters from their doctrines and
rules. Whereas it is evident from Scriptures,
1. King, LLJL, 289.
2. King, LLJL, 289.
3. King, LLJL, 289.
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that all priesthood terminated in the Great
High Priest, Jesus Christ, who was the last
Priest.1
Thus it was, says Locke, that the Christian clergy attempted
to secure for themselves the power of the office that
belonged to the priests among the Jews.
Locke's analysis of the way in which religious persecu¬
tion and religious wars arise is notable.
The magistrate, being persuaded it is his duty
to punish those the clergy please to call heretics,
schismatics, or fanatics, or else taught to appre¬
hend danger from dissention in religion, thinks it
his interest to suppress them - persecutes all
who observe not the same form in the religious
worship which is set up in his country. The people,
on the other side, finding the mischiefs that fall
on them from worshipping God according to their
own persuasions, enter into confederacies and com¬
binations to secure themselves as well as they can;
so that the oppression and vexation on the one
side, self-defense and desire for religious liberty
on the other, create dislikes, jealosies, appre¬
hensions, and factions, which seldom fail to
break out into downright persecution, or open war.
In the "Sacerdos" we have a hint of an idea which was
to stand out in Locke's mature religious thinking. In this
treatise he not only repeats his contention that the desire
for power is the basis for a tyrannical priestcraft in the
1. King, LLJL, 289
2. King, LLJL, 290
Christian as well as the pagan church, but that the priest¬
ly accretions have obscured the original, pure, religion of
Christ. Later Locke was to say this more positively. He
was to say that one must return to the original and simple
gospel in order to get to the heart of Christianity. Here
we have the negative idea that was to alater develop into a
positive trend of thought.
In 1667 Locke wrote but did not publish "An Essay con¬
cerning Toleration." The years between the writing of this
essay and the Restoration had been rife with religious con¬
flict and persecution. The Act of Uniformity of 1662, the
Conventicle Act of 1664, and the Five-mile Act of I665 had
brought severe hardship upon the Dissenters. Locke himself
suffered under the new order. He was not a Dissenter, but
when he applied for the degree of Doctor of Medicine at
Oxford, after completing the usual course, it was not granted,
presumably because the High Church Party was then in power,
and Locke, not being an adherent to their principles, thus
lost his degree. We may, however, acquit Locke of any exclu¬
sively personal motive in writing his essay. Toleration was
a subject much discussed, and as we have seen, he had already
given much attention to it. It may be true that the personal
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rebuff serve to urge him to find a solution to the much-
mooted problem. His desire to reach the truth of the matter,
together with his broad sympathies, prevented his making any
one-sided conclusion. Perhaps that is why this early essay
is almost identical with the more famous Epistola which he
was to publish in 1685, the latter being but an enlargement
of the essential arguments in the earlier work.
We have seen and outlined in our foregoing discussion
something of the history of Locke's interest in toleration.
We have been able to look behind the scenes into some of
his unpublished writings on the subject which show the
sequence of his ideas and how much they reflect both the
man and his time. It is our purpose now to examine, as
systematically as possible, what might be called Locke's
Doctrine of the Church. We will attempt to determine in
what he considered the character of the church to consist,
and what the attitude of its members should be to those who
are outside its fold.
From what we have already learned of Locke's religious
ideas we are not led to expect that he attached great import¬
ance to the place of the church. He believed with Chilling-
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worth that the Bible alone is the whole religion of Protest¬
ants and that reason alone ensures the validity of revela¬
tion. According to Locke's theology man stands as an
independent moral being before God, his Creator, and is
alone personally accountable to Him in the matter of salvation.
Man is justified by his faith in Christ as Messiah. Locke
appears to have honestly believed that the church had more
often been a hindrance than a help in man's relationship
to God.
Locke disagreed with the Romanists that it was upon
Peter that the Christian Church had been founded. He believed
that it was founded upon Christ alone. "Our Saviour has
promised that he will build his church on this fundamental
truth, that he is 'Christ the son of God; so that the gates
of hell shall not prevail against it!"1 In another place
he says, "I do not remember that our Saviour any-where
promises any other assistance but that of his Spirit; or
gives his little flock any encouragement to expect much
countenance or help from the great men of this world;.....
'not many wise men, after the flesh, not many mighty, not
many noble,' I Cor. i. 26, is the style of the Gospel."^
1. Works, 6. 484.
2. Works, 6. 485»
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In his Common-place Book, Locke addresses himself to a
discussion of the church. It may be pointed out in passing
that Locke's idea is Puritan, in that it divides the full
life of man between the church on the one hand, and the
state on the other. "There is a twofold society, of which
all men in the world are members, and that from the twofold
concernment they have to attain happiness: viz, that of
this world and that of the other: and hence there arises
these two following societies, viz. religious and civil."'*"
It will be noticed that Locke often uses the words religious
society in place of the word church. The very fact that he
uses the terms interchangably indicates his attitude towards
the church.
In the Epistola, Locke gives us his definition of the
church. "Let us now consider what a church is. A church
then I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining them¬
selves together of their own accord, in order to the public
worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable
to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls."2 In
a paper written in Holland, and dates 1673-4, Locke drew up
1. King, LLJL, 300.
2. Works, 6. 13»
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rules for his ideal religious society. It is entitled
"Pacific Christians", and the rules are quote in full as
follows:
1. We think nothing to he known or believed for
salvation, but what God hath revealed.
2. We therefore embrace all those who, in sincerity,
receive the V/ord of Truth revealed in ohe Scripture,
ana obey the light which enlightens every man that
comes into this world.
3. 'We judge no man in meats, or drinks, or habits,
or days, or any other outward observances, but leave
every one to his freedom in the use of those outward
things which he thinks can most contribute to build
up the inward man in righteousness, holiness, and the
true love of God, and his neighbor, in Christ Jesus.
4. If any one find any doctrinal parts of Scripture
difficult to be understood, we recommend him, -1st,
The study of the Scriptures in humility and singleness
of heart; 2nd, Prayer to the Father of lights to en¬
lighten him; 3rd, Obedience to what is already revealed
to him, remembering that the practice of what we do
know is the surest way to more knowledge; our infallible
guide having told us, If any man will do the will of
Him that sent me, he shall know of the doctrine, John
vii, 17. 4th, We leave him to the advice and assistance
of those who he thinks best able to instruct him. No
man or society of men, having any authority to impose
their opinion or interpretations on any other, the
meanest Christian. Since, in matters of religion, every
man must know, and believe, and give an"account for
himself.
5. We hold it to be an indespensable duty for all
Christians to maintain love and charity in the diversity
of contrary opinions: by which charity we do not mean an
empty sound, but an effectual forbearance and good-will,
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carrying men to a communion, friendship, and mutual
assistance one to another, in outward as .well as
spiritual things; and hy debarring all magistrates
from the making use of their authority, much less
their sword (which was put into their hands only
against evil-doers), in matters of faith and
worship.
6. Since the Christian religion we profess is not
a notional science, to furnish speculation to the
brain, or discourse to the tongue, but a rule of
righteousness to influence odr lives, Christ having
given himself to redeem us from all iniquity, and
purify unto himself a people zealous of good works,
we profess the only business of our public assemblies
to be to exhort thereunto, laying aside all controv¬
ersy and speculative questions, instruct and encour¬
age one another in the duties of a good life, which
is acknowledged to be the great business of true
religion, and to pray God for the assistance of his
Spirit for the enlightening our understanding and
subduing our corruptions, that so we may return unto
him a reasonable and acceptable service, and show our
faith by our works, proposing ourselves and others
the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, as
the great pattern for our imitation.
7. One alone being our Master, even Christ, we acknow¬
ledge no masters of our assembly; but, if any man in
the spirit, of love, peace and meekness, has a word of
exhortation, we hear him.
8. Nothing being so oppressive, or having proved so
fatal to unity, love and charity, the first great
characteristical duties of Christianity, as men's
fondness of their own opinions, and their endeavours to
set them up, and have them followed, instead of the
Gospel of peace; to prevent these seeds of dissension
and division, and maintain unity in the difference of
opinions which we know cannot be avoided - if any one
appear contentious, abounding in his own sense rather
than in love, and desirous to draw followers after him¬
self, with destruction or opposition to others, we
* Titus, ii. 14 (This is Locke's footnote)
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judge him not to have learned Christ as he ought, and
therefore not fit to he a teacher of others»
9» Decency and order in our assemblies being directed,
as they ought, to edification, can need but very few
and plain rules. Time and place of meeting being settled,
if anything else needs regulation, the assembly itself,
or four of the ancientest, soberest, and discreetest of
the brethern, chosen for the occasion, shall regulate it.
10. From every brother that, after admonition, walk-
eth disorderly, we withdraw ourselves.
11. We each of us think it our duty to propagate the
doctrine g,nd practice of universal good-will and
obedience in all places, and on all occasions, as God
shall give us opportunity.!
This is a remarkable document. It contains most of Locke's
ideas on the church, and much though its content reflects
his own ideas, it appears to have been strongly influenced
by the Quakers.
Several features of Locke's idea of the church stand
out, and we shall make special note of them, drawing our
material both from the passage above and from other pertin¬
ent sections of his writings. Locke insists upon the volun¬
tary character of man's relationship with the church. "Nobody
is born a member of any church"2, Locke says, in the sense
that he is born a member of civil society. One may choose
1. King, LLJL, 276 - 278.
2. Works, 6. 13 •
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what church oris desires, and shall suffer no interference
from any other person as to what this choice shall "be. "it
is part of my liberty as a Christian and as a man to choose
of what Church or religious sc|oiety I will he of, as most
conducing to the salvation of my soul, of which I alone can
judge. The individualism marked in the last phrase of this
statement shows how thoroughly the idea is embedded in
Locke's whol£philosophy.
Since man's hope of salvation can be the only reason
for his affiliation with any religious society, so Locke
.i
says that it can be the only reason why he should continue
his membership in it. "For if afterwards he discover any¬
thing either erroneous in the doctrine, or incongruous in
the worship of that society to which he has joined himself,
why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to
enter? No member of a religious society can be tied with any
other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation
of eternal life. A church then is. a society of members
voluntarily uniting to this end."^
The church is voluntary. But "no church or company, I
1. King, LLJL, 356.
2. Works, 6. 13»
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say, can In the least subsist and hold together, hut will
presently dissolve, and break to pieces, unless it be reg¬
ulated by some laws, and the members all consent to observe
some order.The making and maintaining of these laws is
vested in the society as a whole. They may choose someone to
guide their deliberations, but there shall be no priests.
Locke speaks definitely against apostolic succession in this
connection. To say that "no society can be a true church,
/
unless is have in it a bishop, or presbyter, with ruling
authority derived from the very apostles and continued down
to the present time by an uninterrupted succession"2 is
folly. Christ's own promise, Locke maintained, was far more
simple and explicit, and implied a denial of such a view.
"Wheresoever two or three are gathered together in his name,
he will be in the midst of them" is the passage which Locke
cites from Matthew 18 : 20 for his proof.
If one is really solicitip,us about the true church,
Locke points out the basis of true communion with it, which
is an acceptance "in such things and such things only, as
the Holy Spirit has in Holy Scriptures declared in express
words, to be necessary to salvation."-' The church has no
1. Works, 6. 14.
2. Works, 6. 14.
3. Works, 6. 15»
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right to initiate doctrine, for it comes alone through the
Holy Spirit in the Scriptures. Nor has it a right to inter¬
pret doctrine, for that each man must do for himself.
It may he asked then, what is the purpose of the church,
and what are its powers? Having stated that the chief end
of a religious society is to attain happiness in another
world, Locke, in one of his "Miscellaneous Papers" gives a
more explicit account of what he thinks to he the purpose
of the church. The condition of communion with any church,
he holds, is the promise to ohey the laws of the society.
The proper matter of the laws of this society,
are all things tending to the attainment of future
hliss, which are of three sorts: 1. Gredenda, or
matters of faith and opinion, which terminate in
the understanding. 2. Gultus religiosus, which
contains in it both the ways of expressing our
honour and adoration of the Diety, and of address
to him for the obtaining of any good from him.
3. Moralia, or the right management of our actions
in respect to ourselves and others.1
The proper matters of the society are spiritual. The only
"arms by which the members of this society are to be kept
within their duty, are admonitions, exhortations and advice"2
"From every brother that, after admonition, walketh
1. King, LLJL, 301.
2. Works, 6. 16.
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disorderly, we withdraw ourselves."1 "This is the last and
utmost force of ecclesiastical authority."^
Since membership in a religious society is voluntary, a
man may, if he so chooses, affiliate himself with no church
at all. If, however, he does decide to join the membership
of some communion (and Locke assumes that every thinking
man will do so), it is not wholly an indifferent matter as
to which he will join. Locke makes the tacit assumption
that all Protestant churches differed only in matters of
small moment, and that all accepted what he considered to
be the fundamentals in doctrine necessary to salvation. On
such a basis, it would make little difference which church
one joins. But Locke does not allow this inference to be
made. It does make a difference to which church one belongs,
because in every church truth is to be found mixed with
error, and every reasonable person has the intellectual
obligation to choose the communion with the greatest truth
in its doctrine. Each person must make his own choice in
this matter.
We have seen that Locke asserts that the function of
the church is to direct man towards salvation, and that
1. King, LLJL, 277»
2. Works, 6. 16.
- 213 -
there are three areas in which the church must concern
itself, i,.<3., Oredenda, Cultus rellgiosus and Moralia. We
will consider these separately and in detail.
From what we know of Locke's religious opinions we would
expect that he would demand that church doctrine should "be
very simple and "lay level with the commonest understanding."
Ke divided Christian doctrine into two sorts, those which
are essential to salvation, and those which are not necessary
hut useful. As we have seen, the church does not originate
doctrine, hut its members seek to understand what they find
in Holy Scripture, the most important task of which is to
separate the necessary from the unnecessary beliefs. When
a church thinks that it has found a doctrine that is true,
that doctrine is to he given the widest possible hearing.
Its truth must he proclaimed far and wide. But, Locke
cautions, no church, even when its members are convinced of
the truth of its doctrine, has the right to claim infall¬
ibility.
It would appear that the position of the unnecessary
but useful doctrines in Locke's classification is anomolous.
'He says that these doctrines must be studied, systematized
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and harmonized with other doctrine. But their value is not
clear. The reason for their introduction becomes apparent
when Locke presses the point that failing to distinguish
between necessary and unnecessary doctrine has been the
parent of all heresy and schism. "Heresy," he says, "is a
separation made in the ecclesiastical communion between men
of the same religion, for some opinion contained in the
rule itself Amongst those who acknowledge nothing but
Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith, heresy is a
separation made in the Christian communion for opinions not
contained in the express words of Scripture.This is a
hard blow at much church doctrine, but Locke was willing to
accept as necessary doctrine only that which is expressly
contained in Scripture. It is this fact which undoubtedly
influenced what appears to be his rejection of the Doctrine
of the Trinity, for he could find no reference to it in
Holy Writ.
We have anticipated Locke's answer to the question con¬
cerning the question as to what are the necessary doctrines
in Christian faith on which man's redemption depends. Locke's,
conception of the great simplicity of the Gospel is apparent
Works, 6. 55, 56.
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here. Anything intricate in a system of divinity, with "too
nice divisions", he believed was prima facie evidence ag¬
ainst its truth.
While all Scripture was accepted as verbally inspired,
and equally true, Locke looked for his essential doctrine
in the Gospels and the Acts. He disregarded the Epistles
because he found that they were written for specific sit¬
uations which had arisen in the churches, and so do not
contain doctrine that iS universal. Further, they were
written in a difficult style, ana a±i men couxa not easily
understand them. Finally, they were written as instructions
to those who were already in the faith, and could not be
regarded as articles the believing of which constituted a
man a Christian.
I do not deny, but the great doctrines of the
Christian faith are dropt here and there, and
scattered up and down in most of them. But it
is not in the epistles we are to learn what are
the fundamental articles of faith.4
It was in the Gospels and the Acts that Locke found a
single fundamental doctrine, the acceptance of which differ¬
entiated a Christian from an unbeliever. This doctrine Locke
!. Works, 7« 154.
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considered to have "been his own personal discovery. In the
preface to the Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of
Christianity he says of it,
The first view I had of it seemed mightily to
satisfy my mind, in the reasonableness and plain¬
ness of this doctrine; but yet the general silence
I had in my little reading met with, concerning any
such thing, awed me with the apprehension of sing¬
ularity; until going on in the gospel-history, the
whole tenour of it made it so clear and visible,
that I more wondered that every body did not see
and embrace it; than I should assent to what was so
plainly laid down, and so frequently inculcated in
holy writ, though systems of divinity said nothing
of it.l
This was the one, grand, fundamental doctrine which Locke
discovered that was required in express words in the Gospel.
"Jesus is the Messiah." "This was the proposition that was
then controverted, concerning Jesus of Nazareth, 'Whether
he was the Messiah or no?' And the assent to that was that
which distinguished believers from unbelievers."2 This
alone Locke considered to be the one necessary and cardinal
tenet of Christian doctrine. Other doctr&ines might be
useful, but belief in them did not effect the matter of
salvation. In the last chapter it has been shown how this
doctrine is the keystone of Locke's scheme of redemption
1. Works, 7* 187*
2. Works, 7• 17•
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and its consideration need no longer detain us here. So
much, then, for credenda.
Locke accepted the two sacraments of Baptism and the
Lord's Supper. We have seen that he "believed that no one
was br|on into the church, and consonant with that fact, we
may infer that baptism was regarded "by him as a kind of
initiatory rite. In this view he inclines towards the
Zwinglian position. In his Commentary, Locke writes of
"baptism as the "initiatory ceremony of the Christian Church.
Again, commenting on Romans 6: 1, he says that Paul explained
to his converts that "by "the very initiatory ceremony of
baptism, wherein they were typically buried with Christ....
they, as he did, ought to die to sin; and as he rose
to live in God, they should rise to a new life of obedience
to God.It is evident that Locke considered baptism to be
the first formal step in redemption, a profession of faith,
which brought a person into communion with Christ and His
church.
Locke's position regarding the Lord's Supper is also
Zwinglian. In the Commentary he describes the origin of the
1. Works, 8. 142.
2. Works, 8. 332.
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sacrament.
Two of these ceremonies [of the Jew's Passover]
were eating of tread solemnly broken, and drinking
a cup of wine, called the cup of blessing. These
two our Saviour transferred into the Christian
church, to be used in their assemblies, for a
commemoration of his death and sufferings.1
There is no indication but that Locke thought the bread and
wine as anything but symbolic of Christ's suffering and
death. In commenting on I Corinthians 10 : 4, Locke says
that spiritual meat and drink, "all which were typical rep¬
resentations of Christ, as well as the bread and wine, which
we eat and drink in the Lord's Supper, are typical represent¬
ations of him."2 In the sixteenth verse of the same chapter
we find, "They, who drink the cup of blessing, which we
bless in the Lord's supper, do they not hereby partake of
the benefits, purchased by Christ's blood, shed for them on
the cross, which they here symbolically drink? And they,
who eat of the bread broken there, do they not partake of
the sacrifice of the body of Christ, and profess to be
members of him?"^ The sacrament of the Lord's Supper Locke
understood as a symbolical memorial to the blood and body
1. Works, 8. 156.
2. Works, 8. 143.
3* Works, 8. 145.
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of Christ.
The ceremonies and rites of the church, other than the
sacraments, Locke divides into two groups. There are those,
in the first place, which come to us directly from Scripture,
instituted "by Christ and the apostles. Secondly, there are
those in respect to which, in lieu of any gospel prescrip¬
tion, the injunction of St. Paul is to he followed:"that
everything he done decently and in order." Whenever Locke
speaks of .ceremonies and rites he usually does so in a
disparaging tone, for he always has in the hack of his mind
the notion that ceremonies are hut priestly accretions
engrafted upon the pure and simple gospel. One of the great
practical advantages of Christ's advent was his inaugura¬
tion of a simple and inward worship of God. Before the
Incarnation, "stately buildings, costly ornaments, peculiar
and uncouth hahits, and a numerous huddle of pompous, fan¬
tastical, cumbersome ceremonies, every-where attended
divine worship. This, as it had a peculiar name, so it was
thought the principal part if not the whole part of religion'.'"1-
Christ showed the useless character of this kind of worship,
and that "to he worshipped in spirit and in truth, with
1. Works, 7 • 14-7.
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application of mind and sincerity of heart, was what God
henceforth required." "Praises and prayer, humbly offered
up to the Deity, were the worship now demanded; and in these
every one was to look after his own heart, and to know that
it was that alone which God had regard to, and accepted.
Since the time of Christ, the priests had obscured true
Christian worship. It was necessary to return to the simple
spiritual worship of God which Christ required. Thus we see
that Locke not only tended to narrow doctrine, but that he
also sought to limit and transform the cultus rellgiosus
according to Christ's own pattern.
If Locke's teaching minimized doctrine and the forms of
worship, it everywhere emphasized the importance of moralia.
His most pointed criticism is based on his belief that it
does violence to righteousness. "Lustrations and processions
were much easier than a clean conscience, and a steady course
of virtue; and an expatory sacrifice that atoned for the y/ant
of it, was much moreeeonvenient than a strict and holy life'P
Everywhere in his writings, Locke is explicit in his conten¬
tion that righteousness is the most important element in the
1. Works, 7» 148.
2. Works, 7« 148.
3. Works, 7. 139.
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Christian life. He refers to it again and again. "The Christ¬
ian religion we profess is not a notional science, to furnish
speculation to the hrain or discourse to the tongue, "but a
rule of righteousness to influence our lives. "•*■ When Locke
was urged by Molyneaux to develop a system of ethics accord¬
ing to the mathematical method, he replied that he did not
have the time to do it, but that, in any case, the matter
was not urgent since a perfect system of ethics was to be
found in the New Testament. The virtue taught in the New
Testament was implemented by the hope and fear of future
reward or punishment in the world to come. Locke emphasizes
that G-od requires a determined obedience to His will. While
Locke ultimately rests salvation of mankind in the grace of
G-od, he insists that obedience to the Christian moralia is
the essential evidence that one believes.
We have now seen what Locke conceived to be the nature
and purpose of the church and it remains for us to examine
his view of the relation between church and civil authority.
Locke declares his position thoroughly in the Epistola. the
chief arguments of which it is now our purpose to consider.
Locke begins his discussion with the assertion that the
1. King, LLJL, 277
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chief mark of the church is toleration. He spends some time
in exposing the hypocrisy of those who persecute in the
name of religion. He then passes to a consideration of the
authority of the state.
The commonwealth seems to me to he a society of
men constituted only for the procuring, preserving
and advancing their own civil interests. Civil
interest I call life, liberty, health and indol-
ency of body; and the possession of outward things,
such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the
like.l
It is the duty of the magistrate to see that his people are
secured to the "just possession of these things belonging
to this life."2 His jurisdiction "reaches only to these
civil concernments,and cannot "be extended to the sal¬
vation of souls.Two reasons for this are given. First,
the care of souls is not committed by God to the care of the
magistrates or to any human being other than oneself. Each
man alone is responsible for his own soul and he can deputise
its control to no one in the matter of salvation. Faith
cannot be prescribed according to the will of the magistrate,
but can be built only on " an inward and full persuasion of
1. Works, 6. 10.
2. Works, 6. 10.
3. Works, 6. 10.
4. Works, 6. 10.
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the mind."-*- Secondly, outward force can do good, for "such
is the nature of the understanding that it cannot "be com¬
pelled to the "belief of anything "by outward force."2 Gould
one's mind "be changed at will by the power of the magistrate,
salvation would be dependent not upon the light of reason
and purity of life, but on the fashion of the ruling powers
in the country into which one has been born.
The religious and civil societies are distinct. Each has
its rights, on which the other cannot intrude. A church has
the exclusive right to remove from its membership anyone
who has failed to obey its rules. Differences in opinion
should not prejudice one's civil affairs. No church, even
with the approval of the magistrate, has any right to inter¬
fere with the concerns of other churches. If a man fails to
take proper care of his own soul, this is no business of the
state. Each person will have to answer to G-od on the last
day for his own actions. Anything to do with salvation is
outside the jurisdiction of the civil authority.
*
But, says Locke, some will argue that while the authority
in religious matters does not originally belong to the magis-
1. Works, 6. 11.
2. Works, 6. 11.
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trate, it raay be delegated to him by an infallible church.
Locke stumbles at this suggestion. "Of what church I beseech
you?"1 The magistrate will favour the church "which certainly
likes him best."^ "V/hat difference is there vfnether he lead
me himself or deliver me over to be led by others .If
the religion of any church became, therefore.;true and saving,
because the head of the sect, the prelates and the priests,
and those of the tribe, do all of them with all their might,
extol and praise it; what religion can ever be accounted
erroneous, false and destructive."-^
The, magistrate lacks the power to prescribe rites and
ceremonies either in his own church or in any other church.
He does not have the right to forbid such rites and ceremonies
in any church so long as they do not affect morals and the
public peace. "Whatever is lawful in the commonwealth cannot
be prohibited by the magistrate in the church. Whatever is
permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use,
neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of
people for their religious use.'"4" Even such a practice as
idolatry must be tolerated. Should a magistrate forbid it,
1. Works, 6. 26.
2. Works. 6. 27.
3. Works, 6. 27«
4. Works, 6. 37*
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such power, once claimed and exercised by him, could be used,
should he desire it, for the supression of orthodoxy. This
would subordinate religious to civil authority.
Just as the magistrate has no right to interfere with
worship in the church, so he has no right to interfere with
the articles of faith. Locke considers speculative and pract¬
ical articles separately. What one believes is only for one's
own understanding. Should the magistrate seek to regulate the
speculative articles of faith, he could do no more than
encourage hypocrisy. Locke has bitter sarcasm for civil
intrusion in this instance. "A sweet religion, indeed, that
obliges men to dissemble, and tell lies both to G-od and to
man for the salvation of their souls.Locke's polemic in
this natter, as in others, is to assert the autonomy of
religious belief when such belief does not jeopardize the
safety and security of the state.
Practical articles of faith concern conduct, and since
morals lie within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, Locke
urges great care in distinguishing between civil and religious
authority in this sphere. One must watch that the state does
(
not attempt to infringe on the rights of the church. In this
1. Works, 6. 40.
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be remembered, he says, that the chief purpose of the church
is to assist man to attain happiness in the other v/orld, and
the business of the state is to protect persons and their
goods in this world. If one makes this fundamental distinc¬
tion, no conflict becomes too difficult to solve. Thus, when
a, man has erroneous opinions which do not interfere with the
civil rights of his fellow men, he is to be tolerated. Locke
makes the statement that one man's perdition is of no pre¬
judice to another man's affairs. One may not be content to see
such a man persist in wrong opinion, but the only instruments
to be used for his correction are "kind exhortations and
affectionate remonstrances."
Locke then raises a difficult question for one who divided,
as he did, the total life of man between church and state.
"What is the magistrate should enjoin anything by his author¬
ity, "that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private
person?" Locke thought that such an instance would be exceed¬
ingly rare, but he replied that should such a conflict arise,
a man was always to obey G-od first. He was to break the law
of the magistrate and accept the penalty in punishment for
the sake of conscience. Should it happen that the conflict
was a clear example of a magistrate attempting to exercise
227 -
control "beyond the recognized sphere of his authority in
religious matters, Locke enjoined men to resist the encroach¬
ment.
There are, Locke recognized, instances when a church
sought to exceed its authority and interfere in matters which
were contrary to the morality allowed within the state,"and
dangerous to the public peace. He instances the fact of child
sacrifice, which, he says, if prescribed as a religious rite
of the church, should be forbidden by the magistrate because
it interferes with civil rights. Again, Locke gives examples
of the practice of certain ecclesiastics, who maintained
that "faith need not be kept with heretics" and "kings excom¬
municated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms."-1- Such persons,
who seek special privileges for themselves in civil concern¬
ments on the pretence of religion, are not to be trusted,
Locke observes. They are hypocrites.
There are two classes of persons who are not to be tol¬
erated. "That church can have no right to be tolerated by the
magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that
all those who enter into it, do thereby ipso facto deliver
themselves up to the protection and service of another
1. Works, 6. 45, 46.
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prince."1 Locke takes for his example the Mohametans, hut it 4
/I
quite clear that it is the Roman Catholics whom he has pri¬
marily in mind. The state can tolerate such a church only at
great danger to itself. The true ground for suppression is
then not religious hut civil.
Htheists also ar& not to he tolerated. For, "promises,
covenants and oaths, which are the "bonds of human society,
can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of G-od
hut even in thought, dissolves all."* Suppression in this, as
in the last instance, is, however, not upon religious but on
civil grounds, since v/ithout a belief in G-od to give them a
proper basis for morality, such men are liable to do violence
to their fellow-men. This seems strange to our thinking today,
but it is important to remember that in Locke's time, atheism
was a term used to denote those of profligate character.
There are four principle arguments behind Locke's plea
for toleration. In the first place, Locke claimed that intol¬
erance and persecution were but tools of those who sought for
power in the name of religion. This was sheer hypocrisy, for
true religion could be propagated only by means of charity.
1. Works, 6. 46.
2. Works, 6. 47.
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Secondly, since the church was a voluntary society of men,
it had no power to use force, since force is no part of its
right. Should it happen that in a given church a member fail¬
ed to obey the rules of that body, the utmost extent of the
church's right was to excommunicate him. Thirdly, the narrow
limits of man's knowledge about life and destiny made intol¬
erance unjustifiable. It was possible that there might be
genuine disagreement about matters of belief and forms of
"worship, and history had vouched instances when the persecut¬
ed had been nearer the truth than the persecutors. It will
be still time enough to persecute, Locke maintained, when the
truth is fully known. Fraser says of this argument. "A deep
and abiding conviction of the narrow limits of man's under¬
standing in the sphere of religion was at the bottom of Locke's
argument."''" lastly, even if truth were known completely, per¬
secution is a poor tool for conversion; it fails, in fact to
achieve its true end. Force, it is true, may bring about out-
*
ward conformity, but it can never create an inward conviction,
which alone is necessary to salvation. Charitable exhortation
and example are the effective instruments of a church sincerely
engaged in its own task. Intolerant persecution is both wrong
and fruitless.
1. Fraser, LOC, 92, 93»
CONCHJSION
We have now completed our investigation of the important
points in the theology of John Locke. The material for our
study has been of a somewhat fragmentary character. There
are many omissions in Locke's religious opinions; many
important points in Christian theology are either not treated
at all or are mere touched upon. Much of Locke's specifical¬
ly theological writing lacks real substance. Often there are
painstaking arguments and many repetitions to confirm a
single point. The Reasonableness of Christianity could be
contracted into one-fifth of its bulk by a skilful scholar
and lose nothing in its content thereby; indeed it would
gain. As a result of this paucity of substantial material
in Locke's specifically religious writings, we have had to
search for hints to his theological opinions dropped here
and there throughout his entire writings. We have found
many valuable suggestions in his works on philosophy, educa¬
tion and politics, and in his more informal writings and
letters.
Two important points must be borne in mind in the
interpretation of Locke's theology. First, his interest
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Is always primarily practical. As he said, the Christian
religion was not a source of speculation to talk about,but
a rule of righteousness to guide one's life in its pract¬
ical adjustment. Second, Locke's method of writing, even in
O 1
, as important a work as the Essay.is casual, put down as his
j
mind turned to the subjects he wrote upon.
Despite the paucity of material and the fragmentary
character of its content, Locke's theology is not as inco¬
herent as it may appear to be on first view. It has been
our purpose to present as ordered an account of it as its
unsystematic character will allow. This task, we believe, has
not been unrewarding, for, with all his faults, Locke was
a thinker of the first order, and his genuine interest in
religion has left us with many penetrating insights.
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Locke's
theology is his twofold division of the source of religious
knowledge into reason and revelation. Locke is clear that
reason is the tool of the soul in its sojourn through this
life, and the more reason is used, the happier its user
becomes. Revelation, on the other hand, to use Locke's own
words, is like a telescope, which guided by reason, focuses
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on eternal things, and is concerned chiefly with man's
destiny in another world. Locke Inherited and accepted the
idea that the spheres of reason and revelation were separ¬
ate. Assuming the reality of this distinction between nat¬
ural and revealed religon, he attempted to define the sphere
of each. The division he made was in the nature of a
compromise and did not eventually prove successful. Thinkers
who saw deeply into the significance of Locke's treatment
of this twofold division in the source of religious know¬
ledge could not escape the conclusion that the claims of
revelation were included here, not because of any natural
congruity with the main body of Locke's thinking, but
because it was necessary to satisfy the intellectual demands
of Locke's intensely religious disposition. Consequently,
the rationalists were not satisfied with Locke's formula¬
tion. Nor did the compromise please the theologians, who
saw, in the humble place assigned to revelation and in
Locke's stringent narrowing of doctrine, a threat to the
orthodox position.
As an empiricist, Locke was inclined to look for
evidence of truth among the things of sense. It is for that
reason that he was led to test Divine revelation by miracles.
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Without miracles to vouch the authority of revelation, Locke
dismissed its claim as "enthusiasm"» As has been pointed out,
however, Locke unwittingly undermined his own position by
making testimony the criterion of the validity of miracles.
But the account of these miracles was found only within the
inspired writings themselves. When Hume looked into this
question, he quickly exposed the fallacy of its position,
with the result that the supernatural element in Locke's
theology lost the foundation he gave to it.
On its rational side, Locke's chief contribution to
theology was his "demonstration" of the existence of God and
the formulation of the attributes of His nature. But, as we
have seen, Locke tends in this respect to assume all that he
wishes to prove. The failure of his demonstration is a
commentary upon the fact that the reality of God is not known
by means of a chain of argument, but because that Reality
is ever present with men through His Spirit.
Two questions may be raised in connexion with the
influence of Locke's theology. First, it may be asked, what
is Locke's relation to Deism? It is not our purpose to treat
this question in detail but to give the solution which
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becomes apparent after a detailed study of Locke's theology»
Locke has been called the father of Deism» But this desig¬
nation is scarcely correct, for the Deists, in general,
identified the religious life with the moral, and rejected
its mysterious and supernatural elements. They advocated a
natural religion, the content of which could be known entire¬
ly by the use of reason» We have seen that Locke was sympa¬
thetic to this point of view. He emphasized the importance
of the use of reason in religion, as did, indeed, most of
the theologians of his time. He was anxious to show Christ¬
ianity a reasonable religion» Furthermore, some of the Deists
acknowledged Locke as the source of their inspiration» But,
in our opinion, Locke cannot be called a Deist. It is sig¬
nificant that not once during his lifetime was he referred
to as such. While he subjected revelation to the strictest
tests by reason, he believed that reason could not discover
the full content of religious truth. His references to nat¬
ural religion in some sections of his theological writings
are far from complimentary. He believed that Cod had sent
His Son into the world to lead men to salvation. Ihis know¬
ledge he considered to be beyond reason's power to discover,
but not contrary to it. He was convinced of the truth of
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auch revealed mysteries as the Virgin birth and the Resur¬
rection of Christ. Locke cannot he classed as orthodox, yet,
at the same -time for the reasons we have given neither can
he he accounted a Deist.
None the less, it is not hard to see how the Deists could
/ ' YXS-'t
x fail to derive inspiration from Locke's writings. When the
weakness of his grounding of revealed doctrine on miracles
became apparent, the weight of his influence tended to
support the Deist position. Hence, though Locke may not be
reckoned a Deist, his works must be understood as making a
substantial contribution to its furtherance. f
The second question concerns Locke's relationship to
the notion of a return to the early simplicity of the Gospel.
Can it be said 'that Locke was the author of this sort of
thinking? The idea of the return to the original simplicity
of the Gospel, like that of Deism, had its roots in a pract¬
ical moral protest. Lord Herbert of Cherbury had already
pointed out that pagan cults were the result of priestcraft
and that the early success of Christianity was dependent
upon its simple appeal to the heart. He believed that in
his own time the religion of Jesus had been obscured by
priestly accretions. In this Locke agreed with Lord Herbert,
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but whether he got his idea directly from him is difficult
to determine. Undoubtedly the latter had influenced the
whole climate of opinion which Locke knew. In any case,
Locke very early suspected priestcraft as being responsible
for the unworthy elements in religion. He said that priest¬
craft and tyranny went hand in hand. To prevent this state
of affairs Locke thought the only solution would be to re¬
turn to the simple religion of Jesus. This he conceived to
be an Inward and spiritual worship of Q-od and obedience to
His will. It was his positive solution to the problem of the
immoral elements he found within the organized religpn of
his time. There is a clear argument to be found in Locke's
writings which indicates complete sympathy with a "back to
the simple Gospel" movement. This sort of thought, however,
was so much a part of the time, when men had become tired of
disputes and persecution arising out of conflicts in specu¬
lative theological opinions, that we cannot credit Locke
I
with originating it. But the influential character of his
formulation of this trend of thought is bound to lead to
constant associations of his name with it.
Surprise has often been expressed that Locke's theology,
with its comparative lack of originality, its inconsist¬
encies and negative emphasis, should have exercised such a
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powerful Influence In the two or three generations follow¬
ing his death, not only in England "but in France and America
as well. Two considerations stand out to show why this should
have been so.
In the first place, in his common-sense way, Locke was
a "progressive", who consolidated the advance positions made
by the leading thinkers before and during his time. With
his typical caution, he chose a prudent course, combining
together reason and experience. Now and again he was led to
tinwise compromises. Yet for the most part he stood for slow,
steady and reasonable progress. He was fortunate in the
time in which he lived. He came into a world which was
becoming aware of the great advances which had been made in
many fields in the proceeding era. It was nothing less than
genius that he was able to consolidate these advances within
the scope of his work.
In the second place, the greatness of Locke*s character
must be taken into account. He was blessed with a keen brain
and a great soul, and had other fine qualities of mind and
heart. These qualities, reflected throughout his writings,
earned for him a unique place in the history of thought in
England. He was a servant of truth, almost a slave, eager
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to expand the claims of knowledge in the religious sphere,
yet he never allowed his own enthusiasm to carry him further
than the light of strict reasoning would permit» He was
neither a dogmatist nor a sceptic. The breadth of his inter¬
ests, with its tendency to make his insights superficial,
none the less gave to his thought a comprehensiveness and
a vision that would have otherwise been impossible. He was
able to leave his impress not only on theology, but upon
philosophy, education, medicine, law, and politics, and to
exert considerable influence in the management of the pract¬
ical affairs of his time. He raised common-sense to the
point of genius. And it must be admitted that his arguments
are often more practically helpful than theoretically con¬
vincing. In an age of excitement and prejudice he was able to
help men to think clearly in religious matters. He loosened
the chains of dogma and won for men the right to pursue
truth for its own sake in religion. He made a great contrib¬
ution to the cause of toleration. The stature of his character
(r^ot
could not lead to great Influence in his own time and in
1\
later generations.
In his controversy with Jonas Proast, he was taunted
with "writing for a party." Locke^reply is so typical of j
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his spirit in theological thought that we will conclude
our discussion with it.
But that you may another time he a little
better informed what party I write for, I will
tell you. They are those who in every nation
fear God, work righteousness, and are accepted
with him; and not those who in every nation
are zealous for human constitutions; cry up
nothing so much as outward conformity to the
national religion; and are accepted by those
who are promoters of it. Those that I write
for are those, who, according to the light of
their own consciences, are every-where in
earnest in matters of their own salvation^
A without any desire to impose on others; a
parta so seldom favoured by any of the powers
or sects of this world; a party that has so
few preferments to bestow; so few benefices
to reward the endeavours of any one who appears
for it; that I conclude I shall easily be be¬
lieved when I say, that neither hopes of pre¬
ferment, nor a design to recommend myself to
those I live amongst, has biased my understand¬
ing, or misled me In my undertaking. So much truth
as serves the turn of any particular church, and
can be accomodated to the narrow interest of
some human constitution, is indeed often received
with applause, and the publisher finds his
account for it. But I think I may say, truth,
in its full latitude of thos, generous principles
of the gospel, which so much recommend and in¬
culcate universal charity, and a freedom from
the inventions and impositions of men in the
things of God; has so seldom had a fair and
favourable hearing anywhere, that he must be
very ignorant of the history and nature of man,
however dignified and distinguished, who proposes
to himself any secular advantage by writing for
her at that rate.*
1. Works. 6. 544, 545
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